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ABSTRACT
Television policy has been viewed historically as posing an
irreconcilable conflict between static and dynamic efficiency. Static
efficiency requires that the price for television programming be set at
marginal cost, which in the case of television programming is
essentially zero. Dynamic efficiency dictates that the price be set
high enough to allow the program to generate sufficient revenue to
cover its fixed costs. Truly optimal (i.e., first-best) pricing was
regarded as impossible, with any pricing decision necessarily
reducing to a tradeoff between these two considerations. In this
Article, Professor Yoo combines the insights of public good
economics and monopolistic competition theory to advance a new
approach to the regulation of television that brings these two
seemingly contradictory forces into alignment. He then explores this
framework by using it to evaluate one of the most longstanding and
central commitments of U.S. television policy—the promotion and
preservation of free, local television—which he argues is better
viewed as being comprised of four subcommitments. Application of
this framework reveals that these subcommitments have actually had
the effect of impeding rather than promoting free, local television.
Abandonment of these subcommitments would likely cause the
quantity, quality, and diversity of television programming to
increase. The analysis also shows how attempts to foster free, local
television have induced secondary distortions in markets for other
spectrum-based communications and has slowed the deployment of
new technologies, such as third-generation wireless devices.

INTRODUCTION
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) have long recognized the critical role that television plays
in providing the news, entertainment, and public affairs programming upon
which our society depends.1 In recent years, the industry has undergone a

1

See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (finding that television “continue[s] to be an important source of local news
and public affairs programming . . . critical to an informed electorate”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180, 194 (1997) (recognizing that television “is an important source of information to many Americans
. . . . by tradition and use for decades now it has been an essential part of the national discourse on subjects
across the whole broad spectrum of speech, thought, and expression”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
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fairly radical transformation. It has played a starring role in a number of the
recent megamergers and spinoffs that have buffeted the communications
marketplace.2 Even more important is the emergence of new television
technologies that promise to revolutionize the U.S. media environment. After
years of somnolence, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) systems,3 such as
DirecTV and the Dish Network, have emerged as significant media platforms
offering innovative programming options and greatly increasing the
competitiveness of the overall industry. In addition, broadcasters are in the
process of deploying digital television, with over 563 stations now
operational.4 And looming over the entire industry is the prospect of video-ondemand provided over the Internet. Together these technologies promise to
transform the way that U.S. households receive information, which in turn will
have a dramatic impact on democratic processes and economic efficiency
alike.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the drastic changes in the technological
and business environment surrounding television have yet to effect
corresponding changes in the regulatory approach taken by Congress and the
FCC. Quite the contrary, television policy has continued to adhere to the same
core commitment that has governed the industry since its infancy: the

U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (acknowledging that television “‘is demonstrably a principal source of information and
entertainment for a great part of the Nation’s population’”) (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968)); Review of Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., Report & Order,
14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,912 ¶ 18 (1999) (finding that television is “the primary source of news and entertainment programming for Americans” and “play[s] a leading role in shaping democratic debate and cultural attitudes”).
2 The most significant mergers include Time Warner’s acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System and
the subsequent acquisition of that combined entity by America Online, AT&T’s acquisition of the cable properties owned by TCI and MediaOne and the subsequent sale of those properties to Comcast, Disney’s acquisition of ABC, Viacom’s acquisition of CBS, EchoStar’s failed bid for DirecTV, and Vivendi’s pending sale of
its media properties to Universal.
3 DBS was first envisioned by science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke in 1945. Arthur C. Clarke, ExtraTerrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at
305. The FCC would not authorize DBS service until 1982. See Application of Satellite Television Corp. for
Authority to Construct an Experimental Direct Broad. Satellite Sys., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 91
F.C.C.2d 953 (1982). DBS would not be commercially deployed until 1994. See Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in Mkt. for Delivery of Video Programming, Third Annual Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358,
4377-78 ¶ 40 (1997).
4 Fed. Communications Comm’n, DTV Stations on the Air (Oct. 15, 2003), at http://www.fcc.gov/
mb/video/files/dtvonair.html.
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promotion and preservation of free, local television.5 This regulatory inertia
cannot be explained by widespread satisfaction with the status quo. A long
line of high-profile commentators from a wide variety of perspectives have
issued a steady stream of criticism condemning the quality and diversity of
television programming that has emerged under the current regime as wholly
inadequate.6
These developments have convinced me that a comprehensive reevaluation
of the commitment to free, local television is long overdue. In particular, I
propose reevaluating this commitment in light of two economic features
commonly thought to distinguish the market for television programming from
markets for more conventional goods. The first is the fact that television
programming exhibits the lack of rivalry associated with public goods. The
second is the fact that the market for television programming is comprised of
differentiated products. Although I am not the first to explore the intersection
between these two approaches,7 no previous work has taken into account the
full complexity of either approach or explored the full range of policy options
available.

5 See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(16), 106
Stat. 1460, 1462 (identifying preservation of “the economic viability of free local broadcast television” as one
of the statute’s goals); Turner, 520 U.S. at 191 (identifying “preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local
broadcast television” as an important governmental interest); Turner, 512 U.S. at 662 (same); H.R. REP. NO.
887, Part 2, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988) (regulating satellite television so that it “do[es] not undermine the
base of free local television service upon which the American people continue to rely”); Amendment of
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv.
for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, First Report and Order,
38 F.C.C. 683, 699-700 ¶¶ 44-48 (1965) (justifying cable regulation by the need to preserve free, local
television).
6 See, e.g., BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 220-21 (1987); C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING
AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 44-70 (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
59-65 (paperback ed. 1995); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of
Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1093-1107 (1990); Reed Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the
Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089 (1996); Newton N. Minow, Address
to the National Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), in NEWTON M. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY,
ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND 185-96 (1995); Ralph Nader & Claire Riley, Oh, Say Can You See: A
Broadcast Network for the Audience, 5 J.L. & POL. 1, 24-46, 55 (1988).
7 Of particular note is the work of C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 20-40 (2002).
Although we reach widely divergent conclusions, his analysis will undoubtedly be of help to anyone interested
in these issues. For other leading analyses integrating public good economics and monopolistic competition,
see STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 134-47, 160-64
(1991); Michael Spence & Bruce Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare, 91
Q.J. ECON. 103 (1977).
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A more complete understanding of the insights provided by public good
economics and product differentiation theory helps to explain why previous
attempts to promote free, local television have proven so ineffectual. Indeed, it
reveals how current policy has exacted a terrible toll on all types of television
programming. The commitment to localism has prevented television providers
from realizing the available economies of scale, while attempts to foster free
television have reduced the responsiveness of the market by depriving viewers
of the ability to use prices to signal the intensity of their preferences. Equally
problematic is the manner in which current policy has stifled the emergence of
competition from new television platforms and impeded providers’ ability to
promote both static and dynamic efficiency through price discrimination. The
net effect is not only a reduction in the total amount of television
programming, but also a degradation in its quality and diversity. Furthermore,
the key decisions in promoting free, local television have had the collateral
consequence of forestalling the development of new nontelevision
communications technologies, such as third-generation wireless devices (3G),
that depend upon the electromagnetic spectrum as their means of transmission.
What emerges is an analytical model of considerable generality that has
implications for a number of other fields.8 It should also be of interest to
anyone interested in television policy from an economic perspective. Even
those who reject economic analysis as the basis for defining the ends of
television policy will still appreciate the importance of understanding what
economic analysis can teach us about the relative efficacy of the various means
for effecting the ends chosen. Ignoring the economic underpinnings of the
various policy instruments available can drastically increase the costs
associated with the remedial measures chosen. Even worse, it can even cause
government intervention to have the perverse effect of frustrating the very
goals sought to be promoted.
Part I of this Article introduces the basic economics of product
differentiation and public goods. Although there are other ways to model
product differentiation, this Article builds on the principles of monopolistic

8 My argument should have considerable applicability to all kinds of intellectual property, because most
intellectual property goods are similarly nonrival and differentiated. For an argument applying this model to
copyright law, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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competition first advanced by Edward Chamberlin9 in order to facilitate the
combination of insights provided by product differentiation with the analysis
of public goods. Part II evaluates the applicability of the analysis that I
develop to the market for television programming.
Part III employs the economic model to evaluate past efforts to promote
free, local television.
It begins by introducing the major television
technologies and traces the role that the commitment to free, local television
has played in shaping regulatory policy with respect to each. In particular, I
argue that the overarching commitment to free, local television should be
disaggregated into four, more discrete subcommitments:
(1)

the preference for local programming over national programming,

(2)

the preference for free television over pay television,

(3)

the preference for incumbent television providers over new
entrants and emerging television technologies, and

(4)

the preference for single-channel television technologies over
multi-channel television technologies.

I then employ the basic economic principles developed in Part I to critique
each of these subcommitments. The analysis indicates that adherence to these
subcommitments has been a policy disaster that has reduced the quantity,
quality, and diversity of television programming.
Part IV explores the secondary distortions that the commitment to free,
local television has imposed on emerging technologies, paying particular
attention to the impact on 3G. It concludes that the commitment has further
harmed overall welfare by imposing static inefficiencies in the pricing of
related markets and by imposing dynamic efficiencies by delaying and
forestalling the emergence of new communications technologies.

9

EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956).
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE ATYPICAL ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC GOODS AND
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
Deciphering why previous efforts to promote free, local television have had
the perverse effect of stripping the market of local programming and of
degrading the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of television
programming requires an appreciation of two qualities that cause the economic
analysis of the market for television programming to deviate from the
principles suggested by standard neoclassical economics. The first is that
television programming exhibits a quality known as “lack of rivalry”
commonly associated with public goods. The second is that the market for
television programming involves differentiated products that do not serve as
perfect substitutes for one another.
Section A opens by providing a description of the standard model of
perfect competition that will serve as the baseline case for comparison.
Section B describes the economic complications that arise when a product
exhibits the characteristics of a public good. Section C reviews the insights
provided by monopolistic competition theory. Section D explores the welfare
implications of the interaction of these two concepts, paying particular
attention to the standard argument that the welfare calculus necessarily
requires striking a balance between the opposing forces of static and dynamic
efficiency. Section E extends the existing theories and explores the extent to
which price discrimination can resolve this seemingly intractable dilemma.
A. Perfect Competition Among Undifferentiated Products as a Baseline Case
The discussion of how public good economics and product differentiation
can lead to market failure requires an appreciation of the ways that it deviates
from the standard model of perfect competition. Therefore, at the risk of some
tedium,10 this section sketches the basic model of perfect competition.
A perfectly competitive market is generally assumed to consist of a large
number of producers selling undifferentiated products for purchase by a large
number of consumers. In addition, entry and exit by producing firms is
assumed to be easy. Under this model, consumers and producers use prices to

10 The analysis that follows can be found in any basic textbook on microeconomics. Those familiar with
the basic theory of perfect competition may prefer to skip directly to Part I.B.
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reveal the intensity of their preferences. The fact that a consumer is willing to
pay a particular price for a product indicates that consuming the product would
provide that consumer with benefits that equal or exceed the price paid for it.
The prices at which all consumers would be willing to purchase that product
can be aggregated and represented by an industry demand curve, which, in
accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal returns, is presumed to
be downward sloping. Conversely, the fact that a particular producer is willing
to sell a product at a particular price reveals that the price charged equals or
exceeds the marginal cost of producing an additional unit. The costs incurred
by producers can be aggregated into an industry supply curve, which, again in
accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal returns, is presumed to
be upward sloping.
1. Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition
Equilibrium price and quantity are established at the industry level where
the industry demand curve intersects with the industry supply curve. If the
industry produces at a level that falls short of the equilibrium quantity, there
will necessarily be consumers who are willing to pay more for the product than
it costs to make it. This in turn induces the existing firms to expand their
production and sell to these customers. As this occurs, the firms’ costs rise,
and the benefits derived by the additional purchasers fall. As quantity
increases, the spread between the two narrows until all of the unsatisfied
demand is met, which occurs when the benefits derived by the marginal
consumer no longer exceed the costs to the marginal producer.
The equilibrium price in turn determines the behavior of individual firms.
Under this model, individual firms are assumed to be trying to maximize their
profits. A firm seeking to maximize its profits will sell additional units of the
product so long as the benefits it derives from doing so exceed the costs. In
other words, it will expand its production until it reaches the point where its
marginal cost curve intersects with its marginal revenue curve.
Because perfect competition assumes that there are a large number of
producers each selling undifferentiated products, any firm that attempts to
charge a price that exceeds the prices charged by its competitors will
immediately lose all of its sales, as its customers transfer their purchases to
other producers offering the same product at a lower price. Individual firms
are thus said to be “price takers” who lack any “power over price,” because
they must accept the prices dictated by the overall market and cannot raise
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their prices without losing their entire market share. As a result, the marginal
revenue curve confronting individual firms is simply a horizontal line drawn at
equilibrium price set at the industry level.
Figure 1
Short-Run Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition

P ($/unit)

P ($/unit)

SSR
MC

CS

MR

PSR

PSR

Profit

PS
D
Q (000s units)

AC

Q (units)

Perfect competition also presumes that the relevant cost curves are Ushaped. Production of most goods requires the incurrence of both fixed and
variable costs. At relatively low volumes, the existence of fixed costs yields
significant returns to scale as those fixed costs are spread over increasingly
large volumes. Technological economies of scale also generally cause variable
costs initially to decline as the quantity produced increases. Each of these effects cause both the average cost curve (AC in Figure 1) and the marginal cost
curve (MC in Figure 1) to slope downward when production volumes are low,
and the presence of fixed costs initially causes the average cost curve to lie
above the marginal cost curve.
As production increases, the impact of the amortization of fixed costs on
average cost decays exponentially. With respect to variable costs, the principle
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of diminishing marginal returns eventually exhausts all of the available
economies of scale. In addition, when consumption by different individuals is
rivalrous (i.e., consumption by one person necessarily reduces the supply
available to others), the demand for scarce factors of production causes the
variable costs associated with producing additional quantities to rise. After
production reaches a certain level, the emerging diseconomies of scale
dominate the available economies of scale, and the marginal cost curve begins
to curve upward. Once the increase in marginal costs more than offsets the
ever-decreasing downward pressure caused by the amortization of fixed costs,
the average cost curve begins to curve upward as well, after which point it lies
below the marginal cost curve. The marginal cost curve necessarily intersects
the average cost curve’s lowest point.
Figure 2
Long-Run Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition
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If the equilibrium price lies below a firm’s average cost curve, the firm will
go out of business and exit the market. As a result, under this model, firms
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only produce output at levels in which the average cost curve lies at or below
the marginal cost curve, and every producer is necessarily able to generate sufficient revenue to cover all of the costs associated with producing the goods.
If the equilibrium price lies above the firm’s average cost curve, basic
principles of profit maximization suggest that the firm will increase its
production until marginal cost equals the equilibrium price. To the extent that
the equilibrium price exceeds the firm’s average costs at the level of
production chosen by a particular firm, the firm may earn some economic
profits in the short run. In the absence of any barriers to entry, the presence of
these economic profits eventually attracts other producers into the market. The
arrival of these new producers causes the market supply curve to shift outward,
which in turn causes the equilibrium price to drop. Such entry occurs until the
firms participating in the industry no longer earn any profits. When this point
is reached, all firms produce where average cost is at its minimum.11
2. The Welfare Characteristics of the Equilibrium Under Perfect
Competition
The long-run equilibrium under perfect competition has a number of
socially beneficial characteristics that have particular significance for the
analysis presented in this Article. The first is the manner in which the
equilibrium maximizes both productive and allocative efficiency. Productive
efficiency is achieved when a particular good is produced using the fewest
resources. Allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing goods are
allocated to those buyers who value them the most (i.e., are willing to pay the
most for them).12 Because both of these approaches take the goods to be
produced as given and simply focus on the proper distribution of the goods on
both the supply side and demand side respectively, they can both be subsumed
within the concept of static efficiency.

11 Conversely, if the price established by the interaction of supply and demand causes the incumbent
firms to lose money (i.e., if equilibrium price falls below average cost), one would expect firms to exit the
market. This in turn causes the supply curve to shift backward and the equilibrium price to rise until it allows
the firms participating in the market to cover their average costs. Again, this occurs at the point where average
costs are the lowest, which is the point that maximizes allocative efficiency.
12 For an accessible discussion of the difference between productive and allocative efficiency, see Joseph
F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Process, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025-27 (1987).
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Because the long-run equilibrium occurs at the point that minimizes the
average costs of each firm, perfectly competitive markets can be said to
achieve productive efficiency. In addition, the equilibrium under perfect
competition also maximizes allocative efficiency by allowing sales to every
consumer who would derive net benefits from doing so (i.e., whenever the
benefits that they would derive from consuming the good would equal or
exceed the costs of producing an additional unit of the good). It should be
noted that this allocative efficiency requires that firms set price along the
marginal cost curve, which in turn requires that the firms’ marginal revenue
curve coincide with a horizontal line positioned at the equilibrium price. In
other words, firms must be price takers. If that is not true, marginal revenue
will no longer accurately reflect the benefits to the marginal consumer. As a
result, the price mechanism will not bring the marginal benefits to consumers
and the marginal costs of producers into balance.
The absence of supra-competitive profits over the long run is also
significant. As discussed above,13 the absence of profits follows directly from
the assumption that there are no barriers to entry. So long as that is the case,
free entry by new competitors dissipates any supra-competitive profits that
may exist in the short run. Because both the long-run and short-run equilibria
occur at a point on or above the average cost curve, it is necessarily true that
the equilibrium price will be sufficient for producing firms to cover both their
fixed and variable costs.
Finally, the equilibrium maximizes both consumer and total surplus. Consumer surplus is created whenever consumers find bargains. It is the excess
value that they are able to enjoy whenever the price they actually pay falls below the maximum price they would be willing to pay (called their “reservation
price”). Conversely, producer surplus is the excess value enjoyed by producers
whenever they are able to sell their products at prices that exceed their costs of
producing the product. The sum of the value created for both consumers and
producers (i.e., consumer surplus + producer surplus) is called the total surplus.
Because firms in perfectly competitive markets compete solely on the basis
of price, some form of surplus represents an appropriate welfare criterion for
perfectly competitive markets. There is considerable disagreement, however,

13

See supra p. 1590.
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over whether the goals of competition policy should be defined in terms of
total surplus (which would focus on the net benefits to all of society) or
consumer surplus (which would focus on the net benefits to consumers).
Economists generally view the maximization of total surplus as the preferred
measure of economic performance.14 Under this perspective, generation of the
highest level of social benefits that could possibly be created by a particular
product is all that matters. Although transfer of surplus from consumers to
producers may have important distributional consequences,15 it has no impact
on efficiency.16 Other commentators have argued that the competition policy
should maximize consumer welfare.17 The debate between these two measures
of welfare remains unresolved.18 In fact, one can find authority supporting
either perspective.19
The equilibrium reached under perfect competition obviates the need to
resolve this dispute. By setting price and quantity at the point where the
demand and supply curves intersect, the equilibrium simultaneously allows
every consumer who would derive net benefits from consuming a product and
every producer who would derive net benefits from producing a product to do
so. As a result it maximizes both consumer and total surplus. Producing at
any quantity less than the equilibrium quantity would reduce consumer surplus
by preventing some consumers from purchasing the product even though they
would derive net benefits from doing so. In addition, it would reduce producer

14 See, e.g., Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 104; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
15 In asserting that wealth transfers are competitively neutral, I follow the Marshallian tradition of holding income effects constant. I recognize that acknowledging income effects may give wealth transfers greater
significance from a welfare standpoint. For a useful discussion comparing these two approaches, see HAL
VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 160-68 (3d ed. 1992).
16 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 24-25 (3d ed. 1990); Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Economic Welfare and Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-Service Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 33 (1999);
Gregory J. Werden, An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, ANTITRUST, Summer
1997, at 12, 14.
17 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
18 See Brian A. Facey et al., The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Right, ANTITRUST, Fall 2000, at
70, 70 & n.2 (noting the debate between consumer and total surplus perspectives); Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 41 n.186
(1997) (same).
19 See Werden, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting the existence of cases supporting the use of total surplus
while also noting that the 1997 revision of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines leaned toward consumer surplus).
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surplus by preventing some producers from selling their products
notwithstanding the existence of unsatisfied buyers willing to purchase them.
Together these reductions in surplus are known as “deadweight loss.”
B. Nonrivalry and the Economics of Public Goods
The model of perfect competition sketched above is firmly ensconced as
the foundation of economic analysis. It is, however, based on a number of
assumptions that tend not to hold in many real-world markets. One key feature
for our purposes is that perfect competition theory fails to provide a useful
model for products that exhibit the characteristics of a public good, the analysis
of which is most strongly associated with the work of Nobel Laureate Paul
Samuelson.20
1. The Definition of a Public Good
The most common definition of a public good posits that public goods
possess two distinctive qualities: the “lack of excludability,” which occurs
when producers cannot restrict the benefits provided by their products only to
those consumers who are willing to pay for them, and the “lack of rivalry,”
which occurs when consumption by one person does not subtract from the
supply available for consumption by others.21 One oft-cited example of a
public good is national defense, which is simultaneously nonexcludable, in that
national defense cannot be provided to one household without also providing it
to all others in the same geographic area, and nonrivalrous, in that one

20 Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 335-36
(1958) [hereinafter Samuelson, Aspects]; Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public
Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955) [hereinafter Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition]; Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) [hereinafter
Samuelson, Pure Theory]. For a useful overview of public good economics, see William H. Oakland, Theory
of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 486 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
1987). For a more extended and technical treatment, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY
OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996).
21 The concepts of nonrivalry and nonexcludability appear as distinct concepts in Samuelson’s work.
Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335. This terminology appears to originate with R.A. Musgrave,
Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS 124, 126 (Julius Margolis & Henri Guitton eds., 1969). It
now appears in many textbooks on microeconomics, public economics, and law and economics. See, e.g.,
DAVID A. BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 749 (2002); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42, 106, 126 (3d ed. 2000); CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 20, at 8-9; ROBERT
S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 638 (1989); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 87, 99-103 (1986).
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household can enjoy the benefits provided by the protection without affecting
the ability of any neighboring household to do so as well.22 Another
commonly cited example are lighthouses, which are said to be nonexcludable,
in that it is impossible to provide the services of the lighthouse to one ship
without providing it to all, and nonrivalrous, in that consumption of the
warning services by one ship has no effect on the availability of warning
services to other ships.23
Theoretical developments since that time have placed increasing pressure
on this classic definition of a pure public good. Although nonexcludability
does tend to give rise to the collective action problems associated with free
riding,24 the seminal works by Ronald Coase25 and Garrett Hardin26 suggest
that the government could eliminate many of these problems through the use of
well defined property rights rather than through more intrusive forms of
regulatory intervention.27 As a result, a number of public good theorists have
questioned whether nonexcludability is a necessary part of the definition of a
public good.28 Indeed, Samuelson himself suggested as much.29

22 See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 638; STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 100, 102;
Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 334.
23 See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (3d
ed. 2000); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 159 n.1 (6th ed. 1964); STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 102. For a
classic critique of the lighthouse as an example of the need for government intervention, see Ronald H. Coase,
The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974), reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 3248 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002). See also David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse:
“Government” or “Private” Provision of Goods, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1993).
24 In fact, many microeconomic texts discuss public goods solely in terms of the problems associated
with free riding. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 362 (1995); PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 641.
25 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also Coase, supra note 23,
at 375 (recounting the history of private provision of lighthouses in Great Britain in which government
involvement was limited to the establishment and enforcement of property rights in the lighthouse).
26 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
27 James M. Buchanan & Milton Z. Kafoglis, A Note on Public Goods Supply, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 403
(1963); see also SHMANSKE, supra note 7, at 17-20 (observing that many public goods are in fact excludable
and that property rights can often be developed to solve nonexcludability problems). It should be noted that
situations involving goods that create negative externalities are not necessarily symmetrical with situations
involving goods that create positive externalities, because it is difficult to conceive of a legal regime that
would give the recipient of the external benefit the legal right to force the person creating the benefit to increase consumption of the activity that generates the external benefits. Oakland, supra note 20, at 513.
28 See, e.g., SHMANSKE, supra note 7, at 7; David J. Brennan, Fair Price and Public Goods: A Theory of
Value Applied to Retransmission, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 347, 350 (2002); J.G. Head, Public Goods and
Public Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197, 215 (1962); Oakland, supra note 20, at 487.
29 SAMUELSON, supra note 23, at 159 n.1; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335.
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It is thus far from clear whether nonexclusion can be properly regarded as
an essential part of the theory of public goods. Fortunately, the argument
presented in this Article does not depend upon resolution of this dispute, as it is
the economic implications stemming from the lack of rivalry that carry the
greatest implications for television.
2. Static Efficiency and Declining Average Costs
The lack of rivalry changes the cost structure of public goods in ways that
cause market outcomes to deviate significantly from the results indicated by
the standard model of perfect competition. As noted earlier,30 the cost curves
for firms engaged in perfect competition are U-shaped, as depicted in Figures 1
and 2, in that they initially slope downward before eventually sloping upward.
Once the average cost curve begins sloping upward, it necessarily lies below
the marginal cost curve, and any firm setting price along the marginal cost
curve necessarily generates sufficient revenue to break even.
A different situation obtains when goods are nonrivalrous. Because
consumption by one person does not affect the supply available for
consumption by others, providing the product to an additional person does not
cause variable costs to increase. Under such conditions, variable costs have no
effect on marginal cost whatsoever, and the sole determinant of marginal cost
is the amortization of fixed costs. As a result, the classic analyses of public
goods assumed that the variable costs of producing another unit of output are
zero and constant.31 This assumption does not reduce the generality of the
analysis, as cases involving pure nonrivalry have been shown to be
indistinguishable from cases when marginal costs are nonzero so long as they
are sufficiently small relative to fixed cost.32

30

See supra pp. 1588-90.
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the MinasianSamuelson Debate, 10 J.L. & ECON. 193, 195 (1967); Head, supra note 28, at 213; Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J.L. & ECON. 71, 74 (1964); Samuelson, Aspects, supra note
20, at 335.
32 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
301-02 (rev. ed. 1988).
31
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Figure 3
Efficient Pricing of a Nonrival Product
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This causes average cost to decline across all volumes, as the fixed costs
are amortized over increasingly large volumes.33 The presence of constantly
declining average costs carries with it two relevant implications. First, it
creates inexhaustible economies of scale that naturally lead nonrival goods to
seek the broadest market possible.34 Indeed, if the product is a uniform
commodity, the presence of constantly declining average costs inevitably leads
markets involving nonrival goods to become natural monopolies,35 making it

33

See Head, supra note 28, at 211-15; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335.
See BAKER, supra note 7, at 226.
35 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 47 (1982); SHMANSKE, supra
note 7, at 26-27, 193 n.5 (collecting sources); C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 311, 411 (1997); Head, supra note 28, at 211-15; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also
CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 20, at 348-49 (noting that for pure public goods, “[t]he entire population is in
a single provision association”); Dagobert L. Brito & William H. Oakland, On the Monopolistic Provision of
Excludable Public Goods, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 691 (1980) (noting that “scale economies in . . . production
34
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appropriate to model demand,36 average cost, and marginal cost at the industry
level. In addition, any attempt to limit the size of the market that any firm can
reach can only serve to force production below equilibrium levels. This has
the inevitable effect of making the products sold by that firm more expensive.
It also increases the minimum volume needed for the firm to be viable.
Second, the fact that the average cost curve slopes downward throughout
its entire range gives rise to an intractable pricing problem. Recall that pricing
along the marginal cost curve represents one of the basic criteria for
maximizing allocative efficiency.37 The problem stems from the fact that the
marginal cost curve always lies below the average cost curve. As a result,
marginal cost pricing is economically infeasible, because any price set along
the marginal cost curve will not allow the firm to cover its costs. Indeed, if
marginal costs are zero as suggested by public goods theory and depicted in
Figure 3, pricing along the marginal cost curve would lead firms to charge
nothing at all for their products.38 Although this price would maximize
allocative efficiency by allowing every person who would derive net benefits
from consuming a product to do so, it would also prevent the producer from
generating any revenue whatsoever. Consequently, the producers would be
unable to recover the fixed costs needed to create their products in the first
place.39
Allowing producers of nonrivalrous goods to generate sufficient revenue to
cover fixed costs necessarily requires permitting them to charge a positive
price for their products. If left to their own devices, producing firms will act as
monopolists and produce at the level where marginal revenue equals marginal
cost, as depicted in Figure 4.40 Unfortunately, charging a positive price creates

as well as a uniqueness arising because of locational considerations” would lead the provision of many public
goods “[i]f left in the private sector . . . to be characterized by monopoly elements”).
36 As a technical matter, it would be more accurate to represent consumer-side effects with a marginal
rate of substitution curve (MRS) rather than a demand curve. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra
note 20, at 353-54. The eventual integration of this model with monopolistic competition theory obviates the
need to parse the similarities and differences between these two types of curves.
37 See supra p. 1591.
38 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also BAKER, supra note 7, at 9.
39 These polar cases provide a particularly effective illustration of the pricing problem. That said, the
basic problem is general and is not limited to these restrictive assumptions. So long as average cost is decreasing, the average cost curve will lie above the marginal cost curve even if marginal cost is nonconstant and
nonzero. As a result, marginal cost pricing will be impossible. See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 32, at 18-22.
40 For a more detailed discussion of monopoly pricing, see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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deadweight loss by denying some consumers access to the product even though
the benefits that they would derive from consuming it would exceed the
marginal cost of allowing them to do so. Moreover, to the extent that
equilibrium price exceeds average cost, it permits the producing firm to earn
supra-competitive profits. The natural monopoly characteristics created by a
downward sloping average cost curve dictate that such profits would be
sustainable over the long run.
Figure 4
Monopoly Pricing of a Nonrival, Differentiated Product
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Consumer surplus would be maximized and profits would be eliminated if
regulators were to turn to the device usually employed in declining-cost
industries and require that prices be set along the average cost curve. This
approach would also reduce, but not eliminate, deadweight loss. The fact that
the average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve prevents its complete
elimination.
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Figure 5
Regulated Pricing of a Nonrival, Differentiated Product
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The basic principle of marginal cost pricing thus suggests that any price
charged for a nonrival good is too high from the standpoint of allocative or
static efficiency.
3. The Unresolved Conundrum of Dynamic Efficiency
Taken to its logical extreme, this line of reasoning suggests that the optimal
policy from the standpoint of static efficiency would be for the nonrival good
to be priced at marginal cost (i.e., at zero). The resulting revenue shortfall
could be covered through a system of publicly financed subsidies41 of the type
first conceived by Pigou.42

41

See, e.g., SAMUELSON, supra note 23, at 159 n.1; Brennan, supra note 28, at 351; Samuelson, Aspects,
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This analysis has been criticized for begging an important question: by
taking the existing supply of nonrival goods as given and simply focusing on
the most efficient way to produce and allocate that good, it fails to provide an
endogenous basis for determining which and how many goods should be
produced in the first place.43 In other words, setting price as close to marginal
cost as possible maximizes static efficiency without shedding any light on
considerations of dynamic efficiency.
The suggestion that the government could use subsidies to determine which
goods should be produced is similarly problematic. What would make sense is
to calibrate the subsidy to reflect the aggregation of individuals’ preferences
for the public good. The problem is that any system of taxation that is
calibrated in such a manner will itself create substantial distortions.44
Furthermore, as Samuelson himself recognized, calibration of such a subsidy
would require the government to obtain accurate information about the utility
that every person would derive from every possible product.45 Such a task has
been criticized as insuperable even with respect to rivalrous goods. Both tasks
become even more intractable when nonrivalrous goods are involved, because
the possibility that another consumer might fund the fixed costs needed to
create the good makes it even less likely that any consumer would accurately
reveal his or her true preferences.46

supra note 20, at 335-36; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 122. Samuelson later emphasized that he was simply using the example to illustrate the intractability of the pricing problem and did not intend to suggest that
was the preferred policy outcome. Paul A. Samuelson, Public Goods and Subscription TV: Correction of the
Record, 7 J.L. & ECON. 81, 81-82 (1964).
42 A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 30-34 (3d ed. 1947).
43 Minasian, supra note 31, at 73, 79; see also Brennan, supra note 28, at 354-55 (noting Samuelson’s
tendency to focus on static efficiency at the expense of dynamic efficiency); Janusz Ordover & William Baumol, Antitrust Policy and High-Technology Industries, 4 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 13, 14, 32 (1988) (noting
the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency).
44 See A.B. Atkinson & N.H. Stern, Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 119
(1974); Joseph E. Stiglitz & P.S. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency, 38
REV. ECON. STUD. 151 (1971). See generally Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal
Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 21, at 61 (reviewing the literature).
45 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 336.
46 Head, supra note 28, at 208-09; Oakland, supra note 20, at 513-14, 520; Samuelson, Aspects, supra
note 20, at 336; Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra note 20, at 355; Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra
note 20, at 389. Demsetz challenged this conclusion by arguing that consumers of nonrivalrous goods are no
less likely to disclose their preferences accurately than are consumers of rivalrous goods. Harold Demsetz,
The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 299, 303-04 (1970). Subsequent experimental
work has confirmed that the free riding predicted by the theory does in fact occur, although at lower levels
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C. Product Differentiation and the Theory of Monopolistic Competition
One can resolve this unanswered question of dynamic efficiency by
integrating public good economics with the insights of another intriguing and
unusual approach to economic analysis known as “monopolistic
competition.”47 First advanced by Edward Chamberlin48 and extended by
subsequent scholars, including most notably by Avinash Dixit, Joseph Stiglitz,
and Michael Spence,49 monopolistic competition retains the key assumptions
of the standard model of perfect competition while relaxing the assumption
that all products are undifferentiated.50 Relaxation of this assumption allows

than might have been expected. See generally DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 317-80 (1993) (reviewing this literature); John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.,
1995) (same).
47 For an excellent survey of the literature on monopolistic competition, see Curtis Eaton & Richard G.
Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 728-34, 759-65 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). Useful discussions of monopolistic competition theory can be
found in most leading textbooks on microeconomics and industrial organization. See, e.g., BESANKO &
BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at 584-89; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 23, at 201-15; JEFFREY CHURCH &
ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 369-76 (2000); CLEMENT G. KROUSE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMICS 128-32, 179-80, 198-214 (1990); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 421-26; JEAN TIROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 298-300 (1988); HAL VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9298 (2d ed. 1984).
48 See CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9; see also JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
COMPETITION (1933) (offering a similar analysis).
49 See Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,
67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977); Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
407, 408 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product Differentiation]; Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed
Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 234 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product
Selection].
50 It should be noted that monopolistic competition theory represents only one of several established
methods for analyzing competition among differentiated products. Another line of economic research has built
on a seminal article authored by Harold Hotelling to offer models in which producers compete by positioning
their products at particular locations in a product space. See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39
ECON. J. 41 (1929). Two lines of commentary have emerged applying these principles to television
programming. The better established of the two limited the product space by dividing various television
stations into pre-identified categories of program formats. This greatly simplified the welfare calculus by
allowing it to be determined by voting. See, e.g., Jack H. Beebe, Institutional Structure and Program Choices
in Television Markets, 91 Q.J. ECON 15 (1977); Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the
Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952). A second line employed
models that allowed particular programs to vary across the product space in a manner more consistent with
Hotelling’s original conception. See, e.g., Harold J. Barnett & Edward Greenberg, TV Program Diversity—
New Evidence and Old Theories, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 89 (1971); Eli M. Noam, A Public and Private-Choice
Model of Broadcasting, 55 PUB. CHOICE 163 (1987); Alessandro Vaglio, A Model of the Audience for TV
Broadcasting: Implications for Advertising Competition and Regulation, 42 INT’L REV. ECON. & BUS. 33
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monopolistic competition to explore the effect of a ubiquitous feature of our
economy. For example, cars come in a wide range of styles and combine
features in ways that are not immediately comparable. Restaurants vary
widely in terms of cuisine, pricing, atmosphere, service, and quality. Even
different brands of commodities such as bread, soap, and soft drinks differ in
ways that lead people to prefer particular brands over others.
Allowing for the possibility of product differentiation changes the
economic analysis in profound ways. What is most interesting for our
purposes is the ease with which the insights of monopolistic competition can
be combined with those of public good economics. The resulting combination
offers a unified framework that permits a richer understanding of the
economics underlying products exhibiting both of these qualities. In addition,
the combined framework yields a possible resolution to the conflict between
static and dynamic efficiency that proved intractable under public goods
theory.
1. Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition
Under Chamberlin’s classic formulation, all products in a monopolistically
competitive industry serve as imperfect substitutes in equal competition with
one another. The fact that the substitution among these products is imperfect
allows individual firms to raise their prices without losing all of their sales to
their rivals. As a result, product differentiation prevents the market from
devolving into a natural monopoly just because average costs are decreasing.
The differences in customer preferences can allow multiple declining cost
firms to survive by targeting different segments of the overall customer base.51

(1995); David Waterman, Diversity and Quality of Information Products in a Monopolistically Competitive
Industry, 4 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 291 (1990); Steven S. Wildman, A Note on Measuring Surplus Attributable
to Differentiated Products, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 123 (1984). The difficulty of integrating these analyses into a
framework that also reflects public good economics has led me to rely on monopolistic competition theory as
the method for modeling competition between differentiated products. I do not mean to suggest that I regard
spatial models as unimportant. On the contrary, it is my hope to offer a more comprehensive analysis of these
models in later work. For my initial thoughts on the first of these two lines of scholarship, see Christopher S.
Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1936-42 (2000).
51 Edward Chamberlin’s work provides the seminal analysis of how competition among differentiated
products can yield an equilibrium in which multiple declining-cost firms exist. See CHAMBERLIN, supra note
9. See also WILLIAM F. BAXTER ET AL., RETAIL BANKING IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 101-20 (1977). For
applications of this principle to the television industry, see BRUCE M. OWEN, THE INTERNET CHALLENGE TO
TELEVISION 32 (1999), and Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic
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Product differentiation also causes the equilibrium to deviate from the equilibrium reached under perfect competition in a number of interesting ways.
These deviations result from the fact that firms selling differentiated products
are no longer price takers who face perfectly elastic (i.e., horizontal) demand
and marginal revenue curves. Instead they possess some degree of power over
price, with the extent of that power determined by the degree of substitutability
among the products.
Figure 6
Short Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition
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Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1355-56, 1368-70 (1986). This is the
supply-side analog to the manner in which customer heterogeneity can mitigate the demand-side economies of
scale resulting from network economic effects. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization and
Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network
Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 106 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice
Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292 (1996). See generally Daniel F. Spulber &
Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885
(2003) (discussing this literature); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 272, 280-81 (2002) (same).
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The fact that monopolistically competitive firms each face downward
sloping demand curves indicates that equilibrium price and quantity are
modeled at the firm, rather than the industry, level. It also causes the marginal
revenue curve for firms selling differentiated products to lie somewhere below
the demand curve. The intuition underlying this result is quite simple. A firm
that already is charging the maximum possible for a given level of production
can only attract new customers by lowering its price. If the firm could offer
the lower price only to new customers without also having to offer that price to
its existing customers, the marginal revenue curve would coincide with the
demand curve over the relevant range. However, most firms have trouble
reducing prices for new customers without also reducing prices for their
existing customers. Any revenue gained by moving farther down the demand
curve must be offset by the revenue lost by giving the lower price to existing
customers. If that is the case, the marginal revenue curve is represented by the
demand curve minus the revenue lost by offering the price reduction to the
existing customers.52 This causes the marginal revenue curve to lie below the
demand curve.53
Like any firm seeking to maximize its profits, a firm selling a differentiated
product increases its production until the marginal revenue it obtains from
selling an additional unit no longer exceeds the marginal cost of producing the
additional unit (i.e., where the marginal revenue curve intersects the marginal
cost curve). Having identified the profit maximizing level of production, the
firm then charges the maximum that it can receive for that quantity, which is
represented by where that quantity falls along the demand curve faced by that
firm. Because the price charged by the firm is not set along the marginal cost
curve, monopolistic competition necessarily gives rise to some degree of
deadweight loss.

52 This analysis changes somewhat if the firm is able to lower the prices charged to customers who place
a lower value on the product without offering the same price discount to all of its customers, including those
who value the product the most highly. I discuss below the effect that price discrimination can have on the
analysis infra Part I.E.
53 In fact, when the demand function for a particular product is linear, the marginal revenue curve is
represented by a straight line with twice the slope of the demand curve intersecting the vertical axis at the same
point as the demand curve. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 16, at 21 n.13 (offering a simple proof of this
relationship).
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Figure 7
Long-Run Equilibrium Under Monopolistic Competition
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One of the distinctive features of the short-run equilibrium is that some
firms engaged in monopolistic competition can earn supra-competitive profits
in the short run, in the event that the demand curve facing the firm lies above
the average cost curve (depicted by the shaded area in Figure 7). The
possibility of free entry posited under monopolistic competition ensures that
any such profits should not persist in the long run. As was the case under the
standard model of perfect competition,54 the presence of supra-competitive
profits attracts entry by new firms. Because the classic model of monopolistic
competition presumes that firms are in equal competition with one another,
entry by new firms affects incumbents symmetrically and causes their demand

54

See supra p. 1590.
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curves to shift backwards uniformly until the demand curve is tangent to the
average cost curve.55
Because the principle of diminishing marginal returns requires that the
demand curve be downward sloping, this long-run equilibrium necessarily
occurs where the average cost curve is also downward sloping and above the
marginal cost curve.
As a result, the seminal analyses of classic
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition have assumed that marginal costs are
constant, which increases mathematical tractability without losing the key
characteristics of both the average and marginal cost curves.56 This renders the
shape of the cost curves contained in the key monopolistic competition models
identical in shape to the cost curves for nonrival goods. This simplifying
assumption does not cause any loss of generality because the important aspects
of the monopolistic competition equilibrium would remain unchanged even if
the marginal cost curve were assumed to have the more typical U-shape.57
Another key difference between the equilibrium reached under
monopolistic competition and the equilibrium reached under public good
economics is the absence of supra-competitive profits. Unlike under public
good economics, the fact that products produced by different firms are
imperfect rather than perfect substitutes allows additional firms to enter the
market. As was the case under perfect competition,58 such entry will occur
until all supra-competitive profits are dissipated.
There are, however, a couple of noteworthy caveats to the zero-profit result
under monopolistic competition. The first occurs when firms must incur a
large, indivisible fixed cost to enter the market. The “lumpiness” caused by
large fixed costs can give rise to what has become known as the “integer
problem,” in which n firms might earn small profits while n+1 firms would run
losses. In such cases, the equilibrium would consist of n firms each earning

55 See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9, at 83-85. Interestingly, contestability theory suggests that actual
entry need not occur for prices to remain at competitive levels. So long as entry and exit are easy, potential
competition can discipline price just as effectively as actual competition. See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 32,
at 288-301.
56 See, e.g., Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 299; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at
411.
57 CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 23, at 208; see also Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49,
at 409 (using the constantly declining cost case as analogous to the decreasing average cost equilibrium under
monopolistic competition).
58 See supra pp. 1590-91.
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some degree of sustainable profits. If n is sufficiently large, any such profits
would be relatively small.59
The zero-profit result also depends in large part on the symmetry
assumption, which posits that the differentiated product offered by any
particular firm is engaged in equal competition with all similar products
offered by other firms.60 The symmetry assumption thus ensures that new
entrants will take business equally from all of the incumbent firms until no
firm earns profits.61 Although such an assumption may be appealing when
product differentiation is spurious, such as might occur if created by brandimage advertising, it is less appealing when product differentiation results from
real differences in product attributes.62 When the latter is the case, one would
expect that some products would serve as better substitutes than others. As a
result, it may be more realistic to assume that a new entrant will not take
business equally from all incumbent firms, but will instead compete more with
some businesses than others. Under this view, each product can be conceived
as occupying a certain position along a scale, with any particular product
participating more with those products that are close by and less with those that
are farther off.63 In this way, asymmetric preferences create the possibility of
the emergence of localized competition, which in turn gives rise to the
possibility that the integer problem could arise with respect to subsegments of
the market rather than just with respect to the market as a whole. This could
result in the emergence of “overlapping oligopolies” each earning supracompetitive profits that entry by new firms is unable to dissipate.64

59 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 47, at 733-34, 749. The seminal statement was offered by Nicholas
Kaldor, Market Imperfections and Excess Capacity, 2 ECONOMICA 33, 42-43 (1935).
60 The seminal analysis was again offered by Kaldor, supra note 59, at 38-39. Chamberlin ultimately
accepted this criticism. Edward H. Chamberlin, Monopolistic Competition Revisited, 18 ECONOMICA 343
(1951).
61 See supra pp. 1590-91.
62 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 47, at 734.
63 Kaldor, supra note 59, at 38. This approach is similar to the location models mentioned above, supra
note 50.
64 G.C. Archibald et al., Address Models of Value Theory, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF
MARKET STRUCTURE 3, 29 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); Kaldor, supra note 59, at
39. Note that this approach does not allow for the type of clean segregation that would justify treating any one
segment of the overall range of product offerings as a discrete market. This is because, although relaxation of
the symmetry assumption does suggest that products compete more strongly with their near neighbors, it does
presume that a weaker form of competition will continue to exist with their more distant neighbors. It is this
overlapping nature of localized competition that inhibits treating each segment as a separate market. The
extent to which this is true will depend on the degree of product differentiation.
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There are, however, considerations that mitigate some of the concerns
associated with the existence of sustainable profits. Such profits would be
minimized in “large economies,” in which each subsegment of the overall
market is populated by a relatively large number of firms. When this occurs,
each subsegment is sufficiently competitive to drop any profits to de minimis
levels and to drive prices fairly close to marginal cost. The sustainability of
profits thus depends on the factors that tend to make economies large, i.e.,
relatively weak product differentiation and fixed costs that are small relative to
the overall size of the market.65
2. Static Efficiency and the Proper Allocation of Goods That Are Produced
Given the similarity of the relevant demand and cost curves, it should come
as no surprise that goods in monopolistic competition experience the same
types of allocative inefficiency as that associated with public goods. Like
nonrival goods, monopolistically competitive goods face downward sloping
demand curves, albeit for different reasons.66 Because such firms tend to set
price above marginal cost, they will inevitably incur some degree of
deadweight loss. If the number of firms is sufficiently numerous, the demand
curve facing each firm should be relatively flat and the deadweight losses
relatively small.
Monopolistic competition also gives rise to productive efficiency loss. As
noted earlier, monopolistically competitive markets reach long-term
equilibrium at the point where the demand curve is tangent to the average cost
curve. The fact that the principle of diminishing marginal returns requires that
the demand curve be downward sloping necessarily implies that this
equilibrium will occur where the average cost curve is downward sloping as

65 Oliver D. Hart, Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities, 46
REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1979); Larry E. Jones, The Efficiency of Monopolistically Competitive Equilibria in
Large Economies: Commodity Differentiation with Gross Substitutes, 41 J. ECON. THEORY 356 (1987); see
also B. Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16
RAND J. ECON. 282 (1985) (deriving similar results in a spatial competition model in the tradition of
Hotelling).
66 The presence of constantly decreasing average costs inevitably causes markets for nonrival goods to
become natural monopolies that, like any monopoly, have power over price. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text. In the case of monopolistic competition, the downward slope of the demand curve results
from the assumption that all competing products serve as imperfect rather than perfect substitutes for one
another. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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well. Thus, unlike perfectly competitive markets, which reach long-term
equilibrium at the point at which average costs are minimized,
monopolistically competitive markets do not minimize average cost.67 This
indicates the presence of unexploited gains from trade that would allow the
same products to be produced with fewer resources if the total number of firms
were reduced and the firms that remained in the market expanded production.68
As a result, many theorists have concluded that monopolistically competitive
industries operate with “excess capacity” stimulated by excess entry.69 Any
attempt to restrict the size of the market commanded by any particular firm
would only cause these inefficiencies to worsen.
In addition, the fact that monopolistically competitive markets reach
equilibrium on the declining portion of the average cost curve gives rise to the
same pricing problem identified with respect to nonrival goods.70 Because the
presence of declining average costs necessarily implies that the marginal cost
curve lies below the average cost curve, any price that maximizes total surplus
would necessarily prevent the producing firm from covering its costs.
Conversely, any price that allows the firm to break even would necessarily
impose some degree of deadweight loss.71
3. Dynamic Efficiency and the Number of Goods Produced
As noted earlier,72 the key problem associated with the analysis of
deadweight loss and marginal cost pricing is that it focuses solely on static
efficiency without taking dynamic efficiency into account. By taking the
existence of the relevant goods as given and focusing on the proper allocation
of those goods, this approach fails to provide a way to determine the amount of
resources that should be devoted to the production of the goods in the first
place. The perspective of monopolistic competition allows a particularly

67

See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9, at 104-10.
The situation is somewhat different for nonrival goods. Because the cost curves for monopolistically
competitive firms are U-shaped, producing at minimum average cost is feasible. The fact that the average cost
curves associated with nonrival goods are constantly declining makes such an outcome impossible. In
addition, the fact that nonrival goods tend to be natural monopolies eliminates any possibility of gains from
trade resulting from having one firm benefit another firm by reducing production.
69 See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 9, at 104-10.
70 See supra Part I.B.2.
71 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408-09.
72 See supra Part I.B.3.
68
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insightful characterization of this concern. In recognizing that each product
can in essence constitute its own market, monopolistic competition implicitly
recognizes that more than one way exists to increase total surplus. Not only
can surplus increase through the reduction of deadweight loss with respect to
any one product; it can also increase through the creation of additional
products.
In addition to providing a useful way to reconceptualize this problem, attempts by monopolistic competition theorists to solve the problem of optimal
diversity offer a potential metric for measuring dynamic efficiency. The
maximization of total surplus requires the production of a product whenever
the total benefits created by it exceed the total costs needed to produce it. The
total benefit created by any one product is represented by the area under the
demand curve that it faces. In the case of nonrival goods, marginal cost is
zero, and the only relevant costs are the fixed costs associated with producing
the good. Therefore, subject to an important caveat that will be discussed
later,73 the maximization of total surplus requires that a good be produced
whenever the area under the demand curve exceeds the fixed costs associated
with production. Monopolistic competition theorists have pointed out that this
condition would be satisfied in equilibrium if each firm were able to capture
the entire surplus created by the goods it produces. Any slippage in the firm’s
ability to capture the entire surplus causes some number of surplus-enhancing
products not to be produced.74 The smaller the proportion of the total surplus
captured by producers, the more severe this effect becomes.
The point can be illustrated with the following example. Assume the
existence of two products that each create $10 million in benefits. The first
would require the incurrence of $3 million in fixed costs, and the second would
require the incurrence of $6 million in fixed costs. Assume further that, in
accordance with Samuelson’s vision, the unit price is set relatively close to
marginal cost so that the product generates only $1 million in revenue. From
the standpoint of maximizing total surplus, society would be better off if both
of these products were created, because the total benefits associated with

73

See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 407-08; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49,
at 218-20, 224, 230; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 110-11; see also Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 297;
Roger W. Koenker & Martin K. Perry, Product Differentiation, Monopolistic Competition, and Public Policy,
12 BELL J. ECON. 217, 226 (1981).
74
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creating each would exceed the costs of doing so. Because the $1 million in
revenue captured by the producer is insufficient to cover fixed costs associated
with creating either product, neither will be produced despite the fact that
production of each one would be socially beneficial.
The situation changes if the firm is allowed to set prices so that it
maximizes its own profits. Assuming linear demand and zero marginal costs,
the producing firm is able to capture half of the total benefits created by its
product. In that event, each product could generate $5 million in revenue.
This would be sufficient to cover the $3 million in fixed costs needed to
produce the first product, and therefore, the first product would be produced.
The $5 million in revenue would be insufficient to cover the $6 million needed
to produce the second product. This second product will not be created unless
the producer is able to capture at least sixty percent of the total benefits
created.75
The severity of this effect is thus likely to weigh particularly heavily
against products with high fixed costs, because the presence of such costs
increases the proportion of the total surplus that must be captured if the product
is to break even.76 It also appears that this effect will have a particularly strong
impact on products with steep inverse demand functions.77 As Figure 8
illustrates,78 producers of products that face demand curves that are convex to
the origin are able to capture a smaller percentage of the total surplus than are
producers of products facing demand curves that are concave to the origin,
even when the total benefits created by each product are identical. Because
these products are typically those whose benefits are concentrated in a

75 This example reveals the flaw with the regulated pricing solution depicted in Figure 5. Maximizing
consumer surplus inevitably reduces the amount of surplus appropriated by producers. Thus, although it
promotes static efficiency, it detracts from dynamic efficiency and reduces the total variety of products further
below optimum.
76 Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 224.
77 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 409-10; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49,
at 224, 230; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 111-12; see also Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49, at 307
(identifying the same effect and arguing that it explains why the market is biased against opera relative to
football).
78 Figure 8 is adapted from BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 112 figs.4.5 &
4.6 (1992), and Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 409 fig.1.
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relatively small group of consumers with particularly intense preferences, these
products have been dubbed “special interest” or “minority taste” products.79
Figure 8
Bias Against Special Interest Products
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Put another way, producers are unable to appropriate two different types of
surplus. The first is the triangular-shaped area located to the right of the producer surplus, which represents the deadweight loss identified by the previous
discussion of nonrival goods. The second is the triangular-shaped area located
above the producer surplus, which represents the amount of the surplus currently captured by consumers.
Conceiving the problem in this manner reveals how dynamic efficiency differs from static efficiency. Static efficiency would be satisfied as long as the

79 See Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 111-12; see also Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49,
at 410; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 225.
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deadweight loss were eliminated. It does not matter if it were appropriated by
either producers or consumers. It also does not matter if consumers retain the
surplus represented by the triangular-shaped area above the producer surplus.
Dynamic efficiency similarly requires the elimination of deadweight loss. The
key difference is that it requires producers, not consumers, to be the ones to
appropriate the surplus generated through the elimination of deadweight loss.
It also requires that the surplus represented by the triangular-shaped area above
the producer surplus currently captured by consumers be transferred to producers. Anything less would leave the producer unable to appropriate part of the
surplus created by its products and would cause a surplus-increasing product
not to be created.
This result differs profoundly from the situation that obtains under perfect
competition. Because perfectly competitive markets reach equilibrium at a
point where the average cost curve is nondecreasing, policymakers need not
concern themselves with whether producers capture enough surplus to cover
their fixed costs of production.80 Under perfect competition, the transfer of
surplus from consumers to producers has no impact on total surplus.81 In
contrast, when markets reach equilibrium on the downward sloping portion of
the average cost curves, as occurs under monopolistic competition and in the
case of nonrivalrous goods, transfer of surplus from consumers to producers is
far from immaterial. It instead becomes a necessary condition for promoting
dynamic efficiency.82 In addition, it lacks even distributional consequences in
the long run, because free entry will dissipate any profits that initially accrue to
the producer. Any rents initially captured by producers will eventually accrue
to the benefit of consumers in the form of increased product diversity.
Interestingly, there is another consideration that tends to mitigate any
shortfall resulting from the producers’ inability to appropriate the entire
surplus. The argument that an additional product should be created whenever
the total surplus it creates exceeds the fixed costs associated with creating it
implicitly presupposes that the entire surplus captured by the new entrant
consists of incremental surplus generated by consumers who were not

80

See supra p. 1588.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
82 For a related argument, see Steven S. Wildman & Bruce M. Owen, Program Competition, Diversity,
and Multichannel Bundling in the New Video Industry, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION 244, 266 (Eli M. Noam
ed., 1985).
81
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previously purchasing other products. It is quite possible, however, that some
of the surplus captured by the new product will not result from attracting new
customers into the market, but rather from stealing customers from incumbent
producers. To the extent that the surplus captured by the new entrant results
from the transfer of surplus from other firms already in the market, it does not
represent an increase in total surplus, but rather simply a transfer of surplus
from one producer to another. The problem is that firms seeking to maximize
profits will enter without regard for whether the surplus results from
incremental sales or mere cannibalization.83 The inability to distinguish
between the two causes some entry to be profitable even when the addition of
another product does not generate sufficient benefits to cover the additional
fixed costs. The result is the stimulation of excess entry, which in turn causes
the wasteful incurrence of fixed costs.84
The balance between these two forces is well illustrated by a metaphor
coined by Nobel Laureate Michael Spence, who suggested that a
monopolistically competitive industry could be analogized to a pie.85
Introduction of a new product simultaneously expands the pie and causes it to
be sliced into more pieces, with the addition of a slice creating additional costs
(i.e., the fixed costs of creating a new product). The desirability of adding a
slice depends on whether the increase in the size of the pie exceeds the costs of
adding the slice.
The dynamic efficiency of the monopolistic equilibrium thus depends on a
balance of two opposing factors. On the one hand, the producers’ inability to
capture the entire surplus tends to cause products not to be produced even
when doing so would increase total surplus. On the other hand, the fact that
the surplus captured by any one firm includes both incremental surplus
generated by new sales and surplus cannibalized from other suppliers tends to
encourage excess entry.86 Whether the total number of products offered

83 Koenker & Perry, supra note 74, at 226-27; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 410;
Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 230-31. This tendency is illustrated even more clearly by spatial
competition models. For an overview, see Yoo, supra note 50, at 1936-42.
84 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 410; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at
230-31. This provides an analytical explanation for the excess capacity result noted above. See supra note 69
and accompanying text. It also corresponds to the analysis of differentiated public goods that are subject to
congestion. See Oakland, supra note 20, at 504-05.
85 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 410.
86 Interestingly, a person who values diversity for its own sake would not be concerned by this tradeoff.
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exceeds or falls short of surplus-maximizing levels cannot be determined a
priori.87 The most that can be said is that the market tends to provide too much
product diversity when product differentiation is weak relative to scale
economies and too little when the opposite is true.88 Whether there is too
much or too little product diversity is ultimately determined, as an empirical
matter, by which of these two effects dominates.
D. The Complexity of the Welfare Tradeoffs

The foregoing discussion has led a number of scholars to frame the welfare
analysis of nonrival goods as a conflict between static and dynamic
efficiency.89 Static efficiency concerns about setting price at marginal cost
counsel in favor of lowering price as close to zero as possible. Dynamic
efficiency concerns about the appropriation of total surplus point in the other
direction and instead support allowing producers to increase prices until they
maximize their profits. To these scholars, the policy decision is a simple
matter of calibrating price so that it balances these two irreconcilable
considerations. If they have drawn any conclusions at all, they have simply
suggested that to the extent that dynamic efficiency gains can be sustained
indefinitely, the powers of compounding strongly suggest that long-run
dynamic considerations should dominate any short-run static ones.90

Diversity would be maximized by allowing the producer to capture the entirety of the surplus. Although this
would cause efficiency losses resulting from excessive duplication of fixed costs, such a consideration would
give a person who wanted to promote diversity simpliciter little pause.
87 G.C. Archibald, Chamberlin Versus Chicago, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 2, 6-14 (1961); see also Eaton &
Lipsey, supra note 47, at 751.
88 Koenker & Perry, supra note 74, at 226-27; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408,
410-13; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 233-34.
89 Brennan, supra note 28, at 355; Ordover & Baumol, supra note 43, at 14, 32; Gideon Parchomovsky &
Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1500-01
(2002); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1018 (1987).
90 Brennan, supra note 28, at 355; Ordover & Baumol, supra note 43, at 14, 32; see also 3 PHILLIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720a, at 255 & n.3 (2d ed. 2000); Phillip Areeda,
Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries Make It?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS 29, 31 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (1962); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra, at 119, 122; Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price
Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power,
112 YALE L.J. 681, 781 (2003); Donald F. Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse
Constraints on the Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 485 (1985).
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Although this would appear to be a fairly straightforward tradeoff, upon
closer inspection it becomes clear that the proper welfare calculus is somewhat
more involved. When the possibility of cannibalization is acknowledged, the
implications for dynamic efficiency become ambiguous, because it is equally
possible that the number of products produced in equilibrium will either
exceed or fall short of the optimum.
In addition, determining the welfare implications for differentiated products
is considerably more complicated than determining the welfare implications
under perfect competition. When products are undifferentiated, firms can only
compete in terms of price and quantity. As a result, the welfare calculus is
relatively simple and focuses solely on the extent to which the price charged
diverges from buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices as reflected in total
surplus. Allowing for product differentiation adds an additional level of
complexity to the welfare calculus. In such a world, firms also compete in
terms of how close a particular product comes to an individual consumer’s
ideal combination of product attributes, which is a factor that is not represented
in the conventional two-dimensional space of price and quantity depicted in the
figures above.
It thus remains possible that any reductions in total surplus resulting from
inefficient pricing may be offset in whole or in part by welfare gains derived
from satisfying consumers’ taste for variety and vice versa. Consequently,
modern theorists have largely abandoned the simplistic conclusions that argued
that the excess capacity and deadweight loss endemic to monopolistic
competition indicated that such markets were inherently inefficient.91 Instead,
modern scholars have now acknowledged that any welfare implications are
ambiguous and that losses may or may not be offset in whole or in part by
welfare gains derived by the availability of a wider range of products.92 Most
analyses stop short of resolving the issue, however. Determining whether the
equilibrium configuration maximizes welfare would require a welfare function
that identifies the relative utility that individuals derive from each dimension of

91

See supra Part I.C.2.
See Robert L. Bishop, Monopolistic Competition and Welfare Economics, in MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION THEORY: STUDIES IN IMPACT 251 (Robert E. Kuenne ed., 1967); Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 49,
at 301-02; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 411. For an application of this argument to
television programming, see Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 110-13.
92
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competition. Needless to say, an infinite number of such functions can be
derived that would support any number of conclusions.
Fortunately, monopolistic competition theory makes it possible to combine
both static and dynamic efficiency concerns into a single, total surplus
calculation that represents a useful proxy for total welfare. Indeed, if utility is
linear in the composite commodity, maximization of welfare and maximization
of total surplus are one and the same.93 Even more interestingly, monopolistic
competition theory suggests the existence of a policy instrument that can
address the problems of both static and dynamic efficiency simultaneously.
The skeleton key that promises to unlock both of these contradictory forces is
one of the classic solutions to both deadweight loss and nonappropriability:
price discrimination.
E. Price Discrimination as a Way to Maximize Both Static and Dynamic
Efficiency

The use of a device known as price discrimination may allow markets to
increase static and dynamic efficiency simultaneously. In many cases,
producers can only employ linear, single-part pricing in which every potential
consumer is offered the same price. Under price discrimination, producers use
multi-part pricing to charge different prices to different consumers. One of the
most familiar examples of price discrimination occurs when airlines charge
different amounts to various passengers flying in the same class of service. It
functions by identifying passengers who are likely to be more price-sensitive
(such as vacation travelers) and charging them less, while identifying other
passengers who are likely to be less price-sensitive (such as business travelers)
and charging them more.
Ever since the pioneering work of A.C. Pigou94 and Joan Robinson,95
policymakers and regulatory authorities have viewed price discrimination with
considerable suspicion, regarding it as evidence of market power.96

93

Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 47, at 729 (citing Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408-

09).
94

A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932).
ROBINSON, supra note 48.
96 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 498-99 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 617 (1977); 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD
F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 5.14, at 342 (1978). For an example applying this reasoning to the television
95
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Monopolistic competition reveals that such concerns may well be overstated.
The power over price necessary to support price discrimination may simply
reflect the fact that the relevant market involves differentiated products,
because all products competing within such markets face downward sloping
demand curves even when confronted with competition.97 Furthermore, the
ability to price discriminate may simply reflect the existence of joint costs
shared among different purchasers that are inevitable when consumption is
nonrival.98
The model developed in this Article offers another reason for adopting a
more hospitable stance toward price discrimination. When single-part pricing
is the only policy option available, static and dynamic efficiency become
opposing considerations that must be traded off. Price discrimination can
obviate the need to mediate the conflict between these two competing forces.
Far from being an indicator of anticompetitive behavior, price discrimination
may be a necessary condition for the maximization of total surplus.

industry, see Harry Boadwee, Note, Product Market Definition for Video Programming, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1210, 1219-25 (1986).
97 The seminal contribution on competitive price discrimination is Daniel F. Spulber, Non-Cooperative
Equilibrium with Price Discriminating Firms, 4 ECON. LETTERS 221 (1979). For subsequent work, see
DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 544-48 (1989); Mark Armstrong & John Vickers,
Competitive Price Discrimination, 32 RAND J. ECON. 579 (2001); Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination in
Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J. ECON. 380, 381, 394 (1985); Kenneth S. Corts, Third-Degree Price
Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment, 29 RAND J. ECON. 306 (1998);
Peter C. Coyte & C. Robin Lindsey, Spatial Monopoly and Spatial Monopolistic Competition with Two-Part
Pricing, 55 ECONOMICA 461 (1988); Thomas J. Holmes, The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in
Oligopoly, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 244 (1989); Michael L. Katz, Price Discrimination and Monopolistic
Competition, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1453 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis
After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 74-78 & nn.59-60 (1993); Daniel F. Spulber, Competition and
Multiplant Monopoly with Spatial Nonlinear Pricing, 25 INT’L ECON. REV. 425 (1984); Daniel F. Spulber,
Spatial Nonlinear Pricing, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 923 (1981); and Lars Stole, Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly, 4
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 529 (1995). For recent surveys, see Elhauge, supra note 90, at 732-43, and
LARS A. STOLE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS (Univ. of Chi. Grad. Sch. of Bus.
Working Paper, Nov. 7, 2001) (forthcoming in the new HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION), available
at http://gsblas.uchicago.edu/papers/hio.html. For discussions in the context of antitrust law, see Symposium
on Competitive Price Discrimination, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 593 (2003).
98 When joint costs are being divided among multiple purchasers, it is rational for a producer to take into
account different purchasers’ price elasticities when setting prices, thereby reflecting the same considerations
that go into Ramsey and Lindahl pricing. See Demsetz, supra note 46, at 301-02; Michael E. Levine, Price
Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2002). But see Paul A. Samuelson, Contrast
Between Welfare Conditions for Joint Supply and for Public Goods, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 26, 26 (1969)
(arguing that the theory of public goods was analogous to the theory of joint production).
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1. Perfect Price Discrimination

To see how price discrimination helps maximize total surplus, it is
important to recall that any single-part pricing scheme (such as the one
depicted in Figure 9) necessarily gives rise to two forms of efficiency loss.
The first is the impairment of static efficiency represented by the market’s
failure to cover the triangular area located to the right of the producer surplus.
Because neither producers nor consumers are able to capture this surplus, it is
properly regarded as a deadweight loss. The second is the impairment of
dynamic efficiency associated with the producers’ inability to capture the
consumer surplus represented by the triangular area in the upper corner of the
demand curve.
Figure 9
Single-Part Pricing of Nonrivalrous Product Under
Monopolistic Competition
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The ideal case is known as perfect, or first-degree, price discrimination.
Under perfect price discrimination, the producer is able to charge each
consumer the maximum that consumer is willing to pay. Figure 10 illustrates
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how perfect price discrimination would simultaneously solve the problems
associated with static and dynamic efficiency.99 It would promote static
efficiency by eliminating the deadweight loss in the lower right corner of the
area under the demand curve. By allowing firms to charge each customer the
absolute maximum amount that they would be willing to pay, the firm is able
to offer lower prices to new customers without having to suffer the decrease in
revenue associated with offering the same discount to its existing customer
base. As a result, the firm is able to expand its production until every person
who values the product more than marginal cost is able to consume it.100
Figure 10
Perfect Price Discrimination
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99 Note that the graphical representation is identical to Figure 4, except that producers rather than consumers capture the entire surplus.
100 See Buchanan, supra note 31, at 195; Demsetz, supra note 46, at 301-03; Spence & Owen, supra note
7, at 121-22; Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Collective Goods, 50 REV. ECON.
STAT. 1, 3-5 (1968).
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At the same time, perfect price discrimination allows producing firms to
appropriate the surplus located in the upper corner under the demand curve that
was previously captured by consumers. Because perfect price discrimination
allows producers to capture the entire surplus, there is no slippage between the
total benefits created by the product and the revenue available to cover the
fixed costs associated with creating it.101 Perfect price discrimination also
eliminates the bias against special interest goods with steep inverse demand
functions.102
Stated in terms of the numerical example discussed above,103 assume that a
range of products exists that each generates $10 million in benefits and that
requires anywhere from $1 to just under $10 million in fixed costs to create.
The principles of surplus maximization would imply that society would be
better off if all of these products were produced. As noted earlier, a firm
facing a linear demand employing single-part pricing would only be able to
capture fifty percent of the total surplus created by its product. As a result,
every product that costs more than $5 million to create would not exist even
though producing them would increase total surplus. The situation changes if
the producer can use multi-part pricing to increase the proportion of the total
surplus that it captures. The degree of slippage will be reduced, but not
eliminated, if price discrimination allows it to capture seventy-five percent of
the total surplus, because doing so would allow all products that cost less than
$7.5 million to be produced, but would still exclude those products that cost
between $7.5 million and $10 million. Only if producers are able to employ
perfect price discrimination to capture the entire surplus created by their
products would every surplus-enhancing product be created.
2. Imperfect Price Discrimination

Perfect price discrimination would thus appear to be a panacea designed to
cure the reductions in total surplus identified above (subject to the caveat
discussed above of the possibility of excess entry induced by
cannibalization).104 The problem is that perfect price discrimination is a
practical impossibility. It requires knowing the maximum amount each

101
102
103
104

See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 218-20.
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
See supra pp. 1611-12.
See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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consumer would be willing to pay for the product, which is information that
would be impossible to ascertain accurately.105 Perfect price discrimination
becomes even more problematic when nonrivalrous goods are involved.
Because viewers realize that, once created, the programming can be provided
to everyone without incurring any additional costs, they have no incentive to
give anyone an accurate indication of their true preferences in the hope that
some other person would be willing to finance the first copy costs.106
As a result, producers who seek to mitigate welfare losses in this manner
must resort to some form of imperfect price discrimination that, while unable
to extract the maximum price from each and every customer, is able to sort
customers into groups that place different values on the products and to charge
higher prices to those groups who place a higher value on the goods.107
Imperfect price discrimination can reduce the efficiency losses caused by
deadweight loss by making it possible for the producer to expand production
by offering discounts to some consumers who would not purchase the product
at the price the producer would charge were it limited to charging a single
price.
Admittedly, it is theoretically possible that imperfect price
discrimination would cause the deadweight loss to grow by causing overall
production to decrease.108 The general consensus is that imperfect price
discrimination is more likely to have the former effect than the latter.109

105

See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Pitfalls in the Analysis of Public Goods, 10 J.L. & ECON. 199, 201, 203

(1967).
106 Demsetz, supra note 46, at 303; Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 334, 336; Samuelson, supra
note 105, at 201, 203-04; Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 20, at 388-89.
107 The classic analysis offered by Pigou divides imperfect price discrimination into two classes. In
second-degree price discrimination, the producer holds out certain purchase options designed to appeal
differently to different classes of customers and allows customers’ individual purchasing decisions to sort
themselves into the appropriate group. The key element in second-degree price discrimination is that all
buyers have the opportunity to purchase in any of the available options. In third-degree price discrimination,
the producer again holds out certain purchase options, but instead only makes one option available to any
particular purchaser. As a result, that buyer has the choice of purchasing the proffered option or forgoing
purchasing altogether. See PIGOU, supra note 94, at 275-89.
108 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz, Non-Uniform Pricing, Output and Welfare Under Monopoly, 50 REV.
ECON. STUD. 37, 51 (1983); Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic ThirdDegree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1981); Jun-ji Shih et al., A General Analysis of the
Output Effect Under Third-Degree Price Discrimination, 98 ECON. J. 149, 152-54 (1988).
109 See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 241 (8th ed. 1987); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 16,
at 495.
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Figure 11
Imperfect Price Discrimination
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Placed in the concrete context of the airline example discussed above,110
the airlines’ ability to use the Saturday-night stay requirement to distinguish
price-sensitive leisure travelers from price-insensitive business travelers can
help reduce the deadweight loss associated with nonmarginal cost pricing. It
brings the airlines’ output closer to efficient levels by allowing them to offer to
the former group fares that are closer to marginal cost without having to suffer
the decrease in revenue that would result from having to offer the same
discount to the latter group as well. The result is that price discrimination
allows flights to carry more passengers. This has the effect of allowing a
greater percentage of the passengers who would derive net benefits from taking
the flight to do so. This brings output closer to surplus-maximizing levels,

110

See supra p. 1619.
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which in turn allows the creation of additional flights that would not otherwise
exist.111
To the extent that it also allows producers to raise prices for infra-marginal
customers, imperfect price discrimination will also reduce the reductions in
total surplus caused by the producing firm’s inability to appropriate the entire
surplus created by its product. The net effect would be to increase both static
and dynamic efficiency. The bias against special interest goods112 would still
exist, although it would be substantially mitigated.
Thus, far from being an indicator of a policy problem in need of redress,
price discrimination can help bring the total number and distribution of goods
produced closer to the optimum in terms of both static and dynamic
efficiency.113 By definition, however, imperfect price discrimination does not
allow producers to capture the entire surplus created by their products. This
will be offset to some degree by the tendency toward excess entry stimulated
by the fact that some of the surplus captured is simply the transfer of surplus
from other producers rather than incremental surplus generated by sales to new
customers.114

111 It should be noted, however, that there is one way in which the airline example deviates from the
model developed in this Article. In contravention of the free-entry assumption embodied in monopolistic
competition, the lack of availability of airport landing slots can make the addition of new flights expensive or
impossible. This in turn changes the equilibrium in ways that allow the existing firms to earn supracompetitive profits and to operate at different points along the average cost curve than permitted under
monopolistic competition. The airline example is thus offered only to illustrate how charging different prices
to different groups of customers can allow producers to capture a greater percentage of the surplus.
112 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
113 See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 218-20.
114 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Not everyone supports the idea of making it easier for
television providers to price discriminate. For example, although C. Edwin Baker recognizes that facilitating
price discrimination promises to improve economic welfare, he warns that it will benefit those media most
susceptible to price discrimination, such as television, to the relative detriment of those media which are less
susceptible to price discrimination, such as print. BAKER, supra note 7, at 37-40. I find Baker’s worries to be
unfounded. The fact that print may not benefit from price discrimination to the same extent as television does
not provide a justification for refusing to use all the available means for improving the efficiency of television.
Even if the effects are uneven across media, facilitating price discrimination still creates economic benefits
with respect to television while simultaneously reducing the magnitude of the regulatory intervention with
respect to print.
Baker suggests that the differential impact of price discrimination nonetheless remains a concern
because the increased efficiency of television will allow it to crowd out print. Id. at 38. This argument
necessarily presumes that newspapers and television serve as substitutes for one another and that consumers
will not respond to the relative changes in price by increasing or decreasing their purchases of any other goods.
The problem is that courts that have considered the issue have typically not regarded television and print to be
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3. Price Discrimination and Free Entry

Application of price discrimination in the context of monopolistic
competition does raise an interesting theoretical conundrum. Specifically, the
free-entry assumption embodied in the classic model of monopolistic
competition poses serious questions about the sustainability of any price
discrimination scheme. If free entry is possible, it is likely that other firms will
enter and offer products that will destroy the market power that is necessary for
any system of price discrimination to work. The resulting competition for
those customers threatens to destroy the ability to capture surplus by creating
price competition that beats price down to marginal cost.
The solution to this conundrum lies with the relaxation of the assumption
that products are homogenous. As noted earlier,115 introducing product
differentiation can give each firm power over price sufficient to price
discriminate. This is particularly the case if one relaxes the symmetry
assumption and allows for the possibility that differentiated products compete
more strongly with some products than with others.116

substitutes for one another. See H. Peter Nesvold, Note, Communication Breakdown: Developing an Antitrust
Model for Multimedia Mergers and Acquisitions, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 781, 824-31
(1996) (collecting cases). This perspective is echoed in the complaints appearing in the literature that
consumers rely almost entirely on television as their sole source of information, which suggests that it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to induce them to turn to other sources. See Owen Fiss, The Censorship of
Television, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1215, 1216-17 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88
CAL. L. REV. 499, 529-31 (2000).
It should be acknowledged, however, that the FCC has at times suggested that newspapers may act as
substitutes for television. See, e.g., Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations
Concerning the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 217-20
¶¶ 123-28 (1985); Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, & 73.636] of the
Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations, Report and
Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 25-27 ¶¶ 25-30, 54 ¶ 108 (1984); Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, & 73.636 of
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM & Television Broad. Stations, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 387 ¶ 45 (1983); see also Nesvold, supra, at 841 (noting that the
Justice Department has argued that newspapers and television serve as substitutes for one another).
To the extent that this is true, it would substantially weaken the argument for intervention, since anyone
unable to obtain carriage via television should have available a large number of other effective media options.
In addition, because consumers purchase a wide range of products beyond print and television, the tangential
effects resulting from the greater efficiency of television markets would be dispersed over a broader range of
purchasing decisions rather than being concentrated in the print industry.
115 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
116 Borenstein, supra note 97, at 380, 387-89, 394.
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* * *
The overall thrust of these results is profound. It transforms the
fundamental policy problem from a world in which static and dynamic
efficiency must be traded off one against the other into one in which
simultaneous promotion of both metrics of efficiency is possible. Unlike under
perfect competition, the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers is
anything but neutral. On the contrary, some degree of transfer appears to be a
necessary condition for efficiency. Furthermore, such transfers do not raise the
distributional concerns that occur in other contexts. This is because free entry
will dissipate any supra-competitive profits earned by producers. Indeed, over
the long run the existence of such profits will eventually accrue to the benefit
of consumers in the form of increased product variety.
There are admittedly a number of considerations that may cause the
resulting equilibrium to fall short of the optimum. Some productive
inefficiency inevitably results from the fact that the equilibrium under
monopolistic competition does not minimize average cost. The deadweight
losses that follow from the fact that demand is downward sloping make some
degree of allocative inefficiency endemic. To the extent that fixed costs are
high and product differentiation is strong, some firms may be able to earn
sustainable profits, which in turn will create some degree of static inefficiency
as price is forced farther from marginal cost. The impossibility of perfect price
discrimination suggests that there may be some tendency toward systematic
underproduction. At the same time, the fact that the surplus captured by a new
entrant may include business cannibalized from existing producers can impair
dynamic efficiency by inducing excess entry. How close it will come to the
optimum is an empirical question that depends on the structure of demand, the
relative efficacy of the mechanism for price discrimination, the magnitude of
the fixed costs, and the degree of product differentiation. The ultimate
resolution of the policy issue will thus depend upon a second-best comparison
of the outcome under the approach I am suggesting and the outcome that will
result under the other possible solutions to the problem. As we shall see, the
available empirical evidence suggests that the approach I am proposing will
come closer to the efficient solution than the alternative institutional solutions
embodied in current television policy.
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II. APPLYING PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
TO TELEVISION PROGRAMMING
The integrated model that I have developed thus offers the promise of
reconciling the divergent efficiency considerations that other analyses have
found so insoluble. This Part will examine the fit between the model and the
market for television programming. Section A will examine how well
television programming fits with the definition of nonrival good.117 Section B
will evaluate the fit between the market for television programming and
monopolistic competition. Section C modifies the classic approach taken in
these analyses by arguing in favor of using networks rather than individual
programs as the proper unit of analysis.
A. Television Programming as a Nonrival Good

As Samuelson noted, at first blush television programming appears to
represent a classic example of a public good.118 As is the case with any
information good, the production of television programming requires the
incurrence of significant up-front, fixed costs (often termed “first copy costs”).
In addition, once those first copy costs have been incurred, the costs associated
with transmitting the program to viewers approach zero and do not vary with
audience size. The combination of positive fixed costs and zero marginal costs
thus gives television programming all of the characteristics of a nonrival good.
It is of no consequence that eighty-five percent of U.S. households receive
their television programming via cable, DBS, or some other multi-channel
video program distributor (MVPD) technology that is fully excludable.119 Nor

117 For preliminary discussions of this effect, see Yoo, supra note 51, at 213-17, 232-37; Christopher S.
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 247,
275-77 (2003).
118 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335. For other scholars identifying television programming as a
nonrival good, see, for example, BAKER, supra note 7, at 8-10; BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at
749-50; STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL., MISREGULATING TELEVISION 22, 25, 164 (1984); BRUCE M. OWEN,
ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 18-20 (1975); OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 23-38, 13135; Buchanan, supra note 31; Demsetz, supra note 46; Jora R. Minasian, Public Goods in Theory and Practice
Revisited, 10 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1967); Minasian, supra note 31, at 74; and Ordover & Baumol, supra note 43,
at 14 n.4.
119 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,975, app. B, tbl.B-1 (2002) [hereinafter Ninth
Annual Report on Television Competition].
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does it matter that the development of scrambling technology has even
rendered broadcast television programming fully excludable.120 As noted
above,121 the relevant features of this analysis do not turn on the ability or
inability to exclude anyone from the benefits of any product. The mere fact
that television programming is nonrival in consumption is sufficient by itself to
bring it into conformity with the analysis I am advancing.122
The classic solution to the problem of lack of rivalry discussed above
combines pricing the product at zero and having the government make a direct
payment to the producer of the nonrival good sufficient to fund its creation.123
The interesting wrinkle with respect to television is the availability of over-theair broadcasting as a means for distribution. The availability of this option
created the possibility that much of the funding might be provided by
advertising revenue. This would allow television programs to continue to be
efficiently priced while possibly obviating the need for subsidies.
This section evaluates the extent to which advertising support represents an
efficient solution to the problems of nonrivalry. Subsection 1 examines the
extent to which advertising-supported television is in fact efficiently priced.
Subsection 2 explores whether the marginal costs of producing an additional
unit of television programming are really zero.
1. The Problem of Equating Advertising Support with Efficient Pricing

Samuelson’s case in favor of advertising-supported television hinges on the
assertion that advertising-supported television allows for first-best pricing from
the standpoint of static efficiency. As discussed above,124 this follows from the

120 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also, e.g., BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at
750; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 21, at 638; Head, supra note 28, at 207. It should be noted that some
commentators have focused on noneconomic externalities. They in turn argue that the fact that television
programming creates benefits to the democratic process that are not fully captured by viewers leads to the
systematic underproduction of certain types of programming. BAKER, supra note 7, at 41-62; SUNSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 19-20, 73-74. Discussion of these arguments exceeds the scope of this Article. For my critique of
attempts to justify the regulation of television in terms of its impact on the democratic process, see Yoo, supra
note 117, at 306-46.
121 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
122 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; see also SAMUELSON, supra note 23, at 159 n.1.
123 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
124 See supra pp. 1588-89.
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basic allocative principle that price should be equated with marginal cost. A
closer inspection reveals reasons to question the accuracy of this assertion.
As noted earlier, previous analyses posited that advertising-supported
television was “free” and thus avoided the deadweight loss associated with
charging a positive price. Upon further inquiry, it is far from clear that this
claim is true. On the contrary, there are two countervailing considerations that
raise serious doubts as to whether advertising-supported television is in fact
efficiently priced. On the one hand, these analyses failed to take into account
that advertising-supported television is not “free,” because the audience must
in effect pay for programming through willingness to watch advertisements.125
Although such transactions obviously do not involve cash payments, a more
comprehensive economic analysis would treat the imposition of advertising as
endogenous to the model and regard the nuisance aspects of advertising as
extracting an implicit price from viewers that can create deadweight loss.126
On the other hand, advertising contains content that may have beneficial value
that is distinct from the program itself,127 demonstrated most dramatically by
the existence of infomercials and home shopping networks, which in essence
constitute programming devoted entirely to advertising.128 The fact that
advertising can create benefits as well as extract implicit prices makes the
effective price associated with advertising support ambiguous. It may be too
high or too low. Only in the unlikely event that these two effects exactly offset
each other would it be proper to regard advertising-supported television as
efficiently priced.

125 There is another way that “free” television is not truly free. The broadcast industry’s ability to offer its
programs without exacting direct payments is the direct product of the regulatory decision not to require television stations to pay for their spectrum, because without such an arrangement it is unlikely that advertising
support would be sufficient to cover all of the expenses. As I will discuss later, dedicating this spectrum to
broadcasting has the secondary effect of making other spectrum-based technologies more expensive. In a real
sense, then, viewers pay for free television indirectly by facing higher prices for cellular telephony and other
spectrum-based technologies. See infra Part IV.
126 For examples of more recent analyses that attempt to incorporate direct cash payments and the implicit
price associated with advertising support into a single, integrated pricing model, see Suchan Chae & Daniel
Flores, Broadcasting Versus Narrowcasting, 10 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 41, 45-46 (1998); Claus Thustrup
Hansen & Søren Kyhl, Pay-Per-View Broadcasting of Outstanding Events: Consequences of a Ban, 19 INT’L
J. INDUS. ORG. 589, 590 (2001); and Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, at 264-72.
127 See Chae & Flores, supra note 126, at 52-53 (recognizing that advertising provides benefits to viewers
at the same time that its nuisance value exacts an implicit price).
128 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING
135 (1994).
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As a result, the policy choice between advertising-supported and pay
television is more properly framed not as a choice between first-best, efficient
pricing and second-best, inefficient pricing, but rather as a choice between
second-best pricing schemes.
In addition, acknowledging that both
mechanisms potentially involve second-best pricing arrangements allows for
consideration of mixed regimes in which the networks generate revenue
through both advertising and direct payments.129 Taking all of these
complexities into account reveals the latent ambiguities lurking beneath the
tidy logic supposedly supporting exclusive reliance on advertising support. In
fact, once all of these considerations are taken into account, it becomes
theoretically conceivable that reliance on advertising support could lead to too
much program diversity as well as too little.130
2. The Dangers of Assuming That Marginal Costs Are Zero

Equally questionable is Samuelson’s assumption that the marginal cost of
distributing television programming to additional viewers is zero. Such an
assumption should be approached with some caution, because positing
constant marginal costs makes the economies of scale inexhaustible. As a
result, unless this assumption is empirically valid, the constantly decreasing
average costs may be nothing more than an artifact of the assumptions built
into the model.
A closer analysis provides good reason to question this assumption. It
appears to have been based on the fact that the costs incurred by a local
broadcast station were constant regardless of whether the audience consisted of
one hundred or one hundred thousand viewers. It does not necessarily hold
with respect to cable, because the extension of cable to additional households
does require the incurrence of significant costs. In addition, this reasoning
ignores the fact that television distribution takes place in two stages, not one.
Specifically, transmitting television programming requires that programs be
transmitted from the network to the local broadcast affiliate or cable headend

129

See id. at 54-55; Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, at 253-55. The possibility is also mentioned
without much elaboration in Minasian, supra note 31, at 77, and Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 124.
130 See SIMON P. ANDERSON & STEPHEN COATE, MARKET PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THE CASE OF
BROADCASTING 3, 6, 16-19 (NBER Working Paper 7513, Jan. 2000) (offering a formal model indicating that
reliance on advertising support may lead to too much as well as too little program diversity), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7513.
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before it can be transmitted to homes. When this initial distribution stage was
accomplished through microwave relay systems, it was difficult to argue that
the marginal cost of conveying television programming to additional viewers
was in fact zero. Rather, it would be more appropriate to view the cost
function as a step function, in which no costs are associated with adding a
single marginal viewer, but substantial costs may be involved in adding a block
of viewers.
Technological developments have largely mitigated both of these concerns.
First, the buildout of the cable infrastructure is now largely complete, with
cable now passing over ninety-seven percent of all U.S. television
households.131 This has caused the marginal costs associated with adding an
additional viewer to drop precipitously.132 In addition, satellites have replaced
microwave relay systems as the primary means for distributing programs from
networks to local broadcast stations and cable headends.133 Because satellites
tend to be able to reach relatively large geographic areas without any
appreciable increase in cost, the shift to satellite distribution effectively
eliminates the marginal costs associated with the two-stage transmission of
television programming.
In any event, the possibility that marginal costs may be nonzero does not
substantially change the results. As noted earlier,134 the same analysis applies
without loss of generality so long as marginal costs remain below average
costs. The available empirical evidence indicates that that tends to be the case
for television.135

131 See Ninth Annual Report on Television Competition, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,910 ¶ 19, 26,911 tbl.1
(2002). The FCC noted that the manner in which this number is calculated is not without controversy and
cautioned that it is more reliable as a trend indicator than as an absolute assessment. Even under the more
conservative measures, cable still passes over seventy-eight percent of U.S. households. Id. at 26,910 ¶ 17.
132 Hazlett, supra note 51, at 1348 (citing Omega Satellite Prods. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119,
126 (7th Cir. 1982)).
133 BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 10; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 20, 54, 197.
134 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
135 See Bruce M. Owen & Peter R. Greenhalgh, Competitive Considerations in Cable Television
Franchising, 4 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 69, 76-78 (1986) (reporting empirical results indicating that marginal
costs fall below average costs); see also DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN
CABLE TELEVISION 61 (1997) (reporting estimates that in 1992 programming costs represented seventy-four
percent of cable networks’ total operating expenditures).
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B. The Applicability of Monopolistic Competition Theory to Television

Television programming would also seem to make a good fit with
monopolistic competition theory. Indeed, so good is the fit that Spence’s
seminal analysis invited readers to regard it as a particularly trenchant example
of a monopolistically competitive good.136 Spence subsequently joined with
Bruce Owen, who is perhaps the leading authority on the economics of the
television industry, to offer some initial thoughts applying monopolistic
competition to the television industry. Although Spence and Owen were able
to offer some initial analyses of the welfare impact of their theories,137 they
never empirically validated the applicability of their models to television, nor
did they explore the relative efficacy of the various means of price
discrimination available to the television industry. A reexamination and
extension of their work thus seems to be in order.
The relevant products are clearly differentiated. Although there is some
degree of substitution among programs, viewers do not regard them as perfect
substitutes for one another and clearly have preferences for some programs
over others. In addition, the substitution appears to be driven more by real
differences in product attributes than by spurious product differences.
Consequently, it appears more appropriate to analyze this market through the
lens of the localized competition associated with asymmetric substitution than
that of the equal competition associated with the symmetry assumption.
For the most part, moreover, the market for television programming also
satisfies the requirement of monopolistic competition theory that entry by new
products be relatively easy, although this observation is subject to a caveat. As
I have laid out in more detail elsewhere,138 the television programming

136 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 408; see also Spence, Product Selection, supra note
49, at 234 (drawing conclusions under monopolistic competition theory with respect to television); Spence &
Owen, supra note 7, at 106 (noting that “study of program selection under pay TV is formally
indistinguishable from the analysis of product selection under monopolistic competition”). C. Edwin Baker
also invokes monopolistic competition as a concept. A close inspection suggests that his work really focuses
on the decreasing cost structure caused by the lack of rivalry rather than product differentiation, in which
decreasing costs are a result of the model rather than an assumption. See BAKER, supra note 7, at 9-10, 22-24,
222-26.
137 Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 49, at 411-13; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 118-19.
138 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 182-83, 220-21. For related arguments, see JONATHAN LEVY & FLORENCE
SETZER, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MARKETS 39-
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industry is best viewed as consisting of the same three-stage chain of
production that exists with respect to most goods. The first stage is the
manufacturing stage, in which the actual products to be sold are created. In the
television industry, the manufacturing stage is occupied primarily by the movie
studios. The second stage is the wholesale stage, occupied in the case of
television by the networks, which acquire the rights to these products directly
from manufacturers and assemble them into complete product packages. The
third and final stage is occupied by retailers, who are responsible for final
delivery of the products to end-users. In the case of television, the retail stage
is occupied by local broadcast stations, cable operators, and DBS providers.
Entry into each of the first two stages of production appears to be easy.
The factors of production needed at the manufacturing stage, i.e., talent and
video production equipment, are readily available and already well organized
to supply these same inputs to other industries.139 Recent history has
demonstrated the ease with which new firms can enter the wholesale stage.
Over the last decade, the number of broadcast networks has grown to the point
that A.C. Nielsen now collects data on what it regards to be the seven major
broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox, UPN, WB, and PaxTV). In recent
decades, cable, DBS, and the other MVPDs have surpassed broadcasting as the
primary means of receiving television programming, now serving over eightyfive percent of all U.S. television households.140 The concomitant increase in
channel capacity caused a spectacular proliferation of television networks
offering a dizzying array of increasingly diverse programming. Since 1990,
the number of television networks has skyrocketed from 70 to 308, with
another 60 networks currently in the planning stages.141
Entry into the retail distribution stage is somewhat more constrained. This
is a matter of some concern, because any imperfections in the markets for

40 (1982), and Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie
Channel as a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION, supra note 82, at 338, 347-48.
139 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 222. A notable exception is some sports programming which is
both subject to widely divergent local preferences and which is protected against entry at the factor level by
sports leagues. Two prominent examples are the battle between the New York Yankees and Cablevision as
well as Comcast’s attempts to use its control over the Philadelphia 76ers and Flyers to forestall the emergence
of competing MVPDs.
140 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
141 See Ninth Annual Report on Television Competition, 17 F.C.C.R. 26,901, 26,959 ¶ 134, 26,960 ¶ 137
(2002); Yoo, supra note 51, at 231 & tbl.5.
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inputs into television program production may cause surplus to be captured as
rents at the factor level rather than being reinvested into programming.142 That
said, recent technological developments have made entry into the retail
distribution stage of the television industry easier than ever before. The
number of broadcast stations has increased dramatically, with the number of
over-the-air signals that reach the average U.S. household soaring from 3.9 to
13 between 1980 and 2000.143 Cable television has emerged as the primary
system for delivering television programming to the home, now being
available to over ninety-seven percent of all U.S. households144 and having
captured sixty-five percent of all U.S. television households.145
In addition, since its deployment in 1994, DBS has emerged as “one of the
most successful new consumer electronics product introductions in history.”146
Currently available to any household with a clear line of sight to the southern
sky,147 the most recent data collected by the FCC indicate that DBS has
captured thirteen percent of all U.S. television households and twenty percent
of the MVPD market,148 surpassing the penetration levels identified by federal
law as representing effective competition.149 In addition, DBS subscribership
has been growing at a rate roughly twenty times that of other MVPDs.150

142 The possible retention of rents that may exist if factor markets are imperfect is analogous to the wellknown “double marginalization” that can occur when successive levels of a chain of distribution are
monopolistic or oligopolistic. See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 347 (1950) (offering the seminal statement of this insight). Interestingly, the presence of imperfect
factor markets arguably provides an efficiency justification for allowing greater vertical integration, because
vertical integration would help ensure that such rents were available to finance the fixed costs. See Yoo, supra
note 51, at 192-93, 213-14, 234-35.
143 Yoo, supra note 51, at 212.
144 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
145 Ninth Annual Report on Television Competition, 17 F.C.C.R. at 26,911 tbl.1.
146 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Third Annual Report, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 4377-78 ¶ 40 (1997); accord Paul Farhi, Dishing Out
the Competition to Cable TV, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1996, at H1 (calling DBS “the most successful new
consumer electronics product ever marketed”).
147 Yoo, supra note 51, at 208.
148 Ninth Annual Report on Television Regulation, 17 F.C.C.R. at 26,975 tbl.B-1.
149 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1) (2000) (providing that a cable operator faces effective competition if another
MVPD is available in at least fifty percent of the cable operator’s service area and if the MVPD actually serves
at least fifteen percent of MVPD households in that area).
150 See Yoo, supra note 51, at 208 tbl.1, 228-29.
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In addition, the industry is in the process of deploying digital television,
with 563 stations already transmitting a digital signal.151 It has long been
apparent, moreover, that rather than using these digital channels to transmit a
single stream of high definition television (HDTV), broadcasters could use the
same amount of spectrum to multicast five or more signals of standard
definition television (SDTV) at the same level of resolution currently used in
analog television.152 Thus, although the retail level of the television industry
remains rather concentrated, it does appear to be sufficiently competitive to
justify the application of monopolistic competition theory.
C. Networks vs. Programs as the Proper Unit of Analysis

Public good and monopolistic competition theory would thus seem to
provide apt frameworks for analyzing the market for television programming.
This basic model would benefit from one additional refinement. Although
they are not completely clear on this point, the leading authorities seem to
analyze this market in terms of individual programs.153 By taking individual
programs as the proper unit of analysis, it posits that all transactions for
programs occur in a spot market.
This presumption ignores the fact that television programs tend not to be
distributed on an individual basis.154 The reason that programs tend not to be
offered individually stems from the fact that program producers are able to
achieve substantial cost efficiencies by offering programs in integrated
packages spanning extended blocks of time. Some of the efficiencies related to
network distribution are technological. Currently networks distribute programs

151

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Carriage of Digital Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2621 n.158 (2001) (citing news reports indicating that FCC Commissioners
and industry leaders became aware of the option to multicast SDTV as early as 1992); Richard E. Wiley, The
Challenge of Choice, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 401 (1994).
153 See, e.g., Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 103.
154 There are, of course, some notable exceptions. Recently released films, which tend to be valued higher
than conventional television programs, are often initially offered individually on a pay-per-view basis.
Another exception is syndication, in which individual shows are sold to stations on a city-by-city basis.
Syndicated programming is dominated by reruns of television series that first appeared on network television
(called “off-network syndication”). It also encompasses some programs produced specifically for syndication
(called “first-run syndication”), including daytime talk shows (such as Oprah and The Rosie O’Donnell Show),
certain game shows (such as Jeopardy and Wheel of Fortune), and certain original series (with the most
successful example being Star Trek: The Next Generation).
152

2003]

RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION

1637

to local broadcast stations via satellite. Because satellites tend to be able to
reach relatively large geographic areas without any appreciable increase in
cost, transmitting to large numbers of networked stations leads to dramatic
reductions in the per-station costs of satellite transmission.155
Other reasons that programs are typically distributed through networks are
related to transaction costs. Filling a broadcast schedule requires an
extraordinary number of transactions, with the weekly prime time schedule
alone being comprised of forty-two half-hour slots. If all of the approximately
two hundred television stations affiliated with the major networks were to
attempt to fill their schedules in a spot market for particular programs, those
stations would have to negotiate more than eight thousand transactions with
program producers and complete tens of thousands more negotiations with
advertisers. In addition, the transaction costs associated with assembling a
broadcast schedule are further exacerbated by a phenomenon known as
“adjacency effects,” which arise from the fact that the value of a particular
program depends as much on the character of the programs broadcast
immediately beforehand and afterward as it does on the character of the
program itself. Local broadcast stations attempting to purchase programs in a
spot market would confront a seemingly insuperable joint maximization
problem, as the value of any particular program would depend upon the
outcome of a large number of other negotiations. Network control of
significant blocks of time substantially reduces the total number of transactions
that must be consummated and vastly simplifies what might otherwise be a
nearly intractable joint maximization problem. It also makes it easier to spread
risk of program failure and provide greater flexibility in compensating
advertisers should a particular program fail to do as well as expected.156

155 BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 10; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 20, 54, 197. A similar bias
toward full-time networking existed prior to the advent of satellite distribution of television programming
when programs were distributed primarily through wireline distribution systems or through networks of
microwave relays. That bias was a result of regulatory policy, in that the FCC permitted AT&T, which held a
monopoly over video interconnection services, to charge a higher rate to part-time than to full-time networks.
The arrival of private microwave systems and purchasing of relay services by intermediaries eventually
mitigated the bias inherent in this differential tariff. Ultimately the FCC required AT&T to establish a tariff
that no longer discriminated between part-time and full-time networking. See BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at
10-11.
156 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 53-54; see also BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 6-7.
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Furthermore, network distribution allows program producers to mitigate the
danger of strategic behavior that arises whenever fixed-cost investments are
required. The ideal situation for a particular television station arises when
other stations cover all of the fixed costs associated with creating the network.
Once a producer sinks the fixed costs needed to create a network, individual
stations have the incentive to attempt to free ride on the willingness of other
stations to bear the costs associated with creating and maintaining the network
by holding out in an attempt to force the producer to charge no more than
marginal cost.157 Furthermore, to the extent that the quality of programs is
difficult to determine ex ante, program producers face the problems associated
with adverse selection, in which television stations attempt to take advantage
of the better information available post hoc to accept only those programs that
are the most profitable. Networks allow producers to eliminate these risks by
providing them with a guaranteed national distribution system for the programs
that they create.158
These considerations suggest that the appropriate unit of analysis may be
individual networks, rather than individual programs. Fortunately, such a shift
would not cause any dramatic change in the relevant analysis. Fixed costs
dominate variable costs in the same manner regardless of whether the problem
is analyzed in terms of networks or programs, because after the fixed costs of
assembling a package of network programming have been incurred, the
marginal costs associated with distributing it to additional viewers remain low.
As a result, shifting the unit of analysis from programs to networks may be
made without causing any significant alteration to the core analysis.
III. ANALYZING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION THROUGH A
PUBLIC GOOD AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION LENS
In this Part, I would like to explore the insights provided by the economic
analysis I have developed by applying it to what has perhaps represented the
central commitment in U.S. television policy: the desire to protect free, local
television. Although other policy considerations have emerged,159 localism has

157

See Yoo, supra note 51, at 194-200.
See id. at 214-17.
159 It should be noted that television policy has also focused on two other goals: the promotion of diversity
and competition. The model advanced in this Article has significant implications for both of these
158
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remained the touchstone underlying the regulatory approach adopted with
respect to every television technology that has emerged since that time.160
Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the overarching commitment
to free, local television should be disaggregated into four, more discrete policy
commitments. Specifically, these include:
(1) the preference for local programming over national programming,
(2) the preference for free television over pay television,
(3)

the preference for incumbent television providers over new
entrants and emerging television technologies, and

(4) the preference for single-channel television technologies over
multi-channel television technologies.
Applying the economic analysis developed above helps to explain one of
the great conundrums of television policy, which is why such longstanding
attempts to promote free, local content have proven to be such a dismal
failure.161 Careful application of the model reveals how each of these
subcommitments has reduced the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of
television programming and in the process made it increasingly difficult for
free, local television to survive. If anything, it appears that U.S. television
policy might well have been improved if Congress and the FCC had adopted
precisely the opposite presumptions.

considerations as well. I plan to offer a more comprehensive analysis of these other two policies in later work.
For my initial views of the FCC’s attempts to promote competition in the television industry, see infra Part
III.D.1 and Yoo, supra note 51, at 181-248. For an exploration of diversity-based justifications for television
regulation, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 263-66, 306-46.
160 See infra Part III.A.1.b-d.
161 Empirical studies indicate that broadcasting carries precious little local content. E.g., Thomas W.
Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 17980 (2000); Eli M. Noam, Public-Interest Programming by American Commercial Television, in PUBLIC
TELEVISION IN AMERICA 145, 173 (Eli M. Noam & Jens Waltermann eds., 1998); see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text (documenting scholarly criticism of the diversity and quality of television content).
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A. Decreasing Average Costs and Economies of Scale: Locally Oriented vs.
Nationally Oriented Programming

The first policy subcommitment that I would like to examine is the attempt
to promote locally oriented programming over nationally oriented
programming. Subsection 1 introduces the basic television technologies and
describes how the preference for local content has shaped the regulation of
those technologies. Subsection 2 employs the analysis developed above to
assess the economic impact of the commitment to local content. Subsection 3
then employs the analysis I develop to critique specific regulatory attempts to
promote local content. My overall conclusion is that the commitment to
locally oriented programming has reduced the overall quantity, quality, and
diversity of television programming by preventing television networks from
realizing the existing economies of scale made available by the lack of rivalry.
1. The Regulatory Commitment to Locally Oriented Programming
a. Analog Broadcasting

The commitment to locally oriented television programming first emerged
when the FCC made its initial decisions with respect to conventional broadcast
television.162 For example, it helped to shape one of the first major regulatory
initiatives launched by the FCC known as the Chain Broadcasting Rules,163
which were designed to limit the power of the triopoly of networks that had

162 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizing that
the FCC “historically has followed a policy of ‘localism’ as a sound means of promoting the statutory goal of
efficient public service”); Competition, Rate Deregulation & Comm’n’s Policies Relating to Provision of Cable Television Serv., Report, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962, 5039-40 ¶ 149 (1990) (acknowledging that localism has been a
driving force in FCC policy for the previous fifty years); Satellite Delivery of Network Signals to Unserved
Households for Purposes of Satellite Home Viewer Act, Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2654, 2659 ¶ 11 (1999)
(“Localism has been a central principle of broadcast policy since the Radio Act of 1927.”); Amendment of
Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv.
for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Systems, First Report & Order, 38
F.C.C. 683, 699-700 ¶¶ 44-48 (1965) [hereinafter CATV First Report & Order]; see also Quincy Cable TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that one of the cardinal objectives of the
FCC was “the development of ‘a system of [free] local broadcasting stations,’ such that ‘all communities of
appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for local self-expression’”) (quoting
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968)).
163 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2003). See generally Yoo, supra note 51, at 181-219 (reviewing the Chain Broadcasting Rules).
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come to dominate broadcasting.164 Enactment of the rules was motivated in
part by a desire to ensure that local stations retained control over programming
decisions.165 The Supreme Court invoked the same rationale when upholding
the Chain Broadcasting Rules in NBC v. United States,166 which remains the
seminal case on broadcast regulation. In the words of the Court, “[l]ocal
program service is a vital part of community life,” and the rules were needed to
help ensure that stations stand “ready, able, and willing to serve the needs of
the local community by broadcasting . . . outstanding local events.”167
The desire to promote locally oriented content also underlies the principles
followed by the FCC when allocating television frequencies to particular
communities. The basic policy issue followed from the fact that only so many
stations could operate within any geographic region without interfering with
one another. On the one hand, the FCC could have established a handful of
relatively high-power stations that reached large regions. This would have
increased the number of signals that each household could receive, but would
have restricted broadcast facilities to only the biggest cities. On the other
hand, the FCC had the option of creating a large number of stations operating
at relatively low power. This would allow the FCC to increase the number of
communities that enjoyed the services of their own station. It also meant that
any particular community would receive only a limited number of broadcast
signals.
When it came time to establish the basic table of allocations that would
govern television broadcasting, the FCC adopted the latter approach and
allocated stations so as to ensure that as many communities as possible had at
least one television station.168 As the Supreme Court has noted,169 the FCC did

164 See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 30-34 (1941). Although
initially developed for radio in 1941, it was extended to television shortly thereafter. See Amendment to Part 3
of the Comm’n’s Rules, 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (1946). The FCC has subsequently abolished the Chain Broadcasting
Rules with respect to radio, so as a practical matter their only remaining relevance is with respect to television.
See Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Regarding Television Broad., Report & Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4538,
4539 ¶ 5 (1995).
165 See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 164, at 63, 65, 66.
166 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
167 Id. at 203.
168 Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C.
148, 167-72 ¶¶ 63-82 (1952) [hereinafter Television Allocations Sixth Report & Order]. For a discussion of
the impact that this allocation policy has on the level of competition in the television industry, see infra Part
III.C.2.a.
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so because it believed that placing television stations in a larger number of
communities would provide “local outlets that will be responsive to local
needs.”170 In so ruling, the FCC rejected a proposal submitted by the nascent
DuMont Network that would have made it more likely that a fourth television
network would survive.171 This action was based in part on the belief that it
was more important to maximize the number of communities receiving
television allocations in order to ensure that “as many communities as possible
should have the opportunity of enjoying the advantages that derive from
having local outlets that will be responsive to local needs.”172
In addition, localism concerns provided the foundation for many of the
content-based requirements imposed on television broadcasters. For example,
the commitment to localism was reflected in the licensing criteria applied by
the FCC, which has long emphasized the importance of local ownership173 and

169 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (“Congress designed this system of allocation to afford each community of appreciable size . . . an outlet for exchange on matters of local concern.”);
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968) (recognizing that the FCC and Congress
had historically pursued policies designed to ensure that “‘all communities of appreciable size [will] have at
least one television station’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 3 (1962)).
170 Television Allocations Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. at 172 ¶ 79.
171 As explained later in greater detail, the number of networks is determined largely by the percentage of
the country that could receive four broadcast signals. See infra notes 368-70 and accompanying text. The
DuMont plans would have increased the population receiving four or more channels to nearly ninety-five percent and increased the percentage of the population receiving technically comparable signals to ninety-three
percent—levels that would have greatly increased the feasibility of a fourth network. See Thomas L.
Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications
Commission’s Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 891, 921-26, 929 tbl.10, 938-39 &
tbl.16 (1981).
172 Television Allocations Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. at 171-72 ¶ 79.
173 The FCC has long exhibited a preference for licensees who will participate full time in station
operations, on the grounds that full-time managers are more likely to exhibit “greater sensitivity to an area’s
changing needs, and to programming designed to serve these needs.” Policy Statement on Comparative Broad.
Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395 (1965). The FCC indicated that value of the integration of ownership in
management “is increased if the participating owners are local residents.” Id. at 396. The FCC further
indicated that “residence in the principal community to be served will be of primary importance,” especially if
it is for several years. Id. The D.C. Circuit struck down the integration of ownership and management as
arbitrary and capricious. See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 878-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Flagstaff Broad. Found.
v. FCC, 979 F.2d 1566, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Congress
subsequently enacted legislation that eliminated the FCC’s discretion over new licenses and severely limited
its discretion with respect to renewals. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)-(l) (2000). For a review of the history of these
regulatory provisions, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 256-60, and Lili Levi, Not with a Bang but a Whimper:
Broadcast License Renewal and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 243, 258-63, 275-77
(1996).
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efforts to determine local tastes.174 The FCC has also repeatedly emphasized
that license holders bear an obligation to broadcast local content and that their
willingness to do so will affect the likelihood that their licenses will be
renewed.175 While it was in force, the Fairness Doctrine required that
television stations present news and programs devoted to public issues “of
interest in the community served by the particular station.”176

174 Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. Applicants, First Report & Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 418, 41819 ¶¶ 4-5, 423 ¶ 18 (1976) (requiring that ascertainment be a continuous process and requiring that station
personnel confer with a designated list of community leaders); Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by
Broad. Applicants, Report & Order, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 ¶¶ 17-20 (1971) (adopting interim measures
requiring license applicants to conduct “ascertainment” efforts by consulting with community leaders and
members of the general public six months prior to the filing of the application); En Banc Programming
Inquiry, Report & Statement, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2316 (1960) (calling the “diligent, positive, and continuing
effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of his community or service area” the
“principal ingredient of the licensee’s obligation to operate his station in the public interest” and requiring the
licensee to identify the measures taken to determine those tastes by canvassing the potential audience and
consulting with community leaders) [hereinafter En Banc Programming Inquiry]. The FCC eliminated these
ascertainment requirements in 1984. Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, & Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report & Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1076, 1098-1101 ¶¶ 47-54 (1984) [hereinafter Television Deregulation Order]. The agency is
considering reinstituting a weakened version of ascertainment. Standardized & Enhanced Disclosure
Requirements for Television Broad. Licensee Pub. Interest Obligations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 15
F.C.C.R. 19,816, 19,826-27 ¶¶ 23-25 (2000) [hereinafter Pub. Interest Disclosure Requirements].
175 See Cowles Broad., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981), aff’d sub nom. Cent. Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683
F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (identifying service to the community of license as a consideration in determining
whether a broadcast license should be renewed); Pub. Interest Disclosure Requirements, 15 F.C.C.R. at 19,816
¶ 1, 19,818 ¶ 6 (noting that the public interest requires each television broadcaster to air programming
responsive to the needs and interests of its community of license); Television Deregulation Order, 98 F.C.C.2d
at 1091 ¶ 32 (same), aff’d in part, Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987); En
Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. at 2314 (identifying “opportunity for local self-expression” and the
“development and use of local talent” as “major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest”); see
also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3526(e)(11)(i), (13) (2003) (requiring that broadcasters maintain lists of recent programs
that have provided the station’s most significant treatment of community issues and local public service
announcements). For earlier similar requirements, see, for example, Television Deregulation Order, 98
F.C.C.2d at 1078 nn.3-4 (reporting that between 1961 and 1973 the FCC applied a processing guideline
allowing for expedited renewal for licensees that proposed devoting at least five percent of its schedule to local
live programming), and FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BROADCAST
LICENSEES (1946) (emphasizing the importance of local live programming).
176 Handling of Pub. Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine & the Pub. Interest Standards of the
Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 ¶ 3 (1974) (citing Report on Editorializing by Broad.
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949)). The FCC subsequently abolished the Fairness Doctrine. Syracuse
Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987), aff’d, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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The desire to promote local programming is also evident in the regulation
of a new broadcast service known as low power television (LPTV) initiated in
1982. LPTV operates through micro-television stations that transmit at such
low power that they do not interfere with existing full power stations. As a
result, LPTV stations typically have a range of no more than twenty miles,
which makes them inherently well suited to further the important service
objective of providing local programming.177 In addition, policymakers have
regulated LPTV in a manner designed to promote locally oriented content still
further. For example, LPTV stations can obtain free carriage on cable systems
only if they can show that their programming “would address local news and
information needs which are not being adequately served by full power
broadcast stations.”178 In addition, when Congress passed legislation strengthening the spectrum rights of LPTV stations in 1999, it did so only with respect
to those stations that could demonstrate a commitment to locally produced
programming.179
Perhaps most tellingly, localism has become the primary justification for
allowing television stations to use spectrum for free. Currently, broadcasters
are the only spectrum users who do not have to pay for their licenses. Instead,
television licensees receive six megahertz of spectrum for free, subject only to
the requirement that they use their licenses in a manner that serves the “public
interest, convenience, and necessity.”180 Although policymakers appear to
have initially based their decision to give away spectrum for free on their belief
that market-oriented distribution of spectrum was impossible,181 in subsequent
years they have based the decision to give away spectrum on the broadcaster’s

177 Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l
Telecomms. Sys., Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 21,470 ¶ 12 (1982). In contrast, full power stations
typically have a range of up to eighty miles. See Establishment of a Class A Television Serv., Memorandum
Opinion & Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 8244, 8245-46 ¶ 2 & n.6 (2001). For additional discussion
of LPTV regulation, see infra notes 376-82 and accompanying text.
178 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B) (2000). For a more complete discussion of must-carry, see infra notes 190201 and accompanying text.
179 Id. § 336(f)(2)(A)(i) (limiting new “Class A” licenses to LPTV stations who could show that they
broadcast an average of at least three hours of locally produced programming per week during the ninety-day
period preceding the enactment of the statute).
180 Id. §§ 307(c)(1), 309(a), 309(k)(1)(A).
181 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943). See generally Yoo, supra note 117, at 260,
267-69, 348-49 (discussing controversy over whether Congress and the FCC understood that market allocation
of broadcast licenses was possible); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum
Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 538-39 (1998) (same).
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willingness to fulfill public interest obligations, including providing local
programming.182 Estimates of the value of the spectrum given to conventional
television broadcasters in return for these public interest obligations range
from $20 billion to $132 billion.183
b. Cable Television

The emphasis on localism also underlay the FCC’s initial efforts to regulate
cable television. In a classic example of the type of implicit cross subsidy that
Richard Posner has aptly dubbed “taxation by regulation,”184 the FCC
attempted to promote local programming indirectly by imposing regulations on
cable.185 For example, the FCC attempted to promote local content directly by
requiring cable operators to create original programming186 and to “open[ ] . . .

182 See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (“A licensed broadcaster is ‘granted the free and
exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened
by enforceable public obligations.’”) (quoting Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.)); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969)
(justifying public interest obligations in part by the government’s role in allocating frequencies); Hazlett, supra
note 181, at 539-41. For arguments by FCC personnel justifying the imposition of localism requirements by
the fact that television broadcasters receive their spectrum for free, see Hundt, supra note 6, at 1095-96; Reed
Hundt & Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules
for Children’s Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11, 16-19 (1996); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting
Beyond Scarcity: A New Paradigm for Assessing the Constitutionality of Broadcast Regulation, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1687, 1725-34 (1997); and Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 686, 688-90 (1998).
183 See Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: The Birth and Stillbirth of DTV
Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 533 (1997); Logan, supra note 182, at 1728; Rubin, supra note 182, at
694.
184 Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971).
185 See Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that beginning in 1966
the FCC attempted to use cable regulation to promote localism).
186 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna
Television Sys., First Report & Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969), vacated sub nom. Midwest Video Corp. v.
United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev’d, 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Programs originated by cable
operators were subject to the Fairness Doctrine and were subject to the same sponsorship identification and
equal access to political broadcasting requirements applied to broadcasting. Id. at 218-22 ¶¶ 39-47. The FCC
consistently justified its program origination rules by the importance of “fostering local programming designed
to cater to local needs and interests.” Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G, of the Comm’n’s Rules &
Regulations Relative to Program Origination by Cable Television Sys., Report & Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090,
1105 ¶ 32 (1974) [hereinafter Program Origination Repeal Order]; accord Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K,
of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna Television Systems, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 421-22 ¶ 13 (1968) (mandated programming origination
in order to “increas[e] the number of local outlets for community self-expression”) [hereinafter CATV NPRM
& NOI]; Midwest Television, Inc., Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 478, 505 ¶ 62 (1968) (same); see also Midwest
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new outlets for local expression”187 by devoting channels to public,
educational, and governmental access.188 The FCC and Congress also
attempted to protect the locally oriented content indirectly by restricting cable
operators’ ability to import broadcast signals from other markets.189

Video, 406 U.S. at 668 (plurality opinion) (relying on the goal of “fostering local programming designed to
cater to local needs and interests” to uphold the FCC’s jurisdiction to promulgate program origination
requirements). The FCC later stayed and subsequently repealed this requirement. Program Origination Repeal
Order, 49 F.C.C.2d at 1104-10 ¶¶ 31-45. Some municipal licensing authorities have continued to impose local
origination requirements. See, e.g., Chi. Cable Communications v. Chi. Cable Comm’n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1549
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the encouragement of localism represents an important interest sufficient to
justify upholding municipally imposed local origination requirement against due process, equal protection, and
First Amendment challenges).
187 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna
Television Sys., Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190 ¶ 121 (1972) [hereinafter Cable
Television Report & Order], aff’d sub nom. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Amendment
of Part 76 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Concerning the Cable Television Channel Capacity & Access
Channel Requirements of Section 76.251, Report & Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 ¶ 8, 298 ¶¶ 14-15 (1976).
188 The FCC first imposed these requirements in 1972. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at
190-91 ¶¶ 122-24. Although these rules were originally supposed to go into effect in 1977, the FCC postponed
their implementation. Amendment of Part 76 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Postponing or
Canceling Mar. 31, 1977 Date by Which Major Mkt. Cable Television Sys. Existing Prior to Mar. 31, 1972,
Must Be in Compliance with Section 76.251(a)(1)-(a)(8), Report & Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 207 (1975). The
Supreme Court subsequently struck down the rules as being beyond the FCC’s jurisdiction. FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Congress ultimately obviated the Court’s jurisdictional concerns in 1984
by explicitly authorizing local franchising authorities to require applicants to provide public, educational, and
governmental access channels. 47 U.S.C. § 531(a)-(b) (2000).
189 The regulatory history of these provisions is rather tortuous. The FCC’s first step in restricting the
importation of distant signals was to impose “network nonduplication” rules, which required cable operators to
delete any programming that duplicated programming provided by a local network affiliate. CATV First
Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 719-30 ¶¶ 93-127 (1965). The FCC then prohibited cable systems operating
in the top one hundred major markets from importing signals from other markets without FCC approval on a
case-by-case basis. Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of
Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna
Sys., Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 782 ¶ 141 (1966) [hereinafter CATV Second Report & Order].
The FCC reaffirmed the network nonduplication rules, but shortened it from the thirty-day window running
from fifteen days before the network exhibition to fifteen days afterwards to a simple prohibition of same-day
exhibition. Id. at 788-89 ¶ 156, 746-50 ¶¶ 49-58.
In 1968, the FCC began enforcing new interim rules requiring that cable systems in the top one hundred
markets seeking to import distant signal obtain consent from the station originating the signal. CATV NPRM
& NOI, 15 F.C.C.2d at 437 ¶ 51. The FCC later abandoned this approach in 1972 and instead authorized cable
systems operating in the top one hundred markets to import up to two distant signals. Cable Television Report
& Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 171 ¶ 74, 177-78 ¶ 90. In so doing, the FCC also instituted “leapfrogging” rules,
which required operators that imported distant signals to do so only from the closest available source. Id. at
179 ¶¶ 92-93. It also limited the network nonduplication rule to a ban on simultaneous transmission and
created new “syndicated exclusivity” rules requiring cable operators who import distant signals to delete any
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Most importantly, concerns about localism motivated the protracted
campaign by the FCC and Congress to impose the so-called “must-carry”
rules, which required cable operators to carry all television stations operating
in their service area for free.190 The FCC consistently based must-carry in part
on the need to preserve the local content provided by television
broadcasters.191 After the D.C. Circuit thwarted the FCC’s attempts to impose

syndicated programming to which a local station had acquired exclusive rights. Id. at 165 ¶ 60, 166 ¶¶ 62-64,
181 ¶ 98.
The FCC subsequently repealed the leapfrogging rules in 1976. Amendment of Subpart D of Part 76 of
Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations with Respect to Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage
(Leapfrog Rules): § 76.59(b)(1) & (2), 76.61(b)(1) & (2) & 76.63, Report & Order, 57 F.C.C.2d 625 (1975)
[hereinafter Leapfrogging Rules Repeal Order]. It also repealed the distant signal and the syndicated
exclusivity rules in 1980. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report & Order, 79
F.C.C.2d 663, 725-46 ¶¶ 148-91, 768-69 ¶¶ 241-43 (1980) [hereinafter Syndex Repeal Order], aff’d sub nom.
Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). Eight years
later, the FCC reversed course and reinstated the syndicated exclusivity rules. Amendment of Parts 73 & 76 of
the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Program Exclusivity in the Cable & Broad. Indus., Report & Order, 3
F.C.C.R. 5299 (1988), aff’d sub nom. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The
network nonduplication rules remain in force. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92, 76.101 (2003).
The FCC consistently based these carriage limitations in part on the need to preserve the local content
provided by broadcasting. Syndex Repeal Order, 79 F.C.C.2d at 725-26 ¶¶ 148-50, 744 ¶ 185; Cable
Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 71 F.C.C.2d 1004, 1020
¶¶ 45-46 (1979); Inquiry into Econ. Relationship Between Television Broad. & Cable Television, Report, 71
F.C.C.2d 632, 645 ¶ 33, 658 ¶ 68, 661 ¶ 72 (1979); Leapfrogging Rules Repeal Order, 57 F.C.C.2d at 627 ¶ 6;
Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 150 ¶ 15; CATV NPRM & NOI, 15 F.C.C.2d at 439 ¶ 56;
CATV Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 770 ¶ 114, 775 ¶ 124(iii), 788-89 ¶ 155; CATV First Report &
Order, 38 F.C.C. at 699 ¶ 45, 700 ¶ 48; see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174
(1968) (upholding the FCC’s jurisdiction to prohibit distant signal importation in part because of the need to
preserve “‘outlet[s] for local self-expression’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 3 (1962)).
190 The FCC foreshadowed the imposition of must-carry in the very first decision in which it asserted
jurisdiction over cable systems. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 (1962), aff’d,
321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The FCC later imposed must-carry on cable
systems that received programming through microwave transmission, CATV First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C.
at 705 ¶ 57, 716-17 ¶¶ 85-90, and extended must-carry to systems that retransmitted over-the-air television
broadcasts, CATV Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 746 ¶¶ 48-49, 752-53 ¶ 66 (extending same rules to
all cable systems). See also Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 170-71 ¶ 74, 172-76 ¶¶ 78-87
(reaffirming must-carry); Implementation of Provisions of Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed.
Reg. 18,637 (1985) (same).
191 See, e.g., Inquiry into Econ. Relationship Between Television Broad. & Cable Television, Report, 71
F.C.C.2d 632, 645 ¶ 33, 658 ¶ 68, 661 ¶ 72 (1979); Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 150 ¶ 15;
CATV NPRM & NOI, 15 F.C.C.2d at 439 ¶ 56; CATV Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 770 ¶ 114, 775
¶ 124(iii), 788-89 ¶ 155; CATV First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. at 699 ¶ 45, 700 ¶ 48; see also Southwestern
Cable, 392 U.S. at 174 (upholding the FCC’s jurisdiction to impose must-carry in part on the need to preserve
“‘outlet[s] for local self-expression’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 3).
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must-carry as a regulatory matter,192 Congress intervened with legislation
erecting a new regulatory scheme. This scheme required all full-power local
broadcast stations to decide every three years whether they wished to be
governed by a “retransmission consent” regime,193 which allowed them to
negotiate with cable operators over the terms and conditions of carriage, or by
“must carry,”194 which required the cable operators to provide carriage for
free.195
Congress attached a series of findings to the must-carry legislation
emphasizing that importance of preserving television broadcasting as the
source of “the local origination of programming”196 and of “local news and
public affairs programming.”197 The findings also emphasized that without
must-carry, the ability of local broadcasters “to originate quality local
programming w[ould] be seriously jeopardized.”198
The emphasis on localism was further underscored by two provisions
authorizing the FCC to extend must-carry beyond local full power stations.
These provisions authorized the extension of must-carry to low power stations
that the FCC determined “would address local news and informational needs
which are not being adequately served by full power television broadcast
stations.”199 They also authorized the FCC to include stations operating
outside of a community if justified by “the value of localism” as indicated by
the provision of “coverage or other local service to such community” or “news
coverage of issues of concern to such community or . . . carriage . . . of

192 The D.C. Circuit sustained a constitutional challenge to the FCC’s first attempt to impose must-carry.
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FCC reinstated must-carry as a
transitional measure, only to see it invalidated once again by the D.C. Circuit. Amendment of Part 76 of the
Comm’n’s Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broad. Signals by Cable Television Sys., Report & Order,
1 F.C.C.R. 864 (1986), vacated sub nom. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
193 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1)(A) (2000).
194 Id. §§ 325(b)(1)(B), 534.
195 Id. § 325(b)(3).
196 Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(10),
106 Stat. 1460, 1461.
197 Id. § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. at 1461; see also id. § 2(a)(8)(B), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding that “public
television is a local community institution . . . that provides public service programming that is responsive to
the needs and interests of the local community”).
198 Id. § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462.
199 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B).
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sporting and other events to the community.”200 The Supreme Court relied
heavily on the preservation of locally oriented content in its landmark Turner
Broadcasting decision upholding must-carry against a First Amendment
challenge.201
c. DBS

Localism concerns also underlay the manner in which Congress and the
FCC have regulated DBS systems, such as DirecTV and the Dish Network.202
Initially, the FCC imposed only minimal regulation on DBS and in particular
declined to subject DBS to access requirements designed to ensure that its
programming would be responsive to community interests.203 In so ruling, the
FCC emphasized the importance of allowing a new service to experiment with
service offerings as well as technical and organizational characteristics.204 It
also rejected arguments that the introduction of DBS would harm existing
broadcasters by exposing them to greater competition, would reduce the
availability of free television service, and would reduce the amount and quality
of locally produced programming. The FCC concluded that the prospect of
providing television service to rural areas then unserved by broadcasting and
cable, the increase in variety of programming throughout the country, and the
potential for offering services not previously available, such as high definition
television, stereophonic sound, and dual language sound tracks, justified the
deployment of DBS.205 The D.C. Circuit sustained the FCC’s actions,

200

Id. § 534(h)(1)(C).
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192-93 (1997) (upholding must-carry because
of the government interest in “increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression” and “ensuring
the continuation of the local origination of broadcast programming”) (internal quotations omitted); see also id.
at 234, 244 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the government justified must-carry in part by the need to
preserve “programming that is ‘responsive’ to the needs of the local community”) (citing Brief for Federal
Appellees 13, 30).
202 For useful reviews of the history of DBS, see Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1062-68 (1997), and Richard L.
Weber, Note, Riding on a Diamond in the Sky: The DBS Set-Aside Provision of the 1992 Cable Act, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1795, 1797-1800, 1806-10, 1813-27 (1999).
203 Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broad. Satellites for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 714 ¶¶ 99-100 (1982)
[hereinafter DBS Order], aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
204 Id. at 707-08 ¶ 81.
205 Id. at 686-87 ¶ 32, 689-92 ¶¶ 38-44; Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct
Broad. Satellites for the Period Following 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Notice of Proposed
201
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concluding that “the Act does not entrench any particular system of
broadcasting: existing systems . . . have no entitlement that permits them to
deflect competitive pressure from innovative and effective technology.”206
This attitude of regulatory forbearance would ultimately prove short lived.
The first change arose through copyright law. Although the Copyright Act of
1976 had resolved questions surrounding cable operators’ ability to retransmit
broadcast signals,207 it did not resolve whether DBS and other satellite carriers
would be able to do the same.208 As a result, Congress addressed the issue
directly by enacting the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 (SHVA).209 The
SHVA limited satellite transmission of broadcast signals to “unserved
households” that could not receive acceptable signals from their local network
affiliates through stationary rooftop antennas.210 By limiting the scope of this
provision to unserved households, the SHVA had the effect of barring satellite
providers from carrying programming provided by ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox
to any household capable of receiving those networks over the air.
Congress based its actions in part on the desire to “promote[ ] localism”211
by preserving the role of the local television station in “decid[ing] which
network programs are locally broadcast” and in ensuring the availability of
“local news and other programs of special interest to its local audience.”212
Congress also authorized the FCC to initiate proceedings to extend to DBS the

Policy Statement & Rulemaking, 86 F.C.C.2d 719, 735-41 ¶¶ 43-59 (1981).
206 Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1198. The D.C. Circuit did vacate the FCC’s actions in one
respect. It held the FCC’s attempt to exempt DBS from regulations imposed on broadcasters under Title III of
the Communications Act of 1934 was inconsistent with the FCC’s previous decisions with respect to
subscription television. Id. at 1199-1206 (vacating DBS Order, 90 F.C.C.2d at 708-11 ¶¶ 83-90). The FCC
cured the inconsistency not by altering its decision with respect to DBS, but rather by eliminating the conflict
with its subscription television precedents by ruling that subscription television also fell outside of Title III.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the DBS rules. Subscription Video, Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001 (1987), aff’d
sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
207 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
208 Specifically, satellite carriers were concerned that scrambled transmissions might fall outside the
“passive carrier” exemption, id. § 111(a)(3) (1994), under the 1996 revision to the copyright laws. H.R. REP.
NO. 100-887(I), at 11-14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5614-17.
209 The SHVA was enacted as Title II of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667,
102 Stat. 3935. After its initial authorization expired, it was renewed by the Satellite Home Viewer Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-369, 108 Stat. 3477.
210 § 202(2), 102 Stat. at 3957 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (2000)).
211 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(I), at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5617.
212 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 20 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5649.
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existing syndicated exclusivity requirements that governed cable.213
Enactment of this provision was similarly motivated by the perceived need to
prevent changes in technology and regulation from “undermin[ing] the base of
free local television service upon which the American people continue to
rely.”214
The inability to carry broadcast network programming became a major
impediment to the growth of DBS and generated substantial litigation.215
Congress therefore revised the copyright laws again by enacting the Satellite
Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (SHVIA).216 For the first time, the
new statute authorized satellite providers to carry local broadcast signals, albeit
subject to a fairly restrictive set of conditions. First, the statute limited DBS
providers to providing “local-into-local” service. In other words, they could
only provide subscribers with broadcast signals that originated locally.
Importation of distant broadcast signals was prohibited unless the subscriber
was located in an “unserved area.”217 These provisions had the effect of
prohibiting DBS providers from satisfying a subscriber’s desire for one of the
major broadcast networks (such as ABC, CBS, NBC, or Fox) by providing a
signal from a station based in New York, Los Angeles, or any other distant
city. This left DBS providers who wished to provide broadcast network
programming with no option but to carry only locally originated broadcast
signals.
In addition, the statute gave DBS providers two options to obtain the
copyright licenses they needed to carry broadcast programming. They could

213

§ 203, 102 Stat. at 3958.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 26, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5655.
215 See CBS Broad., Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1998); ABC, Inc.
v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 17 F. Supp. 2d 467 (M.D.N.C. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 184 F.3d
348 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Satellite Delivery of Network Signals to Unserved Households for Purposes of
the Satellite Home Viewer Act, Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2654, 2663-64 ¶ 21 (1999) (citing other
litigation).
216 The SHVIA was enacted as Appendix I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501, app. at 523 (1999).
217 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(A)-(B) (2000). The statute also required the FCC to simplify the process for
determining whether a particular household qualified as unserved. 47 U.S.C. § 339(c)(3) (2000); see also
Technical Standards for Determining Eligibility for Satellite-Delivered Network Signals Pursuant To the
Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,321 (2000); Establishment of an Improved
Model for Predicting the Broad. Television Field Strength Received at Individual Locations, First Report &
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,118 (2000); Satellite Delivery of Network Signals to Unserved Households for Purposes
of the Satellite Home Viewer Act, Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 2654 (1999).
214
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negotiate retransmission consent agreements with individual stations.218
Alternatively, they could invoke a newly created compulsory license219
provided that they complied with a “carry one, carry all” provision, which
required that they carry all of the full power signals available within its service
area.220
The SHVIA also directed the FCC to extend to DBS the network
nonduplication, syndicated exclusivity, and sports blackout rules previously
applicable only to cable television systems.221 In enacting this legislation,
Congress “reassert[ed] the importance of protecting and fostering the system of
television networks as they relate to the concept of localism” on the ground
that “[i]t is well recognized that television broadcast stations provide valuable
programming tailored to local needs, such as news, weather, special
announcements and information related to local activities.”222 Other portions
of the legislative history reiterated the same rationale.223 The Fourth Circuit
mentioned these considerations in passing when sustaining the SHVIA against
a constitutional attack, acknowledging the “distinctive value of local broadcast
programming.224

218

47 U.S.C. § 325(b).
17 U.S.C. § 122(a), (c) (Supp. V 1999); 47 U.S.C. § 339(a)(1)(B).
220 See 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1). The statute postponed the effective date of the must-carry requirements
until January 1, 2002. Id. The must-carry requirements governing satellite carriers are in some ways broader
than those imposed on cable operators. For example, the statute limits the percentage of channel capacity that
some cable systems must devote to must-carry, id. § 534(b)(1)(B), whereas the satellite must-carry provision
imposes no such limit, id. § 338(a)(1). Unlike the compulsory license for local broadcast signals, the
compulsory license for distant broadcast signals requires royalty payments to the copyright holder. See 17
U.S.C. § 122(c) (2000). Satellite providers carrying local programming pursuant to retransmission consent
agreements are not subject to the carry one, carry all requirements. 47 U.S.C. §§ 325(b), 338(a)(1).
221 47 U.S.C. § 339(b); see also Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999:
Application of Network Non-Duplication, Syndicated Exclusivity, & Sports Blackout Rules to Satellite
Retransmissions of Broad. Signals, Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 21,688 (2000).
222 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 92 (1999); accord H.R. REP. NO. 106-86(I), at 9 (1999).
223 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 101-02 (noting that carry one, carry all provision was enacted to
allow satellite television viewers “the same range of choice in local programming they receive through cable
service,” to “help[ ] viewers have access to all local programming,” and to “further[ ] the congressional policy
of localism and diversity of broadcast programming, which provides locally-relevant news, weather, and
information”); H.R. REP. NO. 106-79(I), at 15 (1999) (arguing that the legislation reaffirms the “historical
commitment to localism”); S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 1 (1999) (identifying the protection of local over-the-air
television as one of the SHVIA’s purposes); id. at 13 (same).
224 See Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2001).
219
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d. Digital Broadcasting

The other major technological innovation that is currently transforming the
television industry is the transition to digital broadcasting. Unlike analog
television systems, which encode programming onto electronic signals by
varying the amplitude and frequency of electrical waves, digital television
systems convert television signals into a series of ones and zeroes of the type
employed by computer code. By their nature, digital systems are not subject to
the static interference that plagues analog systems, because the use of binary
coding systems eliminates picture degradation and makes it considerably easier
for television receivers to separate the desired television signal from the
background noise. Digital systems also avoid some of the flicker and scrolling
problems unique to the particular format adopted for analog television.225 In
addition, digital transmission allows television stations to operate at lower
power, which in turn allows them to be spaced closer together without causing
interference. Furthermore, digital technologies also allow for the use of
compression techniques that further increase the efficiency with which
information can be conveyed. Especially when combined with the overall
technical improvements to receiver technology,226 the transition to digital
television allows for a fairly significant increase in the intensity with which
broadcasters can use the spectrum allocated to television.
Shortly after the FCC began considering how to deploy digital television in
1987, it quickly ruled that the best way to deploy digital television was to give
each incumbent analog television station an additional six megahertz of
spectrum in which to begin digital broadcasting.227 The FCC based its decision
in part on concerns about localism, concluding that deploying digital television
in this manner would preserve the system by which U.S. households receive

225 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Notice of Inquiry,
2 F.C.C.R. 5125, 5126-27 ¶¶ 8-17 (1987).
226 See id. at 5132-34 ¶¶ 59-79; Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on the Existing Television
Broad. Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6529-30 ¶¶ 69-71 (1988)
[hereinafter DTV Tentative Decision].
227 DTV Tentative Decision, 3 F.C.C.R. at 6530 ¶¶ 73-74; see also Advanced Television Sys. & Their
Impact Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3342-43 ¶¶ 4-6 (1992) (reaffirming this decision); Advanced Television Sys. &
Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Third Report & Order, &
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, 6930 ¶ 8 (1992) (noting that no parties
objected to this decision). See generally Yoo, supra note 117, at 352-53 (reviewing the history of the decision
to give a free digital channel to all current licensees).
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“local and regional news, information, and entertainment.”228 The FCC also
noted that digital broadcasters would be subject to the same public interest
obligations as analog broadcasters, including the obligation to “air
programming responsive to their communities of license.”229 The FCC is also
entertaining a recommendation by the Gore Commission that digital
broadcasters do even more to ensure that the programming they offer is
responsive to the needs of the local community.230
Congress gave its imprimatur to the FCC’s actions by including a provision
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring that in the event the FCC
decided to issue digital television licenses, eligibility for such licenses would
be limited to existing television broadcasters.231 Congress enacted legislation
the following year in effect guaranteeing that the digital television licenses
would be given for free by including a provision specifically excepting digital
television from the FCC’s authority to auction new licenses.232 The result is
what has been condemned by many as the largest corporate giveaway in
history, with estimates of the value of the spectrum given away to digital
broadcasters ranging from $11 to $70 billion.233
In addition to affecting the decisions about how to deploy digital television,
localism concerns have also arisen with regard to the question of whether the
must-carry statute should be extended to digital, as well as analog, television
signals. The legislative history of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and

228

DTV Tentative Decision, 3 F.C.C.R. at 6525 ¶ 39.
Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 21,638 ¶ 11,
21,640 ¶ 14 (1999) [hereinafter Pub. Int. Oblig. NOI]; accord Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking & Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,545-46 ¶ 33 & n.36 (1995); see also Advanced
Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
12,809, 12,829-30 ¶¶ 48-50 (1997) (ruling that digital broadcasters are subject to the same public interest
obligations as analog broadcasters).
230 Pub. Int. Oblig. NOI, 14 F.C.C.R. at 21,640-41 ¶¶ 14-17, 21,642-43 ¶¶ 20-22; ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING
FUTURE 45-46 (1998) (proposing enhanced disclosure of, inter alia, local programming efforts by digital
broadcasters), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom.piacreport.pdf [hereinafter GORE
COMMISSION REPORT]; id. at 48 (proposing additional efforts by digital broadcasters to identify the
programming needs of the community and minimum public interest obligations on local public affairs
programming).
231 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (2000).
232 Id. § 309(j)(2)(b).
233 See Goodman, supra note 183, at 533; Logan, supra note 182, at 1728; Rubin, supra note 182, at 694.
229
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the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 indicates that Congress did not intend to
resolve whether the must-carry requirements should be extended to digital
television. Instead, Congress left that determination to the FCC.234
This decision to commit the issues surrounding digital must-carry to the
FCC gave rise to what then-FCC Chairman William Kennard called “one of
the most contentious and fascinating debates in communications policy.”235 In
issuing its initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on whether and how to
extend must-carry to digital television, the FCC took as its starting point the
general framework used to uphold must-carry with respect to analog
broadcasting.236 These considerations included the need to preserve “the
benefits derived from the local origination of programming from television
stations” as well as the concern that the absence of mandatory carriage would
jeopardize “the economic viability of local broadcast television and its ability
to originate quality local programming.”237
The FCC recognized, however, that if the extension of must-carry to digital
television were to withstand a First Amendment attack, such a decision had to
be based on a record establishing that the harms to local broadcasting were
“‘real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these
harms in a direct and material way.’”238 The FCC acknowledged the
possibility that refusing to extend must-carry to digital television might
represent the better way to promote local content. As the FCC noted,
“[b]roadcasting may not be the only source of local programming as cable
operators have developed local news channels and public, educational, and
governmental access channels, which provide highly localized content, have
multiplied in the past six years.”239

234 Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broad. Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
13 F.C.C.R. 15,092, 15,098 ¶ 8 (1998) [hereinafter Digital Must-Carry NPRM] (citing S. CONF. REP. NO. 104230, at 161 (1996)); id. at 15,100, 15,101 ¶¶ 12-13 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-217, at 577 (1997),
reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176, 198).
235 See Eric Glick, Digital Puzzle Frustrates Feds, CABLE WORLD, July 13, 1998, at 1, available at
http://www.c-span.org/about/dmc/cworld071398.htm, quoted in Hazlett, supra note 161, at 199.
236 Digital Must-Carry NPRM, 13 F.C.C.R. at 15,101 ¶ 14.
237 Id. at 15,096 ¶ 5 (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(7), (10), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461).
238 Id. at 15,102 ¶ 15 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)) (internal
citation omitted); accord id. at 15,102 ¶ 16.
239 Id. at 15,103 ¶ 16.
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The issues surrounding digital must-carry would be particularly
problematic prior to 2006, when broadcasters would be transmitting both
analog and digital signals.240 The FCC exhibited uncertainty about whether
must-carry required cable operators to transmit the analog signal, the digital
signal, or both. As a result, it sought comment on seven different digital mustcarry proposals, which ranged from immediate carriage of all signals to no
carriage whatsoever.241 Much of the debate centered on whether cable
operators must carry both the analog and digital signals (which the FCC called
“dual carriage”) during this period.242
The FCC’s First Report and Order in this proceeding ultimately ruled that
cable operators must provide free carriage to television stations that transmit
exclusively in an analog or digital format.243 Its resolution of the dual carriage
issue was less definitive. Although the FCC tentatively concluded that a dual
carriage requirement would represent an impermissible burden on cable
operators’ First Amendment rights, it found that the record before it was not
sufficiently complete to determine the impact that dual carriage would have on
local broadcast stations and cable operators. It therefore requested further
comment on the impact that imposing dual carriage would have on local
broadcasters.244 In particular, the FCC sought comment on the extent to which
local broadcasters would be able to obtain carriage of their digital signals
through voluntary retransmission consent agreements.245 In addition, the FCC
asked whether, in light of the paucity of original digital programming
available, imposing dual carriage would in fact enrich the programming
environment or simply duplicate existing offerings.246 Thus, although the FCC
appears to have tentatively rejected dual carriage for the time being, it left open

240

Id. at 15,112-13 ¶ 39.
Id. at 15,113-17 ¶¶ 41-50.
242 Id. at 15,123-25 ¶¶ 69-71.
243 Carriage of Digital Television Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2605 ¶ 13, 2608 ¶ 21 (2001) [hereinafter Digital Must-Carry First Report &
Order & FNPRM]; accord WHDT, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 2692, 2698 ¶ 12 (2001);
Serv. Rules for the 746-764 & 776-794 MHz Bands, & Revisions to Part 27 of the Comm’n’s Rules,
Memorandum Opinion & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,845, 20,872 ¶ 65
(2000).
244 Digital Must-Carry First Report & Order & FNPRM, 16 F.C.C.R. at 2600 ¶ 3, 2647-49 ¶¶ 112-15.
245 Id. at 2648 ¶ 115, 2654-56 ¶¶ 128-31.
246 Id. at 2651 ¶ 120. The FCC also sought information regarding cable operators’ channel capacity in
order to evaluate the extent to which imposing must-carry would burden cable operators’ First Amendment
rights. Id. at 2649 ¶ 115, 2653-54 ¶¶ 123-27.
241

2003]

RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION

1657

the possibility that it might reach a different conclusion if presented with a
more complete record about the impact that failure to mandate dual carriage
would have on local programming.
2. Localism in the Face of Increasing Returns to Scale

The promotion and preservation of local content has thus represented one
of the cornerstones of U.S. media policy since the very beginning of the
television industry. Since that time, this commitment has continued to shape
the way the FCC has responded to every subsequent television technology.
The economic theories described above suggest that this regulatory
commitment betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic economics
of television programming. Decreasing average costs are an inevitable feature
of nonrival goods, because the existence of constant marginal costs causes the
returns to scale resulting from the amortization of fixed costs over increasingly
large volumes to be inexhaustible.247 They are also endemic to markets
involving differentiated products that necessarily reach equilibrium on the
declining portion of the average cost curve.248 Consequently, television
programming will still exhibit a natural tendency toward an equilibrium level
of distribution that is geographically quite broad.249 This is not to say that
products directed at local markets will not exist in equilibrium. Even though
products directed at national markets will enjoy cost advantages over products
directed at local markets, variations in local preferences may allow products
directed at local markets to exist.250 As a theoretical matter, the combination
of these considerations would lead to an equilibrium mix of nationally oriented
and locally oriented products. The greater the taste for locally oriented
products, the greater the proportion of locally oriented products will exist at
equilibrium. In practice, even the most cursory review of any typical
programming day reveals that, with the exception of local news and regional
sports programming, local and national preferences do not differ sufficiently to

247

See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55, 65-71 and accompanying text.
249 BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 5-6; OWEN, supra note 51, at 100. Indeed, the existence of economies
of scale may provide the greatest advantages to programs able to achieve distribution that is international in
scope. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 7, at 222-26; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 49-52; W. Ming Shao,
Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 105
(1995).
250 See OWEN, supra note 118, at 112.
248
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overcome the substantial cost advantages that accrue to programming
distributed on a national scale. Indeed, it is particularly telling that
independent stations unaffiliated with any broadcast network are the stations
least likely to provide locally originated programming.251 The failure of these
stations to provide local content underscores the dramatic cost advantages
enjoyed by stations supported by programming produced for national
audiences.
This in turn suggests that regulations designed to favor locally oriented
programming over nationally oriented programming only serve to limit the
networks’ ability to take advantage of television’s natural economies of scale.
Such limitations cause unit costs to increase, as the fixed costs are amortized
over a market that is even smaller than the already inefficiently small volume
at which these markets reach equilibrium. As unit costs increase, networks
that would have covered their costs had they been able to reach a broader
market find themselves unable to break even. Attempts to promote local
programming thus have the paradoxical effect of reducing the economic
viability of programming that appeals to relatively small audience segments
(such as local content). The ultimate result is to cause the total number of
networks to drop below efficient levels and to reduce the quantity and diversity
of product offerings available. To the extent that quality is related to total
expenditure, such limits would tend to reduce the quality of television
programming as well.
The current system of retransmission consent and must-carry provides a
useful indication of the extent of these effects. As noted earlier, broadcast
stations have the option of either negotiating a retransmission consent
agreement or of obtaining free carriage by invoking their must-carry rights.252
The choice faced by the stations is fairly clear. If a station is strong enough to
command some degree of compensation in return for providing programming,
it will rely on retransmission consent. Only those stations whose bargaining
position is so weak that they would have to pay for carriage will avail
themselves of must-carry. Analysis of the available data indicates that eighty
percent of independent stations chose must-carry, whereas only ten percent of
network affiliates made the same decision.253 This overwhelming indication of

251
252
253

Hazlett, supra note 161, at 178, 181-83, 195-96.
See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
Carriage of the Transmissions of Digital Television Broad. Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
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the financial advantages that network affiliates enjoy over independent stations
attests to the natural advantage that nationally distributed programming enjoys
over locally distributed programming.
3. Application to U.S. Television Policy
a. Analog Broadcasting

The analysis developed in Part I helps to explain why the efforts to use
broadcast policy to promote localism have proven so unsuccessful. Consider
the seminal decision to allocate television to as many communities as possible,
which established a basic structural framework that persisted for more than
thirty years. The idea was to provide communities with local outlets
responsive to local needs.254
Economic analysis reveals the inherent contradiction underlying this
policy. The decreasing cost structure of television programming discussed
above255 gives rise to inexhaustible returns to scale that give a cost advantage
to programming able to obtain national distribution over programming
distributed on a smaller scale. As a result, during the era in which
broadcasting represented the dominant television distribution technology,
stations able to affiliate with networks possessed a decisive advantage over
those unable to do so,256 and the success of any particular network depended
upon its ability to achieve as close to national distribution as possible.
The net effect of the FCC’s station allocation policy, however, was to
ensure that a significant portion of the country could receive no more than
three television signals.257 As a result, the FCC’s attempt to promote localism

13 F.C.C.R. 15,092, 15,110 ¶ 33 & n.92 (1998) (citing Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission
Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable
Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 146 (1996)).
254 See supra Part III.A.1.a.
255 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
256 As noted earlier, these economies of scale are bolstered by technological and transaction efficiencies.
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
257 Specifically, the FCC assigned television stations according to the following priorities:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

To provide at least one television service to all parts of the United States.
To provide each community with at least one television broadcast station.
To provide a choice of at least two television services to all parts of the United States.
To provide each community with at least two television broadcast stations.
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by dispersing stations broadly had the effect of forestalling the emergence of a
fourth network despite evidence that sufficient demand existed to support as
many as six networks.258 It was not until cable emerged as a viable competitor
in the 1980s that this logjam was broken.259 This effect was exacerbated still
further by the Chain Broadcasting Rules, which were designed in part to
preserve local autonomy by curbing the power of the networks.260 In so doing,
the Chain Broadcasting Rules simply ignored the underlying economies of
scale.
Furthermore, the restrictions on the number of stations not only had the
effect of reducing the total number of networks; it also reduced the diversity of
programming available.
This is because the artificial restrictions on
distribution caused by the reduction in the number of networks allowed
programming to be crowded out by other programming that commanded a
larger audience. This could occur even when the program that was crowded
out was able to cover its costs. As a result, programming had to clear more
than just the hurdle of economic viability; it also had to compete with other
programs.261 Regulations requiring stations to carry nonremunerative content
only caused the break-even audience to increase still further.

(5)

Any channels which remain unassigned under the foregoing priorities will be assigned to the
various communities depending on the size of the population of each community, the
geographical location of such community, and the number of television services available to
such community from television stations located in other communities.

Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C. 148, 167
¶ 63 (1952). See generally Yoo, supra note 117, at 275-78 (reviewing the impact of the allocation decision on
the number of networks).
258 FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, 35TH ANNUAL REPORT 135, 137 (1969); ROGER G. NOLL ET AL.,
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 116-20 (1973).
259 A fourth network would only be able to reach sixty-four percent of U.S. households. In addition, it
should be remembered that when a fourth station was available, it was not infrequently a UHF station. UHF
suffers from several technical disadvantages when compared with VHF. As a result, UHF has largely failed as
a service during its first several decades of existence. These differences in quality make the gap even more
severe. When only signals of comparable quality are considered, the percentage of the country that a fourth
network could reach drops to thirty-four percent. See Yoo, supra note 117, at 276-77.
260 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. Baker also recommends that regulatory authorities
continue to give a preference for owners of television stations who live in the community being served and
who are involved in management. BAKER, supra note 7, at 101, 120. Interestingly, Congress and the FCC
have already rejected the last of these proposals after the D.C. Circuit struck down such preferences as
arbitrary and capricious. See supra note 173.
261 See Yoo, supra note 50, at 1940-41.
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The aggregate effect of these requirements was to increase the size of the
audience that a program had to command to obtain airtime. This in turn
reduced the diversity of programming available by forcing out a number of
programs that were economically viable but not sufficiently popular.
Somewhat paradoxically, this necessarily included a significant amount of
local programming, which is one form of special interest programming. Thus
the government’s attempts to promote local programming might have had the
perverse effect of making it more difficult for precisely that type of
programming to appear.
b. Cable Television

My analysis also suggests that efforts to promote localism indirectly by
attempting to regulate cable television in a manner that favors local content
have been similarly counterproductive. As discussed above, regulations such
as must-carry have proven to be singularly ineffective in promoting the values
of localism. This is because only the weakest broadcasters that provide the
least local content are the sole beneficiaries of must-carry.262 Even worse,
carriage of broadcasters by cable operators crowds out additional cable
networks, beginning with those serving the smallest audiences. All too often,
the cable networks in risk of being lost to mandatory carriage requirements are
those providing news and public affairs programming, as evidenced by CSPAN’s vigorous opposition to any expansion of the current must-carry
requirements.263 Indeed, one of the most striking developments in recent years
has been the proliferation of cable channels devoted exclusively to local
news.264 Must-carry threatens to squelch the emergence of locally oriented,
all-news channels on cable by preempting channel capacity available for such
services. In short, must-carry promotes marginal broadcasters at the expense
of marginal cable channels even though it is the marginal cable channels that
are more likely to provide diverse (including local) programming.
Indeed, there is a credible argument that locally oriented programming
would be promoted more effectively if policymakers were to favor cable over

262

See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
See Hazlett, supra note 161, at 175-76. For a partial catalog of cable networks providing news, public
affairs, documentaries, arts-related, and children’s educational programming threatened to be crowded out by
must-carry, see id. at 185-92.
264 See id. at 192-94.
263
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broadcasting instead of the other way around. The leading economic models
of program choice reveal that one of the primary obstacles to the emergence of
diverse programming is the tendency toward duplication of existing program
types that arises whenever products compete on product features as well as
price.265 In other words, new entrants often find it more profitable to offer
additional versions of existing programming rather than to direct their attention
toward smaller audience segments.266 When channel capacity is constrained,
this duplication crowds out the appearance of more diverse programming.
This problem can be solved, however, by increasing the amount of channel
capacity available. If excess channel capacity exists, the minimum break-even
audience size drops, and all commercially viable types of programming should
eventually appear.267 The intuitions underlying these models should be
obvious to anyone who has witnessed the explosion of niche programming that
has accompanied the increase in cable systems’ channel capacity. More formal
empirical studies have corroborated these theoretical conclusions.268
This reasoning suggests that encouraging increases in channel capacity may
represent the best way to promote the emergence of programming, such as
locally oriented content, that commands small audiences. Since cable has
greater channel capacity than broadcasting, localism would arguably be better
served if cable were allowed to develop unfettered.

265 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 50, at 15-17; Noam, supra note 50; Steiner, supra note 50. For reviews of
this literature, see OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 64-92, 140-43; Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying
Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304-17 (1991); Yoo, supra note 50, at 1936-42,
1946-48.
266 The intuition underlying this effect is as follows: If the distribution of viewers is skewed toward a
particular type of program, the new entrant may find it more profitable to split the audience for that program
type with competitors than to serve a smaller audience segment, since a fraction of the largest audience
segment may be larger than the entire audience for other program types. The problem from a welfare
standpoint is that under these circumstances a significant proportion of the viewers obtained by the new entrant
are cannibalized from other stations, which does not cause aggregate welfare to increase. The preferred
outcome from a welfare standpoint would be for the new entrant to provide programming for audience
segments that are currently unserved.
267 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 86-87; Beebe, supra note 50, at 30.
268 See Augustus E. Grant, The Promise Fulfilled? An Empirical Analysis of Program Diversity on
Television, 7 J. MEDIA ECON. 51, 59, 62 (1994); Noam, supra note 161, at 155-71.

2003]

RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION

1663

c. DBS

A similar critique would seem to apply to the restrictions on DBS imposed
by the SHVIA. The economic analysis developed above suggests that
policymakers should be welcoming the advent of DBS rather than constraining
it in the name of preserving local television stations. DBS is the first television
technology that naturally lends itself to national distribution of programming.
In contrast to the geographic footprint of broadcasting and cable providers,
which are inherently limited to a discrete geographic area, DBS can provide
programming on a national and even continental scale.269 As a result, DBS is
the technology best positioned to realize the economies of scale inherent in
television programming. Such gains are likely to be particularly pronounced
with respect to DBS, because once the satellite is deployed and programming
is made available to it, the marginal costs of allowing another household to
view that programming should drop far below those associated with any other
means of transmission.
As a result, imposing an implicit cross-subsidy on DBS in favor of local
broadcasting appears to be economically misconceived. Not only would doing
so bias the industry in ways that would prevent the market from realizing all of
the available economies of scale, but requiring DBS to carry all local stations
would cause it to waste valuable channel capacity. This is because DBS can
currently only target transmissions at the entire country. Although the DBS
providers are in the process of deploying “spot beam” technology that should
allow them to reuse spectrum by restricting the geographic coverage of particular channels, such technologies are not likely to be operational until 2004 at the
earliest.270

269

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See Alicia Mundy, Charlie’s Angel, CABLE WORLD, Apr. 1, 2002, at 12, 15. The FCC’s Media Bureau
has recently invalidated EchoStar’s attempts to use satellites located in the “wing slots” to solve the capacity
problems. The problem is that use of these additional satellites requires the installation of a second satellite
dish. The Bureau ruled that EchoStar has not properly educated customers about the need to install the second
dish, is not displaying the local channels carried on the second dish contiguously with the local channels
provided through the main dish, and is not integrating the channels carried on the second dish into its
electronic programming guide. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, DA 02-765, slip op. at 8-12 ¶¶ 12-28 (Media Bur.
Apr. 4, 2002). This ruling will not necessarily prevent EchoStar from using the second dish to provide local
service. The Bureau identified several steps that EchoStar could take that would bring its second-dish plan
into compliance with applicable law. Id. at 18-19 ¶¶ 31-33.
270
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The limits on the geostationary orbit slots and the current unavailability of
spot beam technology dictate that DBS providers are each restricted to between
450 and 500 channels;271 the prohibition of distant signal importation requires
providers to waste valuable capacity by dedicating channels to signals that only
a small portion of the country would be able to receive. Even worse, the carry
one, carry all rule requires DBS to devote capacity to programming that is
essentially duplicative, because the provision requires DBS providers to carry
all of the ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox affiliates in the markets that they serve,
despite the fact that the programming carried on those channels is identical
during substantial parts of the day. Given that the average U.S. household can
receive thirteen local television signals,272 it is clear that the carry one, carry all
rule will severely limit the number of cities in which DBS will be able to offer
effective competition to cable.
This analysis reveals the fundamental conceptual flaws underlying
requiring DBS to carry locally oriented programming. Indeed, it might be
more economically beneficial if all national network programming were to
migrate to DBS and for television broadcasting to abandon network affiliations
and reposition itself exclusively toward local content.273 Instead, the carry one,
carry all rule is preventing the networks from realizing the significant
economies of scale associated with nationwide distribution. The result is an
inevitable reduction in the quantity, quality, and diversity of the available
programming.
d. Digital Broadcasting

The economics of public goods reveal the misconceived nature of basing
the decision to deploy digital television through existing analog broadcasters
on the need to preserve the local content of television programming. The
approach taken by the FCC implicitly builds on the presumption that the
preservation of incumbent analog broadcasters represents an effective way to
promote local content. As noted earlier,274 a brief review of the current
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Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2001).
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules & Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Biennial Review Report, 15 F.C.C.R.
11,058, 11,064 ¶ 9 (2000); Yoo, supra note 51, at 212.
273 See Shelanski, supra note 202, at 1076-77.
274 See supra notes 161, 251 and accompanying text.
272
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programming offered by local television stations belies this assertion. The vast
majority of local television stations are affiliated with national networks and
fill their programming days with either network programming or nationally
distributed syndicated programming. Independent broadcasters rely even more
heavily on national program sources (usually provided via syndication),
because few independent stations have the resources to produce local content.
The incongruity of attempting to promote localism in this manner becomes
even more apparent when one closely examines the nature of the service being
displaced by the decision to double the spectrum given for free to all
incumbent television stations. Much of the spectrum necessary to implement
the current plan came at the expense of low power television stations275 and
Even though this approach was
vacant noncommercial allotments.276
supposedly designed to promote localism, it somewhat ironically did so at the
expense of the television services believed to be particularly well suited to
providing locally oriented programming.277
Monopolistic competition and public good economics also reveal that
requiring cable operators to provide dual carriage of both analog and digital
broadcast signals is unlikely to prove effective in promoting local content. As
a general matter, nationally distributed programming has an inherent cost
advantage over locally distributed programming. As a result, attempts to
promote locally oriented over nationally oriented programming are likely to
prove ineffectual and will only serve to depress the quantity, quality, and
diversity of television programming. Indeed, previous experience indicates

275 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Sixth Report &
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14,588, 14,595 ¶ 11 (1997) [hereinafter DTV Sixth Report & Order]; Advanced Television
Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Third Report &
Order, & Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, 6953 ¶¶ 37-39 (1992); Advanced
Television Sys. & Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 3350-51 ¶¶ 39-42 (1992) [hereinafter DTV Second Report
& Order].
276 See DTV Sixth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 14,639 ¶ 112; DTV Second Report & Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 3350 ¶¶ 37-38.
277 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 2(a)(8)(B), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (recognizing that “public television is a local community institution . . . that
provides public service programming that is responsive to the needs and interests of the local community”);
Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l
Telecomms. Sys., Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, 21,470 ¶ 12 (1982) (recognizing that LPTV is a medium
particularly well suited to providing local programming).
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that digital must-carry would only benefit those stations that are the least likely
to provide locally oriented content.278
As suggested in the discussion of cable television,279 it is arguable that the
FCC would promote local content more effectively if it were to eliminate
must-carry altogether, let alone extend it to digital television. The wild card in
this scenario is the uncertainty about the type of programming that will appear
on digital television. The increase in the number of available voices made
possible by multicasting may well foster the emergence of local content in
television broadcasting in much the same manner as freeing up channel
capacity on cable did. As a result, it would be improper to regard this as an
argument for favoring cable at the expense of other media. The better position
is to remove implicit cross-subsidies running in either direction. In that way,
market forces, as well as the other economic considerations discussed below,
will determine the final outcome.
* * *
The analysis I advance reveals that the FCC’s attempts to promote locally
oriented content over nationally oriented content are inherently misguided.
This commitment has only served to deprive television networks of resources
by preventing the realization of the available economies of scale without
generating any concomitant increase in locally oriented programming. The net
effect is to reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of programming without
providing any compensating benefits.
These problems become even worse when viewed from a longer-term
perspective. Not only does preventing program producers from realizing the
available efficiencies create welfare losses in the here and now, it also deters
the emergence of new programming and new television technologies in the
future. Viewing these problems from the perspective of dynamic efficiency, it
becomes clear that any access requirements and other regulatory measures that
artificially reduce the overall profitability of network operations have the
inevitable effect of causing investment in new technologies and new

278
279

See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.3.b.
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programming options to drop below efficient levels.280 The localism-related
commitments advanced by the FCC thus heighten the inefficiencies identified
by public good economics.
It thus seems clear that those who view the problems of localism in largely
economic terms would conclude that economic welfare would increase if
policymakers were to abandon the historic commitment to promoting local
content. I do not mean to suggest that the FCC should reverse this
presumption and impose regulation favoring nationally oriented programming
over locally oriented programming. Such steps are unnecessary, because even
without such regulation networks that are able to achieve national distribution
will possess a natural advantage. My point is rather that policymakers should
eliminate implicit cross-subsidies running in either direction. Doing so would
appear to be a more effective way to promote economic welfare and, to the
extent that local content appears to be economically viable, would likely be far
more effective at encouraging local content to appear.
Interestingly, my analysis should give even those who favor locally
oriented programming for noneconomic reasons cause to reject the attempts to
use explicit and implicit cross-subsidies to promote local content. It suggests
that these methods are particularly poorly designed to promote local content.
On the contrary, attempts to promote localism by requiring other media to
cross-subsidize television broadcasting are far more likely to reduce the
amount of local content available by raising the break-even audience needed
for a network to be economically viable. As a result, the current policy
approach simply increases the costs and the constitutional problems faced by
those who would promote localism more directly.
Those committed to localism for noneconomic reasons may find that
implementation of the reforms I am suggesting would reduce the cost and the
magnitude of the intervention required to achieve the results that they seek. In
the process, it would minimize any First Amendment problems raised by large,
content-based government subsidies. Simply put, even those who object to
allowing economics to define the ends of television policy should nonetheless
remain very interested in what economics can teach us about the likely efficacy
of the various means available for pursuing noneconomic goals.

280 For an earlier discussion of the dynamic efficiency problems created by access requirements, see Yoo,
supra note 51, at 246-47, 269.
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In fact, if the definition of community is broadened to include communities
of interest as well as geographic communities, existing attempts to promote
local content necessarily create an inherent tradeoff. Although fostering the
availability of locally oriented programming may strengthen geographic
communities, it does so at the expense of making nationally oriented
programming more expensive and increasing the minimum audience size that
national programming must command in order to cover its fixed costs. Making
nationally oriented programming more expensive in turn reduces television’s
ability to serve communities of interest that are geographically dispersed
across the nation, because any such increase in cost will cause programming
designed to meet the needs of certain small groups to disappear even though
such programming would have been economically viable had the regulatory
measures that I have been criticizing did not exist. In short, even those who
reject viewing policy in terms of maximizing economic welfare must still heed
the basic economic lessons about free lunches. Any policy choice inevitably
involves tradeoffs, and economic analysis almost invariably proves invaluable
in understanding the relative costs and benefits associated with the available
policy options.
B. Advertising Support and the Maximization of Total Surplus: Free vs. Pay
Television

Just as with its commitment to localism, the FCC’s commitment to
preserving free television has reduced the quantity, quality, and diversity of
programming available. Subsection 1 traces the extent to which attempts to
protect free television have shaped television policy with respect to analog
broadcasting, cable television, DBS, and digital television. The balance of this
section analyzes the ways that the commitment to free television has debased
television programming by starving it of resources. Subsection 2 analyzes the
inherent inefficiencies of untargeted subsidy programs, such as those currently
employed to promote access to television. Subsection 3 addresses how
reliance on advertising support interposes an intermediary into the economic
relationship between viewers and the networks that interferes with viewers’
ability to signal their true preferences to the networks. Subsection 4 identifies
the ways that advertising support interferes with the networks’ ability to set
prices that increase total surplus.
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1. The Regulatory Commitment to Free Television

After the commitment to localism, the next most significant subcommitment embodied in the regulatory approach taken by Congress and the
FCC is the commitment to “free” (i.e., advertising-supported) television and its
hostility toward “pay” television, which it defined as television for which an
additional fee is charged on a per-program or per-channel basis.281 This
subsection will trace how this subcommitment is reflected in the regulatory
approach taken with respect to each major television technology.
a. Analog Broadcasting

The desire to preserve free television played a major role in shaping the
way that the FCC regulated analog broadcasting. The nature of the FCC’s
commitment to free television can be discerned in its attempts to suppress the
emergence of a technology known as subscription television (STV), which
employed scrambling devices to make broadcast programming available only
to those willing to pay for the right to view it.282 STV first emerged as a
technology in 1950,283 and the FCC first addressed the regulatory status of
STV when it issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 1955.284 After
several false starts,285 the FCC declined to authorize STV as a general service

281 As a result of this definition, pay television refers primarily to pay-per-view programs and premium
movie channels provided by cable operators and other MVPDs. It does not include programming provided
through the basic tiers of cable television, even though viewers clearly pay a flat fee for access to basic cable
networks.
282 See, e.g., Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 20, at 335. The FCC had authorized a trial subscription
radio service in 1941, which eventually became Muzak. Muzak Corp., 8 F.C.C. 581, 582 (1941).
283 Jill Abeshouse Stern et al., The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory
Philosophy, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 532 (1983).
284 Radio Broad. Servs., Subscription Television Serv., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 Fed. Reg. 988
(Feb. 16, 1955).
285 See Second Report, 16 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1539 (1958); Amendment of Part 3 of the Comm’n’s Rules &
Regulations (Radio Broad. Servs.) to Provide for Subscription Television Serv., First Report, 23 F.C.C. 532
(1957); 22 Fed. Reg. 3758 (May 29, 1957) (notice of further proceedings).
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in 1959.286 Instead, the FCC merely authorized it on an experimental basis,287
which eventually led to the deployment of a single STV station.288
When the FCC eventually authorized more widescale deployment in 1968,
it saddled the technology with a wide range of restrictions. For example, the
regulations limited STV to communities that received at least five broadcast
signals289 and required that STV stations broadcast at least twenty-eight hours
of advertiser-supported programming each week.290 In addition, the FCC
subjected STV to a complicated array of programming restrictions designed to
ensure that STV did not siphon programming from conventional broadcast
television. Specifically, the FCC generally prohibited STV from broadcasting
movies that were between two and ten years old (thereby limiting STV to
offering movies that were very new or very old),291 prohibited STV from
carrying any sporting event that had been carried on conventional television
within the last two years,292 required that movies and sporting events together
not comprise more than ninety percent of STV’s total programming
schedule,293 prohibited STV from carrying any television series that normally
appeared on conventional broadcasting,294 and prohibited STV from including
any commercial advertisements.295
The FCC eventually liberalized the rules relating to movies to exempt
foreign language films, to allow movies to be shown for up to three years after
their release rather than two, and to allow for the broadcast of a greater number

286 Amendment of Part 3 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Radio Broad. Servs.) to Provide for
Subscription Television Serv., Third Report, 26 F.C.C. 265 (1959).
287 Id. at 265-66.
288 See Application of Hartford Phonevision Co. for Authority to Conduct Trial Subscription Television
Operations over Station WHCT, Hartford, Conn., Report & Decision, 30 F.C.C. 301 (1961), aff’d sub nom.
Conn. Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962).
289 Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Radio Broad. Servs.) to Provide for
Subscription Television Serv., Fourth Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 507 ¶ 128, 518-19 ¶¶ 165-67 (1968),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
922 (1970).
290 Id. at 525-26 ¶¶ 190-92.
291 The rules made an exception when conventional broadcasters had been offered and refused those
movies. Id. at 508 ¶ 131, 556-57 ¶¶ 285-87, 569-71 ¶¶ 325-31.
292 Id. at 508-09 ¶ 132, 558-64 ¶¶ 289-305.
293 Id. at 564 ¶ 306.
294 Id. at 509 ¶ 132, 565 ¶ 309.
295 Id. at 565 ¶ 310.
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of films that were more than ten years old.296 The FCC also eliminated the
prohibition of series programming.297 Finally, following the 1977 judicial
invalidation of the parallel restrictions on pay cable discussed below,298 the
FCC eventually repealed the program restrictions on STV.299 Repeal of the
regulations requiring particular programming and limiting STV to markets in
which five or more broadcast channels were available followed four years
later.300
These deregulatory efforts were greeted by some initial growth in the STV
market301 and a flurry of ambitious pronouncements about STV’s future.302 By
this time, however, cable had emerged as a multi-channel platform for pay
television, and the window of opportunity for STV had closed. By 1986, only
one or two STV stations were still in operation.303
b. Cable Television

The FCC also attempted to preserve advertising-supported television by
imposing burdensome regulations on cable. As noted above, the FCC imposed
stringent regulations on cable programming that required payment of a perprogram or per-channel fee, only to see those restrictions invalidated by the
D.C. Circuit.304 In addition, the must-carry, distant signal importation,
network nonduplication, and syndicated exclusivity rules discussed above305

296 Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Pertaining to the
Cablecasting of Programs for Which a Per Program or Per Channel Charge Is Made, First Report & Order, 52
F.C.C.2d 1, 51 ¶¶ 165-66, 53-55 ¶¶ 172-77 (1975).
297 Id. at 65 ¶ 209.
298 The seminal judicial decision was Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
299 Repeal of Programming Restrictions on Subscription Television, Report & Order, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,322
(Apr. 7, 1978).
300 Amendment of Part 73 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations in Regard to Section 73.642(a)(3) & Other
Aspects of the Subscription Television Serv., Third Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
301 See id. at 344 ¶ 8.
302 See, e.g., Stern et al., supra note 283, at 534; Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I:
Why Can’t Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 254 & n.186 (1987).
303 See Subscription Video, Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 1001, 1005 (1987).
304 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna
Television Sys., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 828-29 ¶ 6 (1970). These rules were
ultimately vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
305 See supra notes 189-201 and accompanying text.
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were motivated in large part by a desire to prevent those who are unable or
unwilling to pay for television service from being deprived of it.306
One of the most explicit endorsements of this position appeared in the
legislative findings accompanying the 1992 Cable Act. These findings
asserted that broadcasting programming “is otherwise free to those who own
television sets” and that there is a “substantial government interest in
promoting the continued availability of such free television programming,
especially for viewers who are unable to afford other means of receiving
programming.”307 Without must-carry, “the economic viability of free local
broadcast television . . . w[ould] be seriously jeopardized.”308
The Supreme Court relied on these findings in upholding must-carry
against constitutional attack.309 The Court specifically concluded that
“Congress’s overriding objective in enacting must-carry was . . . to preserve
access to free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans without
cable”310 and “to ensure that every individual with a television set can obtain
access to free television programming.”311 The Court’s ruling that “‘protecting
noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due
to competition from cable systems’ is an important federal interest”312 left little
room for doubt that the desire to preserve free television represented one of the
central forces animating federal cable policy.

306 See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, Report & Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 744
¶ 185 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1143 (1982); Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91 to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern Grant of
Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna
Sys., Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 788-89 ¶ 155 (1966); Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, to
Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations
to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Systems, First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 699 ¶ 44, 700
¶ 48(1) (1965).
307 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(12),
106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000)).
308 § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462.
309 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 191 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 646 (1994).
310 Turner, 512 U.S. at 646; see also Turner, 520 U.S. at 190; Turner, 512 U.S. at 663.
311 Turner, 512 U.S. at 647.
312 Id. at 663 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)); accord Turner, 520
U.S. at 190 (reaffirming this finding).
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c. DBS

The preservation of free television has also shaped the way that
policymakers have regulated DBS. For example, the initial refusal to allow the
importation of distant signals reflected in the SHVA of 1988 stemmed in large
part from the need to preserve free over-the-air television.313 As one of the
Committee Reports noted,
Free local over-the-air television stations continue to play an
important role in providing the American people information and
entertainment. The Committee is concerned that changes in
technology, and accompanying changes in law and regulation, do not
undermine the base of free local television service upon which the
American people continue to rely.314

Congress expressed similar sentiments when enacting the SHVIA in 1999.
As the Conference Report noted, the carry one, carry all provision was
“intended to preserve free television for those not served by satellite or cable
systems” and to further “Congress’ interest in maintaining free over-the-air
television.”315 The Fourth Circuit repeatedly invoked this legislative history in
sustaining the SHVIA against constitutional attack316 and concluded that the
carry one, carry all rule “was designed to preserve a rich mix of broadcast
outlets for consumers who do not (or cannot) pay for subscription television
services.”317
d. Digital Broadcasting

The commitment to free television also played a role in the way that the
FCC has deployed digital television. For example, the FCC has repeatedly
justified the importance of deploying digital television through broadcasting
rather than other television services on the grounds that broadcasting, unlike
subscription services, represents a “free” service that is available to almost all

313

H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5655.
Id.
315 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 101 (1999); accord S. REP. NO. 106-51, at 1 (1999) (recognizing that
the purpose of the legislation was “protecting the availability of free, local over-the-air television”); id. at 13
(finding that “maintaining free over-the-air-television is a preeminent public interest” and identifying
“protecting the viability of free, local, over-the-air television” as one of the statute’s purposes).
316 See Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 349, 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2001).
317 Id. at 350.
314
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U.S. households.318 Although Congress and the FCC authorized digital
broadcasters to offer STV and other forms of pay television, they could do so
only if they provided at least one over-the-air video program signal at no direct
charge to viewers319 and if such services did not derogate from the provision of
free television services.320 The FCC also required digital broadcasters to pay
additional spectrum fees if any of the spectrum was used for pay television.321
The FCC based these regulations on indicia in the legislative history
suggesting that Congress wanted new television services and technologies to
be provided under the leadership of the existing local television broadcasting
system, which is available to all citizens and not only those who can afford
subscription services.322
Finally, concerns about preserving free television have also animated the
FCC’s proceedings regarding the extension of the must-carry rules to digital
programming. As the FCC has noted, both the transition to digital television
and the imposition of must-carry on analog broadcasters share the common
purpose of ensuring “the continued availability of free over-the-air broadcast
service.”323 As a result, the FCC sought comment on the impact that the
various forms of digital must-carry under consideration would have on this

318 Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report &
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,811-12 ¶ 5, 12,820 ¶¶ 27-29 (1997) [hereinafter DTV Fifth Report & Order];
Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 11 F.C.C.R. 6235, 6249 ¶ 36 (1996); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon
the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 3340, 3342 ¶ 4 (1992); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad.
Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6525 ¶¶ 38-39 (1988); see also
Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth Report & Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,787-88 ¶ 33 (1996) (noting that the goals of digital television deployment include
preserving a free, universal broadcasting service); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing
Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking &
Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,541 ¶ 6, 10,543 ¶ 22 (1995) (same).
319 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(b) (2002). The resolution of this signal must be comparable to or better than
current analog service. DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,812 ¶ 7, 12,820 ¶ 28.
320 47 U.S.C. § 336(b)(2) (2000); DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,820-22 ¶¶ 29-32.
321 47 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1); DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,823 ¶ 35. The FCC later set this
fee at five percent of gross revenues received from ancillary and supplementary uses. Fees for Ancillary or
Supplementary Use of Digital Television Spectrum Pursuant to Section 336(e)(1) of Telecomms. Act of 1996,
Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3259 (1998) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(g) (2002)).
322 See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995).
323 Carriage of Transmissions of Digital Broad. Stations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R.
15,092, 15,114-15 ¶ 43 (1998) (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(12), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461; and H.R. REP. NO. 102-628, at 27 (1992)).
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service.324 When the time came to issue the First Report and Order in the
Digital Must-Carry proceedings, the FCC tentatively concluded that the
governmental interests underlying digital must-carry, which included
“preserving the benefits of free over-the-air local broadcast television,” did not
justify requiring cable operators to transmit all of the program streams offered
by digital broadcasters.325 The conclusion was tentative because the FCC
believed that the record before it was not sufficiently complete to determine
the impact that refusing to provide dual carriage would have on broadcast
stations, cable operators, cable programmers, and consumers. As a result, the
FCC sought further comments on the extent to which imposing dual carriage
would further the governmental interests underlying must-carry, including “the
preservation of the benefits of free over-the-air television.”326 However the
FCC finally decides to resolve this issue, it is clear that the commitment to
preserving free television will play a key role in shaping the outcome.
2. The Inefficiency of Untargeted Subsidies

U.S. television policy has thus been shaped in no small part by a desire to
preserve free television. The most commonly asserted reason is to make sure
that Americans have access to television without regard to the ability to pay. A
system that attempts to ensure access to television by providing it to every
household without regard to means would seem to be poor policy. It is far
from clear that an economic case can be made to support the claim that people
should be entitled to receive access to any particular type of communications
for free. Consumers place a high value on many other types of media,
including newspapers, books, and the Internet, and yet no one expects to be
provided with those materials without paying for them.327
Indeed, because governmental interventions to promote free television have
the inevitable effect of skewing demand away from other activities, supporters
of free television must justify why society should subsidize the consumption of
television programming rather than the consumption of other media. If
anything, it is arguable that doing so draws citizens away from other types of

324

Id.
Carriage of Digital Television Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2600 ¶ 3 (2001); accord id. at 2648 ¶ 113.
326 Id.
327 See Winer, supra note 302, at 253; Yoo, supra note 117, at 353-54.
325
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information sources that would be far more effective in improving the quality
of the processes of democratic self-governance.328
In any event, even those who support promoting the ability of all
households to obtain access to television should agree that adopting regulatory
policies that in effect render television free for all households without regard to
the ability to pay represents a distinctly inefficient way to preserve the viewing
options of the poor. As I have noted elsewhere, providing low-income
households with discounts for pay television services in the manner currently
used to promote indigent access to telephone service should promote access to
television far more efficiently than the system of implicit cross-subsidies
currently employed, which effectively lowers the price of television for all
households regardless of ability to pay.329 Had policymakers opted to auction
this spectrum rather than give it away, it would have likely generated more
than enough revenue to support a telephone-style direct subsidy program
aimed at low-income households.330
More important for the purposes of this Article is the fact that the analytical
framework developed above indicates that promoting free television exacts an
even greater price by reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of
programming available on television. The problems are twofold. First,
reliance on advertising support interposes an intermediary into the economic
relationship between viewers and the networks that interferes with viewers’
ability to signal their true preferences to the networks. Second, advertising
support limits the networks’ ability to set prices at levels that maximize total
surplus.

328 Indeed, promoting “free” access to television may well be stimulating excess consumption of
television programming. If so, the predominant role that television plays in contemporary society may be the
consequence of regulation rather than an empirical fact that should be remedied through regulation. For a
general discussion of this problem, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 342-44.
329 See Ross C. Ericksson et al., Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy Schemes: Evidence from
Postdivestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Telephone Service, 41 J.L. & ECON. 477, 481-82 (1998)
(reporting empirical study finding targeted subsidies to be five times more effective than untargeted subsidies);
Yoo, supra note 117, at 354-55.
330 See Yoo, supra note 117, at 354-55.
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3. Distortions Resulting from Allowing Advertisers to Serve as
Intermediaries

One problem associated with relying entirely on broadcast television is the
limitation it places on the viewers’ ability to signal the intensity of their
preferences to program providers. In a normal market, consumers who place a
particularly high value on a good can use their willingness to pay high prices
for that good to communicate that fact to the networks. The availability of
such price signals allows products that are only able to capture small volumes
to generate revenues substantial enough to cover all of the fixed and variable
costs needed to produce the product. So long as their willingness to pay is
high enough, even extremely small audiences can use price signals to obtain
the programming that they seek.
Reliance on advertising support interferes with consumers’ ability to send
such price signals.331 In a system of advertising support, one would expect
advertisers to increase their advertising spending until the marginal cost of
placing additional ads equals the marginal revenue generated by those ads. In
short, the level of advertising spending (and thus the revenue generated by the
networks through advertising support) depends on the return to advertising.332
Although the returns to advertising are primarily a function of audience size,333
they also depend on demographic characteristics, such as income, age, gender,
and geographic location.334 Although these factors may reveal a great deal
about whether a person who sees an advertisement will purchase the advertised
product, they say little about the value that viewer places on the underlying

331

Timothy J. Brennan, Economic Efficiency and Broadcast Content Regulation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 117,
128 (1983); Timothy J. Brennan, The Fairness Doctrine as Public Policy, 33 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 419,
432-33 (1990).
332 Minasian, supra note 31, at 75.
333 The conventional wisdom is well captured by the testimony offered during the Turner remand stating,
“Simply put, a television station’s audience size directly translates into revenue—large audiences attract larger
revenues, through the sale of advertising time.” Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Bus. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27 (1988) (statement of Gary Chapman), quoted in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180, 208 (1997); accord Turner, 520 U.S. at 208-09 (citing empirical research confirming the “direct
correlation between size in audience and station advertising revenues”) (alterations and internal quotations
omitted).
334 See Franklin M. Fisher et al., The Audience-Revenue Relationship for Local Television Stations, 11
BELL J. ECON. 694, 694 (1980).
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program.335 One would not expect advertising revenue to represent an accurate
reflection of viewers’ aggregate desire to view a particular network. Although
it is theoretically possible that this difference could cause advertising support
to generate either too much or too little revenue when compared to actual
intensity of preferences, an oft-cited empirical study estimated that advertising
support understated viewers’ willingness to pay by a factor of seven.336
The point can be illustrated by returning to the airline example. Reliance
on advertising support to finance television would be tantamount to financing
flights between particular cities solely through the purchases of goods
advertised in the airline’s in-flight shopping magazine and perhaps during
periodic presentations during the flight. The interposition of such an indirect
pricing mechanism would no doubt cause the total amount of revenue
generated through such sales to underestimate the value that passengers placed
on the transportation services between those cities.
The indirectness of the revenue signal is exacerbated still further given that
advertising support provides viewers with only a single degree of freedom with
which to respond to viewing, i.e., either purchasing or not purchasing the
advertised product.337 Like all voting models, this has the effect of depriving
people of the ability to signal the intensity of their preferences.338 As a result,
viewers with a particularly strong desire for a particular type of programming
have no way to signal that fact to program producers.
The inability to derive greater revenue from those viewers with the most
intense preferences increases the break-even audience size required for a
network to generate sufficient revenue to cover its fixed costs. This flattening
of viewers’ ability to influence the behavior of program producers thus has the

335 See Inquiry into the Dev. of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broad. Satellites for the Period Following 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, Report & Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676, 681-82 ¶ 17 (1982);
Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 105, 123.
336 NOLL ET AL., supra note 258, at 23. Although some have criticized the magnitude of this estimate,
none has controverted the fundamental conclusion that consumers are willing to pay far more for television
than are advertisers. See Rolla Edward Park, New Television Networks: An Update, in 1 FCC NETWORK
INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS 143, 149 & n.2 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TELEVISION
NETWORKS] (citing Stanley M. Besen & Bridger M. Mitchell, Economic Analysis and Television Regulation, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 301 (1974); and Bryan Ellickson, Hedonic Theory and the Demand for Cable
Television, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 183 (1979)).
337 See Minasian, supra note 31, at 75; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 112 & n.12.
338 See Oakland, supra note 20, at 528.
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greatest impact on networks that seek to offer programming that is intensely
preferred by a relatively small segment of the audience. Thus, reliance on
advertising support is likely to reinforce and worsen the bias against special
interest programs identified earlier.339 The indirectness of this signaling is also
likely to impact most severely those networks catering to the audiences who
are least likely to respond to advertising messages, such as networks offering
children’s education television, because it is with respect to those networks
that responsiveness to advertising and the willingness to pay (in this case the
parents’ willingness to pay) are likely to diverge the most.340 A shift to pay
television would similarly allow parents to have access to larger amounts of
educational programming for their children in the most straightforward way
imaginable. It is no accident that much of the best children’s educational
programming on commercial television appears on cable.341 To the extent that
quality is correlated with the total amount spent on program production, the
shortfall in revenue also causes the quality of television programming to
decline as well.
Reliance on advertising support also introduces another source of bias by
allowing advertisers to introduce their own biases into program selection. A
number of scholars have suggested that reliance on advertising support has
allowed advertisers to discourage programming that addresses controversial
issues or that casts their products in a poor light.342 Although these scholars
concede that this evidence is anecdotal,343 they nonetheless believe that it is
representative of a broader pattern of underproduction of certain types of
television programming.
Both of these effects are demonstrated dramatically by HBO, which is
generally regarded as the premier pay television service. The ability to signal
intensity of preference through direct payments allows HBO to generate one
half the revenue of CBS even though its prime time audience is over five times

339

Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 112-13, 122-23; see also Chae & Flores, supra note 126, at 50-51.
See Policies & Rules Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Report & Order, 11 F.C.C.R.
10,660, 10,675 ¶¶ 32-33 (1996).
341 See Yoo, supra note 117, at 327-28.
342 See BAKER, supra note 6, at 48, 54-56, 62-66; BAKER, supra note 7, at 24-30; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6,
at 63-65; Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 IND. L.J. 689,
696-713 (1994).
343 BAKER, supra note 6, at 49; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 216 (1993).
340
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smaller.344 In addition, in sharp contrast to the difficulties that broadcasters
faced in generating enough advertising to support their decisions to air
programs on abortion,345 HBO faced little trouble in carrying a documentary
on the same subject. A similar scenario played out with respect to the planned
CBS miniseries The Reagans. After controversy about the way that the former
President and First Lady were portrayed threatened to erupt into an advertiser
boycott, Viacom opted to shift the program from CBS to Showtime, a premium
movie channel that does not depend on advertising support.346 The key
difference is, of course, that unlike advertising-supported television, the
economic survival of pay television does not depend upon assuaging sponsors.
As one HBO executive explained, “We’re not any braver than the networks.
It’s just that our economic basis is different.”347
It is thus likely that previous efforts to promote and preserve free television
may have had the perverse effect of reducing the total resources available to
fund television programming. Some rough empirical studies from the 1970s
suggest that the reduction in resources will reduce the overall quantity and
diversity of programming produced.348 A pair of recent event studies
comparing the demand and revenue generated by similar television programs
financed by pay-per-view and by advertising support largely confirm that pay
television appears to be considerably more effective at enabling program
producers to capture a greater percentage of the available surplus. Both studies
concluded that shifting programs to pay-per-view would tend to cause total
output to increase.349 The study that framed the issue in terms of total surplus
also concluded that a shift to pay television transferred surplus from consumers
to producers while simultaneously causing the total revenue and total surplus

344

See 25 Top Television Networks, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 27, 2000, at 54.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 65; Shiffrin, supra note 342, at 698.
346 See Meg James et al., The Vetoing of “Reagans”: How Protests and Bad Timing Led CBS to Cancel a
Movie About the Former First Couple, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at E1; Emily Nelson & Joe Flint, CBS
Pulls “Reagans” amid Opposition from Conservatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2003, at A3.
347 Jan Hoffman, TV Shouts “Baby” (and Barely Whispers “Abortion”), N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, at
H1, quoted in Shiffrin, supra note 342, at 698.
348 Spence and Owen offer an empirical calculation indicating that reliance on advertising support is
preventing the emergence of a fourth television network. Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 118-19. This is
despite the fact that other studies indicated that sufficient demand existed to support up to six networks. See
supra note 258 and accompanying text.
349 See Hansen & Kyhl, supra note 126, at 590, 601, 604; Steinar Holden, Network or Pay-Per-View?: A
Welfare Analysis, 43 ECON. LETTERS 59, 62-64 (1993).
345
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generated to increase.350 As a result, reliance on pay television made possible
the production of programming that would not have existed had advertising
support represented the only option. Although one should take caution before
generalizing from this result,351 it does add support for the position that a shift
to pay television would be welfare enhancing. The resulting increase in the
surplus captured by producers lacks distributional implications, because free
entry will dissipate any such profits and will increase consumer benefits in
terms of increased product diversity.
Economic theory and available empirical evidence would thus seem to
indicate that removing the existing bias in favor of advertising support would
allow television markets to come closer to the optimum. When these
considerations are combined with the difficulties that arise when advertisers
are allowed to act as intermediaries in the economic relationship between
viewers and the networks and the problems associated with calibrating
subsidies discussed above,352 a powerful argument emerges against any
attempt to favor either advertising-supported television or pay television.
Simply allowing the networks’ attempts to maximize their profits resolves
questions about the best way to maximize total surplus.
Although some scholars have proposed retaining the system of advertising
support and redressing these imperfections through targeted subsidies,353 a
number of considerations would seem to make such a solution unrealistic.
First, given that advertising support tends to understate overall demand for
programming, any such subsidy would be massive. In addition, an earlier
discussion emphasized that anyone attempting to figure out how to allocate
such subsidies to particular programs would need an unmanageably large
amount of information concerning the utility that every person would derive

350 Hansen & Kyhl, supra note 126, at 590, 601, 604. The results of the other study are thus consistent,
concluding that a shift to pay television caused total revenue to increase and caused consumer surplus to
decrease. The key difference is that this study looked only at the impact on consumer surplus without going
on to consider the effect on total surplus. See Holden, supra note 349, at 62-64.
351 It should be noted that both studies focused on a single event and involved sports programming
(specifically boxing matches) that may not be generalizable to other types of programming.
352 See supra notes 44-46, 342-43 and accompanying text.
353 See BAKER, supra note 7, at 98-99, 115-17; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 84-88.

1682

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

from each network as well as all of the substitution effects.354 Lastly, such an
intervention may raise serious First Amendment problems.355
The more straightforward solution would be the elimination of the FCC’s
current preference for advertising-supported television over pay television. A
shift to pay television would allow viewers to employ the conventional
economic mechanism for signaling to the networks that preferences for
particular networks are not uniform and that certain networks are particularly
popular with smaller segments of the total audience. Using prices thus allows
smaller audience segments with particularly strong preferences to support
programming that would not meet the minimum audience size required for
economic viability under advertising support. Although some degree of bias
against special interest programming would remain, it will be less severe than
the bias that exists under advertising support.356
This is not to say that advertising-supported television will disappear. It is
conceivable that what would result is a mix of some networks that rely solely
on direct payments, other networks that rely solely on advertising support, and
still other networks that offer a mix of the two. The eventual market could end
up looking much like the current environment for printed newspapers, in which
some charge for subscriptions and contain little advertising, others are given
away free of charge and survive solely on advertising, and some depend on
both subscription and advertising revenue. Allowing such mixed regimes risks
reintroducing the problems associated with permitting advertisers to serve as
intermediaries. Such problems, however, should not prove insuperable so long
as advertising represents a relatively small percentage of total revenues, as
seems to be the case with pay television.357
C. Windowing as a Form of Price Discrimination: Protecting Incumbents vs.
Promoting New Entrants and New Technologies

The third policy commitment that has informed federal policy since the
earliest days of the television industry is the willingness to protect incumbents

354

See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 112-13, 122-23.
356 Spence, Product Selection, supra note 49, at 234; Spence & Owen, supra note 7, at 234.
357 See John E. Lopatka & Michael G. Vita, The Must-Carry Decisions: Bad Law, Bad Economics, 6 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 61, 96 (1998) (citing data indicating that local advertising represents less than five percent of
the typical cable operator’s total revenue).
355
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from the economic dislocation and disruption caused by the appearance of new
entrants and new television technologies.358 At times this commitment appears
to be nothing more than an incidental byproduct of policymakers’ attempts to
favor local content and advertising-supported television technologies. That
cannot be said in all cases, however. All too often, policymakers have
regarded shielding the television industry from the disruption caused by
competitive entry as an independent regulatory justification. Subsection 1
traces the extent to which this has been true in the regulation of conventional
broadcasting, cable television, DBS, and digital broadcasting. Subsection 2
describes the problems that this commitment poses from the standpoint of
competition policy. Subsection 3 explains how favoring incumbents over new
entrants and new technologies creates inefficiencies by reducing the ability to
price discriminate.
1. The Regulatory Commitment to Incumbents
a. Analog Broadcasting

The commitment to protect incumbents against the arrival of new entrants
and new technologies first became evident in the FCC’s spectrum management
policies. At the risk of some oversimplification, it is useful to think of
spectrum management as consisting of two separate functions.359 The first
function is a determination of how much spectrum will be allocated to a
particular service and how its frequencies will be partitioned. The second
function focuses on identifying those to whom the blocks of frequencies
established by the first function will be licensed.
The preference for incumbents is manifest in the way that the FCC has
managed both of these functions. Turning first to the second function, during
the thirty-year period following the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Carroll
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,360 protection of incumbents served as one of the de

358 In addition to protecting broadcasting from competition by new media, the FCC limited the
competition within broadcasting by pursuing policies that prevented the entrance of additional television
stations. See Yoo, supra note 117, at 272-74.
359 This taxonomy is a modified version of the categories described in STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 62-64 (2001).
360 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Although Carroll Broadcasting involved a radio license, the FCC
extended the same principles to television licensing as well. See, e.g., WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1286
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The FCC ultimately
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facto criteria used by the FCC when deciding whether to issue a new television
license, as the FCC required that applicants for new licenses prove that their
entry would not inflict so much harm to incumbent broadcast stations as to
force them to stop providing service. Similar considerations applied to license
renewals. The dominant consideration in license renewals was the “renewal
expectancy,” which extended a preference to incumbent broadcasters that
provided meritorious service in the past.361 Although the FCC based its
decision in part on justifications that carry a great deal of economic
credibility,362 it also relied on the more questionable justification that

abandoned the Carroll doctrine in 1988. Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broad.
Stations on Existing Stations, Report & Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 639-41 ¶¶ 10-25 (1988). In so ruling, the FCC
recognized that “the Carroll doctrine may have the undesired effect of providing existing licensees with an
anticompetitive tool to delay the entry of new stations.” Id. at 640 ¶ 14.
361 The FCC initially attempted to codify the renewal expectancy in 1970 in order to quell industry
reaction to its decision not to renew an incumbent broadcaster the previous year. See WHDH, Inc., 16
F.C.C.2d 1, reconsideration denied, 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969), aff’d sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The 1970 Policy Statement gave a
renewal applicant a “controlling preference” if it could demonstrate substantial past performance without
serious deficiencies. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), rev’d sub nom. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1971). Despite the fact that it had previously recognized that “legitimate renewal expectancies
[were] implicit in the structure of the Act,” Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 854, the D.C. Circuit
struck down the 1970 Policy Statement, ruling that precedent prevented the FCC from elevating the renewal
expectancy into an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the incumbent. Citizens Communications Ctr., 447
F.2d at 1210-14. A later attempt to base a renewal expectancy upon average past performance similarly failed.
Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 953 (1977) (on reconsideration), rev’d sub nom. Cent. Fla. Enters., Inc.
v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). The FCC subsequently
revised its position to make the renewal expectancy simply one of several factors weighed in a comparative
hearing, with the weight accorded to it varying with the quality of the service rendered. Cowles Fla. Broad.,
Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d 993 (1981). This time, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s actions. Central Fla. Enters. v.
FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1084 (1983). For overviews of the twists and turns
on the road to the establishment of the renewal expectancy, see ERWIN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF
BROADCAST REGULATION 206-32 (3d ed. 1982); Levi, supra note 173, at 253-69 (1996); and Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1120-24 (1993).
362 The FCC based its decision in part on the fact that applicants often make paper promises that they are
ultimately unable or unwilling to keep, thereby recognizing that moral hazard problems surround any process
that distributes licenses and does not require applicants to make any upfront investments. It also
acknowledged that strengthening the nature of the property interest conveyed by the license would provide
licensees with better incentives to make efficient levels of investment. Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d
at 1013 ¶ 62(1)-(2). For a discussion of the economic benefits flowing from strengthening the property rights
held by broadcast licensees, see Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond the Coasean Critique of Broadcast Regulation
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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comparing applicants as equals “could lead to a haphazard restructuring of the
broadcast industry.”363
The preference for incumbents is also reflected in the way that the FCC has
allocated and partitioned-off the amount of spectrum devoted to television
broadcasting.364 For example, the allocation principles followed by the FCC
when first setting aside spectrum for television had the effect of ensuring that
most communities would have access to no more than three television
Because of the inherent cost advantages resulting from
stations.365
networking,366 this regulatory decision had the effect of entrenching the
triopoly of broadcast networks that dominated the first thirty years of the
broadcast industry, because it ensured that a fourth network would be able to
reach no more than sixty-four percent of the national audience with a
technically comparable signal.367 In so ruling, the FCC rejected a proposal
submitted by the nascent DuMont Network that would have made entry by a
fourth network possible.368 Although the FCC based this rejection in part on
the localism concerns discussed above,369 it also based its decision in part on
the ground that the DuMont plan would have disrupted the then-emerging
system of broadcasting by requiring some incumbent broadcasters to shift
channel positions, which would in turn force them to abandon some of their
investments in their existing facilities.370
The FCC took the same approach when managing the spectrum allocated to
UHF television. The FCC had recognized since the earliest days of the
television industry that the amount of spectrum available in the VHF band is
insufficient to support a competitive national television service and that the
best long-range solution was for television to reside entirely in the UHF

363

Cowles Fla. Broad., Inc., 86 F.C.C.2d at 1013 ¶ 62(3).
For additional discussion of this dynamic, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 272-74.
365 See Amendment of Section 3.606 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, Sixth Report & Order, 41 F.C.C.
148, 148-53 ¶¶ 1-18 (1952).
366 See supra Part II.C.
367 1 NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 336, at 68 tbls.8-9. A fifth network would reach less than
forty-one percent of the country. Id.
368 The DuMont plans would have increased the population receiving four or more channels to nearly
ninety-five percent and increased the percentage of the population receiving technically comparable signals to
ninety-three percent—levels that would have greatly increased the feasibility of a fourth network. See
Schuessler, supra note 171, at 891, 921-26, 929 tbl.10, 938-39 & tbl.16.
369 See supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
370 Schuessler, supra note 171, at 909-10.
364
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band.371 When widescale deployment of UHF became technologically
feasible, however, the FCC declined to follow through with its plan to shift all
incumbent VHF broadcasters to UHF on the grounds that doing so would force
incumbent broadcasters and purchasers of television sets to abandon their
investments in existing equipment.372 Instead, the FCC opted to “intermix”
VHF and UHF stations into the same geographic markets, a decision which
caused irreparable harm to UHF stations. The problem is that UHF television
has technical characteristics that make it difficult for it to compete directly
with VHF. The decision to protect incumbent broadcasters thus caused UHF
to fail as a television service for more than a quarter century.373
The same preference for incumbent broadcasters and technologies was reflected in the FCC’s reluctance to allow for more intensive use of the VHF
spectrum. For example, the FCC resisted all attempts to allow VHF “drop-ins”
made possible by relaxing the geographic spacing normally required of VHF
television stations.374 In addition, the FCC has consistently refused to reallo-

371 See Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1571, 1577-78 ¶ 18 (1956); Third Notice
of Further Proposed Rule Making, 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3074 (Apr. 6, 1951); Allocation of Frequencies to Various Classes of Non-Governmental Servs. in Radio Spectrum from 10 Kilocycles to 30,000,000 Kilocycles, 39
F.C.C. 68, 129-30 (1945); Public Release, 39 F.C.C. 16, 16 (1939); see also United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968) (“[T]he Commission has held that an appropriate system of local broadcasting may be created only if . . . significantly wider use [is] made of the available ultra-high-frequency channels.”).
372 See H.R. REP. NO. 85-1297, at 76 (noting testimony of FCC Commissioner Hyde that the refusal to
reallocate television stations to the UHF band stemmed from “the fact that these stations were constructed, the
investments made, [and] the public accustomed to listening to them”). This decision also stands in stark
contrast to the FCC’s near-contemporaneous willingness to strand investments in equipment made by
broadcasters and listeners of FM radio by requiring the entire service to shift to a different portion of the
spectrum. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction
Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 410-11 (2001); Schuessler, supra note 171, at 910-11. The two decisions can be
reconciled when one notes that in each case the FCC’s decisions favored the incumbent broadcast networks.
373 For a more detailed review of these events, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 273-74.
374 See Channel Assignments at Sub-Standard Spacings, 13 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1598, 1601 (1957); Second
Report on Deintermixture, 13 Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1571, 1575 (1956). In 1961, the FCC announced that it would
entertain specific drop-in requests on an ad hoc basis. Interim Policy on VHF TV Channel Assignments, 21
Rad. Reg. (P&F) 1695, 1695 (1961). It soon abandoned this policy, however. VHF Drop-Ins, 25 Rad. Reg.
(P&F) 1687, 1687 (1963). The only subsequent attempt to revive the drop-in policy was quickly abandoned.
Compare St. Anthony Television Corp., 2 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 348, 348-49 (1964) (authorizing a VHF drop-in
in Baton Rouge, La.), remanded sub nom. La. Television Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 347 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
with St. Anthony Television Corp., 8 F.C.C.2d 294 (1967) (abandoning the drop-in proposal). Thereafter, the
FCC only granted drop-in requests in “highly unusual circumstances.” Amendment of Section 73.606(b),
Table of Allotments, Television Broad. Stations (Pueblo, Colo.), Report & Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 7662, 7666-67
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cate vacant television allocations to commercial service, notwithstanding the
fact that hundreds of those allocations have never been economically viable
and have lain fallow for decades.375
The only significant broadening of the spectrum allocated to broadcast
television was the initiation of low power television (LPTV) service in 1982.376
Although the FCC promoted the deployment of LPTV by exempting it from
many of the restrictions applicable to full power broadcasters,377 it ensured that
the interests of incumbent broadcasters would predominate by designating
LPTV as a “secondary service” that would have to cease operation whenever it
interfered with the reception of full power stations.378 Widescale deployment
of LPTV was further hamstrung by a series of administrative missteps,
obstruction by full power broadcasters,379 and the failure to accord LPTV

¶ 23 (1995) (citing Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Television Table of Assignments to Add New VHF
Stations in Top 100 Mkts. & to Assure that New Stations Maximize Diversity of Ownership, Control &
Programming, Report & Order, 81 F.C.C.2d 233 (1980)), vacated sub nom. Sangre De Cristo Communications
v. FCC, 139 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The FCC once again revived VHF drop-ins in 1980 only to terminate
the proceedings a decade later without taking any action. Compare Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 83
F.C.C.2d 51 (1980), with Table of Television Channel Allotments, Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 398 (1990). For reviews
of the early history of VHF drop-ins, see BESEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 17-18, and Glen O. Robinson, The
Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 533 & n.190 (1970).
375 See, e.g., Amendment of Section 73.606, Table of Assignments, Television Broad. Stations (Ogden,
Utah), Report & Order, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,253, 25,253-54 (Apr. 30, 1979); Amendment of Section 73.606, Table
of Assignments, Television Broad. Stations (Ogden, Utah), Memorandum Opinion & Order, 26 F.C.C.2d 142
(1970). See generally Deletion of Noncommercial Reservation of Channel *16, 482-88 MHz, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Memorandum Opinion & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 11,700, 11,708 ¶ 18 (1996) (noting that the FCC has never
eliminated a noncommercial allotment, even when vacant or proven not to be economically viable).
376 See Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l
Telecomms. Sys., Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (May 18, 1982) [hereinafter LPTV Final Rule]. LPTV
broadcast at only three kilowatts of power on VHF frequencies and 150 kilowatts on UHF frequencies, which
typically gives them a range of fifteen to twenty miles. Full power television stations, in contrast, can transmit
up to 316 kilowatts of power on VHF and 5000 kilowatts on UHF, which gives them a range of up to eighty
miles. For further discussion of LPTV, see supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
377 LPTV was exempt from the ascertainment and local programming requirements applicable to full
service television, because the limited coverage area would make LPTV inherently responsive to local needs.
LPTV Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 21,491 ¶ 106. It also was exempt from many of the ownership restrictions
imposed on fullpower broadcasters, including the limits on the number of stations that fullpower broadcasters
can own nationwide and the “duopoly” and the “one-to-a-market” rules, which restrict the number and types of
stations that any one licensee can operate within any geographic area. Id. at 21,487-89 ¶¶ 83-95.
378 Inquiry into Future Role of Low Power Broad. & Television Translators in the Nat’l Telecomms. Sys.,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 82 F.C.C.2d 47, 49-50 ¶¶ 6-7 (1980).
379 Specifically, the FCC rejected all applications that were not “complete and sufficient,” which was a
standard that was considerably more stringent than the “substantially complete” standard applied to full-power
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stations full must-carry rights.380 LPTV finally began to flourish after 1994
when the FCC at last removed many of the procedural obstacles that had been
restricting the development of LPTV,381 only to be devastated by the FCC’s
decision to displace a multitude of LPTV stations in order to deploy digital
television by doubling the amount of spectrum given for free to all incumbent,
full-power broadcasters.382 The effect of these presumptions was to forgo the
benefits of competition and to place a premium on industry stability for its own
sake.
b. Cable Television

The desire to protect incumbents also determined the FCC’s response to the
emergence of cable television. After initially declining to assert jurisdiction
over cable, the FCC subsequently decided to hamstring the cable industry with
the series of regulations described at length above.383 Although enactment of
these restrictions arose partly from the desire to preserve and promote locally
oriented content and the availability of free television, the FCC also justified
these regulations in part by the need to protect television broadcasting in
general, and the weaker UHF stations in particular, from competition with this

broadcasters. LPTV Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. at 21,481 ¶ 51. The FCC also confused the public by assigning
LPTV stations five-digit call signs composed of both letters and numerals instead of the traditional four-letter
call signs used by full-power television stations. Id. at 21,490 ¶ 97. See generally Andrew J. Kersey,
Comment, Low Power Television in 1994: Outgrowing its Secondary Status, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 53,
55-56 (1995).
380 See 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B) (2000) (requiring LPTV stations to establish that their programming
“would address local news and informational needs which are not being adequately served by full power
broadcast stations” before receiving free carriage). The irony is that LPTV and must-carry were both animated
by the desire to promote the core policies of localism, diversity of information sources, and competition in an
adequate manner. If those concerns had been taken more seriously, one might have expected Congress to
accord greater protection to LPTV than to conventional broadcasting rather than less, because LPTV stations
were supposedly more likely to promote the statute’s stated goals.
381 Review of Comm’n’s Rules Governing Low Power Television Serv., First Report & Order, 9 F.C.C.R.
2555 (1994).
382 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact Upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Sixth Report &
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14,588, 14,595 ¶ 11 (1997). Congress subsequently mitigated the impact of the digital
television rollout on LPTV by passing legislation in 1999 creating new “Class A” LPTV licenses that no
longer had to yield to full-power stations. In order to qualify for a Class A license, the LPTV must have
broadcast for a minimum of eighteen hours per day, including an average of three hours or more per week of
locally produced programming, during the ninety-day period preceding the enactment of the statute. 47 U.S.C.
§ 336(f)(2)(A)(i); see also Establishment of Class A Television Serv., Report & Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6355
(2000) (implementing the statute).
383 See supra Parts III.A.1.b, III.B.1.b.
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upstart technology. For example, in the seminal decision in which the FCC
asserted jurisdiction over cable television, the FCC denied an application for a
microwave facility to distribute cable television programming in part because
the additional competition threatened to inflict economic harm on a local TV
station.384 Although the FCC explicitly disavowed any intention of protecting
existing investments against new technological advances,385 it repeatedly
prevented the importation of distant signals out of concern that allowing cable
operators to do so would hurt incumbent broadcasters (UHF stations in
particular)386 and would jeopardize the basic structure of over-the-air
television.387 As FCC Chairman Dean Burch candidly admitted in 1971, the
FCC had interpreted its public interest mandate to include the short-term
“protectionism for over-the-air broadcasting” against incursions by cable
television.388 The irony is that cable would ultimately prove to be UHF’s
savior, because cable transmission is what finally allowed UHF stations to
achieve technical parity with VHF stations.389
Congress expressed similar considerations in the findings that accompanied
the 1992 Cable Act, which emphasized the importance of protecting
broadcasters’ ability to continue to provide certain services.390 As the Supreme
Court ultimately concluded, the must-carry provisions “are designed to

384

Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 464-65 (1962).
Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91 to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern Grant of Authorizations in
Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., Second Report &
Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 788 ¶ 155 (1966).
386 See id. at 782 ¶ 141; CATV First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 700 ¶ 48(I) (1965).
387 Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations Relative to Cmty. Antenna
Television Sys., Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 164 ¶ 58 (1972), aff’d sub nom. ACLU v.
FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
388 Cable Antenna Television (CATV): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications & Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971); accord Community
Antenna Television Problems, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen. Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1971), quoted in Stanley M. Besen, The Economics of the Cable
Television “Consensus,” 17 J.L. & ECON. 39, 40-41 (1974).
389 See Rolla Edward Park, Cable Television, UHF Broadcasting, and FCC Regulatory Policy, 15 J.L. &
ECON. 207 (1972).
390 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(10),
106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000)) (finding a substantial government
interest in “ensuring [the] continuation” of the local origin of programming provided by broadcasters);
§
2(a)(12), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding a substantial government interest in “promoting the continued availability
of . . . free television programming”); see also § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding that broadcasters
“continue to be an important source of local news and public affairs programming”).
385

1690

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

guarantee the survival of a medium that has become a vital part of the Nation’s
communication system.”391 In enacting them, “Congress sought to preserve
the existing structure of the Nation’s broadcast television medium while
permitting the concomitant expansion and development of cable television.”392
c. DBS

The desire to protect the economic interests and the existing structure of the
broadcast industry has also shaped the regulation of DBS. Most notable are
the restrictions on the ability of DBS providers to carry programming from the
major broadcast networks. As noted earlier, the SHVA, which Congress
enacted in 1988, prohibited satellite carriers from carrying broadcast signals
(including, most importantly, signals provided by the major broadcast
networks such as ABC, CBS, and NBC), unless the household was unable to
receive such programming over the air. Congress based these restrictions
explicitly on the need to promote “the public interest in protecting the networkaffiliate distribution system.”393 In addition, the SHVA prohibited the
transmission of broadcast signals to any households that had received network
television via cable within the previous ninety days,394 further insulating cable
against the emergence of DBS.
This commitment to protecting broadcast television was still evident when
Congress passed the SHVIA in 1999, which imposed the carry one, carry all
requirement on satellite carriers.395 The available legislative history indicates
that Congress enacted these provisions in order “to hew as closely . . . as

391
392

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994).
Id. at 652; accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 193 (1997) (quoting the same lan-

guage).
393 H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(II), at 19-20 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5638, 5648; accord id. at
20, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5649; H.R. REP. NO. 100-887(I), at 8, 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5611, 5617. Congress added a further level of regulation to DBS in 1992 by subjecting
DBS providers to the same political access requirements that applied to broadcasters and instructing the FCC
to consider how DBS could best serve the principle of localism. 47 U.S.C. § 335(a) (2000). It also required
DBS operators to set aside four to seven percent of its channel capacity for noncommercial programming of an
educational or informational nature. Id. § 335(b)(1). The D.C. Circuit rejected a facial challenge to these
regulations in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 310-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
394 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 202(2), 102 Stat. 3935, 3957 (enacting
17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10)(B)), repealed by Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I,
§ 1005(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-527 (1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10) (2000)).
395 See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
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possible” to the existing structure of broadcast networks.396 The SHVIA did
eliminate the provision that created a ninety-day waiting period for DBS
customers who currently subscribed to cable.397
d. Digital Broadcasting

Finally, policymakers’ commitment to favoring incumbents over new
entrants and new technologies is reflected in the decision, made initially by the
FCC and later endorsed by Congress, to deploy digital television by giving
each incumbent station an additional television channel.398 Invoking a
rationale strikingly reminiscent of the policies favored by then-Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover and the Federal Radio Commission during the
nascent days of the radio industry,399 the FCC contended that current
broadcasters were important sources of relevant expertise and experience and
thus were in the best position to assure a prompt and orderly transition to
digital broadcasting.400 Even more problematically, the FCC stressed the need
to avoid the disruption associated with a change in the ownership structure of
the broadcast industry.401 The FCC declined to revisit this decision even after
it explicitly recognized that digital broadcasters could transmit SDTV in

396

H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 92 (1999); accord S. REP. NO. 106-42, at 10 (1999); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 106-79(I), at 13 (1999) (noting that the DBS must-carry requirement was crafted so as to “protect the
traditional network-affiliate relationship”); see also Implementation of Satellite Home Viewer Improvement
Act of 1999: Broad. Signal Carriage Issues, Report & Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 1918, 1925 ¶ 13 (2001) (observing
that Congress enacted the DBS must-carry requirement in part to “preserve free over-the-air broadcasting”).
397 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I, § 1005(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A527 (1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(10) (2000)).
398 See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
399 Hoover and the Federal Radio Commission made experience and expertise major licensing
considerations, in his case by emphasizing the importance of adequate financial backing and previous
broadcast experience. It goes without saying that such considerations have the inexorable effect of favoring
incumbents over new entrants. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 128, at 22.
400 See Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 7024, 7025 ¶ 6 (1991) [hereinafter DTV Impact]; Advanced Television Sys.
& Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3
F.C.C.R. 6520, 6537-38 ¶¶ 136-37 (1988) [hereinafter DTV Tentative Decision]; see also Advanced
Television Sys. & Their Impact upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 3340, 6926 ¶ 2, 6930 ¶ 8 (1992) (reaffirming the decision to limit
eligibility for digital television licenses to existing license holders) [hereinafter DTV Second Report & Order].
401 See DTV Impact, 6 F.C.C.R. at 7025 ¶ 6; DTV Tentative Decision, 3 F.C.C.R. at 6537-38 ¶ 136-137;
see also DTV Second Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6926 ¶ 2, 6930 ¶ 8 (reaffirming the decision to limit
eligibility for digital television licenses to existing license holders).
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substantially less spectrum, again emphasizing the importance of ensuring an
orderly transition.402
2. An Aside on Competition Policy

The decision to protect incumbents against incursions by new entrants and
new technologies contradicts many of the most fundamental principles of
competition policy. The most important problem that any regulatory authority
can face is excessive horizontal concentration in a particular market. Although
other regulatory responses exist, the best long-term solution to the problems
resulting from such concentration is to encourage entry by new competitors.
This suggests that Congress and the FCC should instead be taking steps to
encourage the emergence of new market entry and new media technologies.
All too often, however, U.S. television policy has had the effect of frustrating
such entry. Many of the key decisions made by Congress and the FCC have
thus had the perverse effect of creating and preserving horizontal concentration
rather than dissipating it.
In each instance, Congress and the FCC justified their actions on two
grounds, neither of which can withstand analysis. The first is the desire to
avoid short-term transitional costs.403 Needless to say, excessive concern over
short-term losses to prevent the realization of sustainable long-term gains is
incredibly short sighted, because the long-term benefits are almost certain to
outweigh any short-term concerns.404 This result is rendered all the more
unfortunate by the fact that the key decisions were made when the television
industry was still in its infancy and the short-term transitional costs were still
relatively low.405
The other justification is a desire to avoid disrupting the existing
industry.406 Put simply, this justification is an economic non sequitur. As an

402 Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report &
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,814 ¶¶ 11-12 (1997); see also Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking & Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,541 ¶¶ 7-8, 10,545 ¶ 27 (1995).
403 See supra notes 370, 372, 401 and accompanying text.
404 Hazlett, supra note 161, at 164-65.
405 See Henry Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications Commission,
63 GEO. L.J. 705, 710-15 (1975).
406 See supra notes 363, 387, 396, 401 and accompanying text.
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FCC working paper recognized, it is inevitable that the increased competition
caused by the arrival of new television technologies would cause some
television stations to exhibit distress and perhaps even cause some to fail.407
Protecting broadcasters against such economic forces inevitably deprived the
marketplace of the benefits that are supposed to flow from competition. The
price of adhering to this policy is likely to increase in the future. Indeed, such
Schumpeterian “gales of creative destruction” may well represent the norm of
competition in the digital age.408 As a result, any attempt to shield the
television industry from such disruption simply blinks reality.
a. Analog Broadcasting

Consider first the structure of the television industry as it existed before the
emergence of cable as the dominant means of transmission. During this era,
policymakers regarded concentration at the wholesale (i.e., network) level of
the chain of distribution to be the television industry’s central problem. As a
result, over the years the FCC launched a series of initiatives designed to
redress the dominance of the three major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and
NBC),409 which in the 1970s commanded ninety percent of the prime time
viewing audience.410
The irony is that the dominant position of ABC, CBS, and NBC the FCC
was attempting to redress was itself the creation of FCC policy.411 As noted
earlier,412 the failure of a fourth network to emerge was largely a product of the
FCC’s allocation policy and its hostility toward pay television. The FCC
compounded this problem by adopting additional measures to reduce the

407 Florence Levy & Jonathan Setzer, Broadcast Television in a Multichannel Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R.
3996, 4001, 4097-98 (OPP Working Paper No. 26, June 27, 1991).
408 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (1942).
409 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 85-1297 (1958) (reprinting the so-called “Barrow Report”); Amendment of
Part 73 of Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations with Respect to Competitiveness & Responsibility in Network
Television Broad., Report & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382 (1970), aff’d sub nom. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971); 1 NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 336; see also FED.
COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, supra note 164, 30-34 (addressing the dominance of radio networks); 2 NEW
TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 336, at 653-716 (describing antitrust actions brought against all three
major broadcast networks in 1974).
410 Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1046 (7th Cir. 1992).
411 For an earlier discussion of this problem, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 275-78.
412 See supra Part III.B.1.
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networks’ profitability.413 These efforts were worse than useless, because
limiting network revenues had two perverse effects. First, the artificial limits
on network revenue depress investment in new programming, which in turn
reduces the diversity of programming and starves the program producers of
investment resources.414 Second, reducing the profitability of network
operations deters entry by new networks and thus tends to entrench the very
network oligopoly that lies at the heart of the competitive problem.415 The
lessons are quite simple. Attempts to promote certain values through implicit
cross-subsidies may actually have the unintended effect of entrenching the
existing, uncompetitive market structure.
b. Cable

When cable television emerged as a technology, the relative scarcity of
broadcast frequencies and the concomitant restrictions on channel capacity
were generally regarded as one of the central regulatory challenges facing television.416 As a result, one might have imagined that policymakers would have
welcomed cable with open arms. Unfortunately, nothing could have been further from the truth. Even though cable television simultaneously eliminated
the handicap in signal quality suffered by UHF and drastically expanded the
channel capacity available to television viewers, the FCC initially responded to
cable television with considerable hostility.417
It was therefore not until cable made it possible for the networks to reach
households without having to rely on local television stations for carriage that
real network competition began to emerge. But rather than embrace cable as a
solution to the inability of a fourth network to reach substantial portions of the
country, the FCC instead chose to impede cable’s emergence in the name of
protecting incumbent (and particularly the weaker UHF) broadcasters.418

413 See Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation),
80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1454-58, 1499-500 (1996); Yoo, supra note 51, at 184-86, 217-18.
414 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1050-52.
415 Id. at 1053; Chen, supra note 413, at 1457-58.
416 For a more complete discussion of scarcity’s role in shaping broadcast regulation, see Yoo, supra note
117, at 260, 262, 265-66.
417 See supra notes 383-92 and accompanying text.
418 See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the subsequent history raises serious doubts about the
credibility of the FCC’s justification for suppressing cable. Ironically, cable
would ultimately prove to be UHF’s savior, because cable transmission is what
finally allowed UHF stations to achieve technical parity with VHF stations.419
In retrospect, the idea that the FCC restricted the growth of the cable industry
in order to protect UHF broadcasters appears ludicrous. In the end, true
competition among television networks developed more from successful
judicial challenges to the FCC’s cable regulations420 than it did from FCC
policies.
Although the advent of cable as the primary means for household
distribution of television programming did alleviate the horizontal
concentration of the wholesaling functions provided by the networks, it
simultaneously increased the concentration of the retail distribution functions
performed by the cable operator. Because of the large, up-front fixed costs
associated with connecting entire neighborhoods with coaxial cable,
policymakers believed that direct competition between cable television
systems was impossible. Despite the existence of some evidence that this was
not the case,421 regulatory authorities began to undertake a series of steps that
only served to entrench the monopoly. For example, municipal licensing
authorities began to make the licenses issued to cable systems exclusive ones
for the supposed reason that doing so would avoid the waste of resources
associated with the establishment of duplicative networks.422 Although
Congress eventually passed legislation prohibiting the issuance of exclusive
licenses,423 the practice has continued.

419

See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-51 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
421 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the
Cable Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in
the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 98 (1972). But see ALBERT K. SMILEY, ANTITRUST DIVISION,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DIRECT COMPETITION AMONG CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS (EAG Paper No. 86-9,
June 5, 1989); Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
422 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications for Public Policy,
7 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 65-70 (1990).
423 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
420
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Such exclusivity terms appear to be useless at best. If cable truly were a
natural monopoly, incumbent cable operators would have little fear that direct
competition would emerge, because no rational company would try to enter the
market. Even if entry were to occur, the resulting competition would create
considerable, albeit temporary, benefits for consumers. In the absence of any
constructive purpose, the only possible effect of such a restriction is to become
a de jure barrier to entry that cannot be unjustified in terms of static
efficiency.424 The imposition of legal restrictions on entry has implications for
dynamic efficiency that may be even more important, because entry
restrictions may frustrate investment in, and the emergence of, alternative
network facilities that represent the only long-term solution to the problems of
horizontal concentration. This effect is further exacerbated by the fact that
such de jure restrictions may continue to exist long after technological
developments have undercut the factors that caused policymakers to view the
technology in question as a natural monopoly in the first place.425
Unfortunately, policymakers do not appear to have learned from their previous

424 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 159, 195-96 347-64 (1978); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 12.6, at 530-31 (2d ed. 2000). See generally CARLTON &
PERLOFF, supra note 23, at 679-82.
425 As Richard Posner observed:

Changes in technology may, over time, erode a natural monopoly. . . . Such developments would
be hindered by the grant of long-term exclusive franchises to cable companies for the franchises
would enlarge the cable companies’ effective monopoly. What is more, since cable companies
might not have monopoly power in the absence of government regulation, an exclusive franchise
could create monopoly where none would otherwise exist.
RICHARD A. POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION: THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL MONOPOLY 15 (1970). Other scholars
have offered similar thoughts. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 286-87 (1982)
(“[B]ecause regulation, once in place, is hard to dismantle, one would like to know whether future technological change is likely to transform an industry that is now a natural monopoly, making it structurally suited to
competition.”); 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 127 (1971) (“In the presence of such
rapid [technological] change, the natural monopoly of yesterday may be transformed into a natural area of
competition today. . . .”); John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural
Monopoly, 8 BELL J. ECON. 1, 21 (1977) (providing public policy analysis of free entry into a regulated natural
monopoly should heed sustainability considerations). Posner similarly notes:
The most pernicious feature of regulation would appear to be precisely its impact on change—its
tendency to retard the growth of competition that would erode the power of regulated
monopolists. To embrace regulation because an industry is today a natural monopoly and seems
likely to remain so is to game dangerously with the future. To impose regulation on the basis of a
prophecy that the industry will remain monopolistic forever may be to make the prophecy selffulfilling.
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 636 (1969).
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mistakes. As noted earlier, the commitment to these policies appears to be
retarding the deployment of 3G wireless devices.426
c. DBS

The way that DBS is regulated also reflects the principle of favoring
incumbents against competition from new entrants and new media
technologies. As noted earlier, the dearth of facilities-based competition
among alternative television providers has long represented one of the central
problems in television policy. Viewed from this perspective, DBS represents
something of a policy godsend. It has emerged as the first viable competitor to
cable, having reached penetration levels identified as representing effective
competition,427 and it is starting to impose price discipline on cable.428 DBS
systems are also providing greater viewing options and innovative products.429
Even more important is the prospect of allowing rural areas to obtain access to
multi-channel television and high-speed Internet service for the first time.430
Instead, policymakers have taken steps to stifle the development of DBS in
order to protect the economic interests and the existing structure of the
broadcast industry. The most egregious provision is the now-repudiated
provision banning customers from subscribing to DBS if they had subscribed
to cable within the past ninety days.431 The most problematic constraint
currently in force is the restriction on DBS providers’ ability to carry
programming from the major broadcast networks. As noted earlier, the SHVA,
which Congress enacted in 1988, prohibited satellite providers from carrying
broadcast signals, including the signals provided by the major broadcast
networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), unless the household was unable to receive
such programming over the air. Congress based these restrictions explicitly on
the need to protect existing broadcast stations,432 while the ninety-day waiting

426

See infra Part IV.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
428 Implementation of Section 3 of Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992,
Report on Cable Industry Prices, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363 ¶ 48, 4364-65 ¶ 53 (2001).
429 Of particular note are DirecTV’s sports packages. See DirecTV Programming and Channels, Sports
Subscriptions, at http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/see/SportsSubscriptions.jsp (last visited Dec. 10, 2003).
430 Yoo, supra note 51, at 257.
431 See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
432 See supra notes 393, 396 and accompanying text.
427
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period served to protect cable.433 Although the SHVIA allowed satellite
providers to begin to offer broadcast signals to all of its customers, it continued
to prohibit distant signal importation and to subject satellite carriers to a wide
variety of other restrictions designed to protect the incumbent broadcasters.434
d. Digital Broadcasting

Finally, the decision to deploy digital television by giving each incumbent
an additional channel contradicts the fundamental economic principles of
competition policy. The decision to double the amount of spectrum devoted to
television without diversifying the ownership structure of the broadcast
industry was one that stunned those who had long complained about the
excessive concentration and lack of diversity in broadcast ownership.435 The
fact that Congress and the FCC were able to do so without displacing a single
other service came as a shock to those who lived through the protracted battles
over attempts to squeeze in a handful of additional channels into the table of
allocations436 as well as those who had long supported attempts to
deconcentrate and diversify broadcast station ownership.437 Admittedly, some
of the more intensive uses of the spectrum were made possible by the nature of
the digital medium. That does not fully explain the FCC’s ability to double the
amount of spectrum given to the industry that is already the heaviest user of
the electromagnetic spectrum. Indeed, the FCC itself acknowledged that many
of the efficiencies resulted from improvements in receiver technology that had
been available for quite some time, but had never before seemed sufficient to
prompt the FCC to liberalize its licensing policies.438
Equally troublesome is the existence of other options that could have
reduced the amount of spectrum needed to deploy digital television. The FCC
could have adopted an HDTV format that required considerably less than six
Moreover, the FCC could have favored
megahertz of spectrum.439

433
434
435

See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
See supra note 216-21, 395-97 and accompanying text.
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 122, 163-64

(1996).
436

See Glen O. Robinson, Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609, 616 (1998).
See Krattenmaker, supra note 435, at 163-64.
438 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
439 For example, the FCC rejected proposals supporting an HDTV format that would have required only
three megahertz of spectrum. Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv.,
437
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multicasting several streams of SDTV rather than a single stream of HDTV,
which would have dramatically increased the number of voices in each
market.440 Alternatively, the FCC could have reduced the amount of spectrum
allocated to each incumbent broadcaster to that needed to transmit a single
stream of SDTV. Doing so would have benefited consumers by freeing up
substantial amounts of spectrum for other uses.
All of these implications raise serious doubts about the sincerity of the
policy commitments supposedly espoused by Congress and the FCC. Indeed,
there are significant indications that the decision to deploy digital television in
this manner was driven by far baser motives. It has long been understood that
the existing allocation of television stations creates substantial monopoly rents
for incumbent broadcasters.441 Broadcasters have been careful to protect their
privileged position by opposing any regulatory reforms that would have
dissipated these rents by allowing new entry or by allocating more spectrum to
commercial broadcasting. The arrival of digital television threatened to upset
the status quo. The only way that broadcasters could ensure that they would
not lose their privileged position would be to ensure that digital television was
deployed in a manner that allowed them to continue to receive their spectrum
for free without increasing the number of channels available or the number of
competing voices.
The FCC’s approach to deploying digital television solved all of these
problems. After years of being unable to justify permitting more intensive use
of the available spectrum or reallocating spectrum from other uses when doing
so would have hurt incumbent television stations,442 the FCC was able to find
sufficient spectrum within the bands already committed to television
broadcasting to double the number of signals that could operate without
interfering with one another. Restricting eligibility for those additional stations
to current license holders ensured that no new entrants would gain access to
broadcast facilities. And the emphasis on HDTV offered the promise of

Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6531-32 ¶¶ 83-93 (1988).
440 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
441 See, e.g., HARVEY J. LEVIN, FACT AND FANCY IN TELEVISION REGULATION 115 (1980); R.H. Coase,
The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 22-23 (1959); Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology,
Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1277 (1984).
442 See supra notes 364-82 and accompanying text.
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ensuring that the transition to digital broadcasting would not cause a
concomitant increase in the number of voices.
Under the standard public choice analysis, the regulated entities generate
political support for this state of affairs by allowing policymakers to redirect a
certain portion of the rents created in directions that they find politically
beneficial.443 In this situation, the key television-related policy issues that
concerned legislators arose around additional restrictions on indecent and
violent programming, increased support for children’s educational
programming, and the provision of free air time for political candidates—
matters that broadcasters had consistently opposed on First Amendment
grounds.444 Just as the television industry’s protracted lobbying campaign in
favor of providing incumbent broadcasters with additional spectrum for free
was about to come to fruition as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
it was placed in jeopardy by a bipartisan group led by Senate Majority Leader
and Presidential candidate Bob Dole, who condemned the impending license
giveaway as an unsupportable act of corporate welfare. This group held up the
enactment of the 1996 Act until it was agreed that the FCC would not award
any digital television licenses until Congress had enacted spectrum reform.
At this point, the broadcast industry began a series of high-level meetings
during which, in the words of one FCC official, broadcasters began “tripping
all over themselves to give up their First Amendment rights.”445 A few days
after Dole resigned from the Senate to campaign for the Presidency full time,
the leadership in the House and Senate sent a letter to the FCC rescinding the
Dole agreement. Significant concessions by the industry with respect to
indecency and violence on television, children’s educational programming, and
candidate access soon followed. Congress eventually enshrined this final
resolution in a provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 explicitly
forbidding the FCC from auctioning digital television licenses.446 The entire
episode thus appears to be yet another example of how the regulations posing
as remedies to the problems caused by barriers to entry in maintaining market

443

See, e.g., FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING (1997).
For an earlier discussion of these events, see Yoo, supra note 117, at 352-53. See also Hazlett, supra
note 181, at 564-67; Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 938-43 (1997); Robinson, supra note 374, at 919.
445 Hazlett, supra note 444, at 942 (internal quotations omitted).
446 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(2)(B) (2000).
444
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concentration are, in fact, revealed to be the means by which those
anticompetitive structures are created and maintained.
Similar issues are raised by the principle against favoring incumbents over
new entrants and new technologies. In this case, digital television is the new
technology that promises to provide increasingly diverse services. From this
perspective, it is arguable that policymakers should take steps to encourage its
deployment, even when doing so would burden established players, such as
cable operators.
3. Windowing and Imperfect Price Discrimination

Although the foregoing discussion focusing on competition policy provides
sufficient reason to advocate abandoning policymakers’ historic commitment
to protecting television broadcasting against the emergence of horizontal
competition, such arguments draw further support from the economic analysis
that forms the heart of this Article. In addition to raising concerns relating to
competition policy, the decision to deploy digital television through incumbent
broadcasters is also somewhat problematic from the standpoint of public good
economics in that it has also had the unfortunate effect of limiting the ability of
the networks to price discriminate. Not only did the FCC’s commitment to
free television deprive consumers of the ability to signal differences in the
intensity of their preferences, obstructing the emergence of new media also had
the effect of frustrating a form of price discrimination known as
“windowing.”447 The best-known example of windowing occurs when a movie
is initially released in first-run theaters, where prices are the highest.
Eventually, the movie is re-released through a series of lower-revenue
channels, including second-run theaters, pay-per-view on cable television,
premium cable movie channels such as HBO and Showtime, prime-time
network television, and then syndication.448 The available empirical studies
confirm that the imperfect price discrimination made possible by release of
television programs through both pay television and advertising-supported

447

For an overview, see OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 78, at 26-38.
Id. at 29-30 & tbl.2.2; David E. Leibowitz, The Sequential Distribution of Television Programming in
a Dynamic Marketplace, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 671, 694-95 (1985); David Waterman, Prerecorded Home Video
and the Distribution of Theatrical Feature Films, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION, supra note 82, at 229-30 &
fig.7.2.
448
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television increases both the total revenues generated by the program and the
total surplus.449
The ability to employ windowing as a form of price discrimination would
thus appear to depend in part on the emergence of pay television and the ability
to make direct charges for television programs, without which price
discrimination would appear to be impossible. Windowing depends on the
availability of different television technologies with different cost structures
and different abilities to sort customers. It is thus conceivable that the
emergence of additional media will allow for even finer segmentation of the
market. For example, it is noteworthy that DBS has been able to offer
programming that is not available on cable.450
That said, the primary way that the emergence of cable television appears
to have facilitated price discrimination has more to do with its ability to serve
as a platform for pay television than it does with the increased opportunities for
windowing provided by the arrival of a new medium.451 The similarity in the
pay-per-view events, premium movie channels, and basic cable networks
offered on cable and DBS also suggests that the additional benefits provided
by the emergence of additional television technologies may be limited. Still,
the possibility remains that the emergence of different media with different
underlying cost structures and audiences may make new windows possible. In
any event, the competitive concerns described above provide ample reason for
encouraging the emergence of new media apart from public good economics.
It bears emphasizing that my point is not that policymakers should impose
cross-subsidies to favor one type of television service over the other. My point
is rather that policymakers should forgo imposing cross-subsidies running in
either direction and should instead allow the marketplace to settle debates
about the relative merits of the various technologies. This position thus
counsels in favor of eliminating must-carry altogether or, failing that, to limit
its scope as much as possible. It does not provide any support for imposing

449

Hansen & Kyhl, supra note 126, at 601-04.
See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
451 See Hansen & Kyhl, supra note 126, at 603-04 (concluding that, although the imperfect price
discrimination made possible by windowing did increase total surplus, that effect was small compared to the
increases in total surplus made possible by the ability to charge direct payments to viewers).
450
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dual carriage or for requiring cable operators to carry multiple program streams
provided by digital broadcasters.
The question whether the FCC should reverse its current presumption and
instead begin adopting policies that promote the emergence of new entrants
and technologies at the expense of the incumbent players is somewhat more
difficult. When horizontal markets are relatively concentrated, stimulating
new entry would clearly create significant welfare gains. In addition, new
entrants and new technologies frequently face different risk profiles and costs
of capital than do established players, which may in turn make it difficult for
them to compete on an equal footing. Although such considerations arguably
support policies favoring new entrants and technologies at the expense of
incumbents, I am somewhat chary of regulatory intervention in the process of
picking technology winners and losers.452 Thus, absent a more compelling
demonstration that government intervention would be more effective at
compensating for these shortcomings than would private ordering, I remain
reluctant to reverse the presumption embodied in past FCC policy and believe
the better policy is to allow the market to resolve the role that each technology
will occupy in the end.
D. Bundling as a Form of Price Discrimination: Single-Channel vs. MultiChannel Television

The fourth and final basic commitment that I believe has animated U.S.
regulatory policy with respect to television has been a preference for singlechannel technologies over multi-channel technologies. In many cases, this
commitment has been an inadvertent side effect of policymakers’ attempts to
promote local content and advertising-supported television technologies by
favoring broadcast television. In other cases, such as the deployment of digital
television, the commitment has been quite conscious and explicit. My analysis
suggests that the preference for single-channel television has exacerbated the
welfare losses that arise in the market for television programming. As the
discussion that follows explains, discouraging the development of multichannel television options inhibits the ability of the program providers to use
bundling to minimize the welfare losses through price discrimination.

452

See Yoo, supra note 51, at 283-84.
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1. The Regulatory Commitment to Single-Channel Television

The FCC’s commitment to single-channel television over multi-channel
television has long been implicit in its attempts described above to require
cable television to cross-subsidize broadcast television.453 It is also implicit in
the decision to require that DBS systems that wished to provide programming
by the major broadcast networks carry all full-power local television stations
broadcasting in that service area.454
The preference for single-channel over multi-channel television became
most explicit during the debates surrounding the deployment of digital
television. From 1987 until 1995, the FCC presumed that digital broadcasters
would use their additional spectrum to simulcast a single stream of HDTV,
which uses the greater efficiency of spectrum usage to double the number of
vertical and horizontal lines used to comprise a television picture so that the
picture quality approximates the resolution of thirty-five millimeter film.455
It has long been apparent, however, that rather than using the increased
efficiency of spectrum to improve the resolution of television images,
broadcasters could instead use the increased efficiency provided by digital
transmission to multicast up to six streams of SDTV.456 Despite this fact, the
FCC initially signaled its intention to adopt a simulcast HDTV system457 and

453

See supra notes 185-90, 305-06 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
455 DTV First Report & Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627, 5627 ¶ 1, 5628 ¶ 7 (1990); see also Advanced Television
Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 11
F.C.C.R. 6235, 6246 ¶ 28 (1996) [hereinafter DTV Fifth FNPRM]; Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact
on Existing Television Broad. Serv., Memorandum Opinion & Order, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking & Third Notice of Inquiry, 10 F.C.C.R. 10,540, 10,542 ¶ 13, 10,544 ¶ 26, 10,547 ¶ 39, 10,553 ¶
82 (1995) [hereinafter DTV Fourth FNPRM].
456 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, even without any increase in resolution,
SDTV would provide substantially higher picture quality than analog television. See supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
457 DTV First Report & Order, 5 F.C.C.R. at 5627 ¶ 1, 5628 ¶ 7; accord Advanced Television Sys. &
Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Tentative Decision & Further Notice of Inquiry, 3
F.C.C.R. 6520, 6522 ¶¶ 10-12 (1988) (reporting that 1988 Interim Report of the Advisory Committee on
Advanced Television Service concluded that “efforts should be focused on establishing an HDTV standard for
terrestrial broadcasting” and suggested that digital SDTV options be considered only as solutions that might
facilitate the transition from analog to HDTV); cf. DTV Fifth FNPRM, 11 F.C.C.R. at 6246 ¶ 28 (noting that
prior to the emergence of the ATSC digital television standard in 1995, it was widely believed that digital
television would be comprised of a single HDTV program stream).
454
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took steps to discourage multicasting.458 Although the FCC eventually
removed its bias against multicasting,459 congressional pressure forced digital
broadcasters to abandon attempts to multicast and to commit instead to
providing a single stream of HDTV.460 The FCC reinforced this conclusion by
requiring digital television stations to simulcast on both their digital and analog
stations during the last years of the transition to digital.461 Furthermore,
drawing on the recommendations of a prominent presidential advisory
committee,462 the FCC has requested comments on whether broadcasters who
multicast should be required to bear additional public interest obligations or
pay additional fees.463 The FCC raised a similar possibility in its proceeding
regarding digital broadcasters’ obligations with respect to children’s television
programming.464
There is one way that the FCC has deviated from its tendency to favor
single-channel television technologies over multi-channel television
technologies. In its Digital Must-Carry proceedings, the FCC determined that

458 See DTV First Report & Order, 5 F.C.C.R. at 5627 ¶ 1, 5629 ¶ 12 (ruling that resolution of the issues
surrounding HDTV take priority over SDTV proposals); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon the
Existing Television Broad. Serv., Second Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 3340, 3355-56 ¶¶ 58-60 (1992) (requiring that broadcasters simulcast the same programming on their
analog and digital channels) [hereinafter DTV Second Report & Order].
459 DTV Fourth FNPRM, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,541-42 ¶¶ 8-11, 10,544 ¶ 23, 10,546 ¶¶ 34-36, 10,547 ¶¶ 3943; accord Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth Report &
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,774 ¶ 5 (1996); DTV Fifth FNPRM, 11 F.C.C.R. at 6246 ¶ 28; DTV Fourth
FNPRM, 10 F.C.C.R. at 10,541 ¶ 4; see also Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact upon Existing
Television Broad. Serv., Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 12,826-27 ¶¶ 41-44 (1997) (declining to
require digital broadcasters to transmit a minimum number of hours of HDTV) [hereinafter DTV Fifth Report
& Order].
460 Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 23, 99-100 (2001) (citing Joel Brinkley, Under Pressure, 2 Broadcasters Decide They Will Now Run
HDTV, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at D1).
461 See DTV Second Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 3355-57 ¶¶ 58-62 (initially requiring one hundred
percent simulcasting); Advanced Television Sys. & Their Impact on Existing Television Broad. Serv.,
Memorandum Opinion & Order, Third Report & Order, & Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 6924, 6970-77 ¶¶ 64-70 (1992) (reaffirming one hundred percent simulcasting phased in over two
years). The FCC retained its simulcast requirement even after it dropped its insistence that digital stations
transmit a single stream of HDTV. DTV Fifth Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. at 12,832-33 ¶¶ 54-56 (retaining
the simulcast requirement, but lengthening the phase-in period).
462 GORE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 230, at 55.
463 Pub. Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, Notice of Inquiry, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 21,635-36 ¶
6, 21,637-38 ¶¶ 10-11 (1999).
464 Children’s Television Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
15 F.C.C.R. 22,946, 22,952-56 ¶¶ 15-24 (2000).
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cable operators need not carry all of the program streams offered by digital
broadcasters who choose to multicast. The FCC reasoned that the must-carry
statute only requires cable operators to provide carriage of a broadcast station’s
“primary video.”465 In the FCC’s opinion, the plain meaning of the term
“primary” and the legislative history both indicated that Congress intended the
must-carry provision to apply only to a single program stream.466
2. Bundling as a Form of Imperfect Price Discrimination

As noted earlier,467 price discrimination offers the promise of bringing the
supposedly conflicting considerations surrounding static and dynamic
efficiency into alignment. It is now generally recognized that bundling
represents one way to effect imperfect price discrimination.468 The seminal
analyses focused on two-product bundles in which the demand for the bundled
products was negatively correlated. In such cases, producers can use the
consumer surplus associated with one of the products to fund the purchase of
the other product, which in turn allows the producer to capture a greater
percentage of the total surplus. The greater the negative correlation of
reservation prices, the more likely that bundling will be profitable.469
This effect can be illustrated with a simple numerical example.470 Assume
that a firm is offering two products to two buyers who both may want to
purchase one or both of the products. The buyers’ reservation prices are noted
in Figure 12.

465

47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3) (2000).
Carriage of Digital Broad. Signals, First Report & Order & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
16 F.C.C.R. 2598, 2620-22 ¶¶ 54-57 (2001).
467 See supra Part 1.E.
468 For recent reviews of this literature, see Gregory S. Crawford, The Discriminatory Incentives to
Bundle 2-4 (June 25, 2001), at http://eller.arizona.edu/~crawford/research/bundling.html, and Barry Nalebuff,
Bundling 1-5 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 99-14, Nov. 22, 1999), at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
abstract_id=185193.
469 The seminal analysis is George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking,
1963 SUP. CT. REV. 152. Stigler’s work was extended by William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen,
Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475 (1976), and Richard Schmalensee,
Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies, 25 J.L. & ECON. 67, 70-71 (1982).
470 The example is taken from Stigler, supra note 469, at 153.
466
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Figure 12
Bundling of Two Products with Negatively Correlated Demands

Buyer A

Buyer B

Product 1

$8.00

$7.00

Product 2

$2.50

$3.00

The key feature is that the buyers’ demands for each product are negatively
correlated, i.e., Buyer A values Product 1 more than Buyer B, with the
opposite being true with respect to Product 2. If the producer sells the products
separately, it will maximize profits by pricing Product 1 at $7 and pricing
Product 2 at $2.50. It would sell two units of each product, earning $19 in
revenue. But if the distributor bundles both products into a single package, it
can sell two such bundles for $10, thereby increasing its revenue to $20.
Subsequent work has revealed that bundling can facilitate price
discrimination even when the buyers’ demands for the bundled products are
independently rather than negatively correlated. In effect, the law of large
numbers dictates that aggregating larger numbers of products lowers the
variance of consumers’ valuations for individual goods when measured on a
per-good basis.471 By reducing the heterogeneity of customers’ preferences,
bundling flattens the aggregate demand curve, which in turn reduces
deadweight loss and makes it easier for the producer to use linear pricing to
capture a larger proportion of the available surplus.472 As Figure 13 indicates,

471 This is because (σ )2 = (σ )2 + (σ )2 + 2ρσ σ , where (σ )2 represents the variance of a bundle of
1+2
1
2
1 2
1+2
goods 1 and 2, and (σ1)2 and (σ2)2 represent the variance of each component. Since (σ1 + σ2)2 = (σ1)2 + (σ2)2 +
2σ1σ2, this implies that σ1+2 ≤ σ1 + σ2. So long as the demands for the components are not perfectly correlated,
the standard deviation of the bundle will be less than the sum of the standard deviations of the components.
See Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand and Commodity Pricing, 57 J. BUS. S211, S219-21 (1984).
472 See Mark Armstrong, Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 151
(1999); Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, 45
MGMT. SCI. 1613, 1614, 1616, 1619 (1999); Crawford, supra note 468, at 4; R. Preston McAfee et al., Multi-
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the variance narrows and the demand flattens still further as the number of
products added to the bundle increases.473
Figure 13
Bundling of Products with Independently Correlated Demands

Put in terms of a simple numerical example, assume that a firm produces
two products. Assume also that individual customers’ willingness to pay for
each product may vary up or down by any amount up to $1, with the price that
the average customer is willing to pay for the first product being $5 and the
price that the average customer is willing to pay for the second being $2. If the
firm offers each product on an unbundled basis at $5 and $2, a person who
valued the first product at $5.50 and who valued the second product at $1.75
would purchase the first product, but not the second. This person would,
however, purchase both products if they were bundled together and offered at a
price of $7. This is because the extent to which this person’s valuation of the

product Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372, 377-80 (1989);
Michael A. Salinger, A Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68 J. BUS. 85, 86, 92-93 (1995); Schmalensee, supra
note 471, at S220, S228.
473 The source for Figure 13 is Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 472, at 1617 fig.1. Note that Figure 13
represents the aggregation of goods whose demand is uniformly distributed across the price space, as
represented in the left-most graph denoting the demand for a single, unbundled good. The effect of
aggregation on the shape of the demand curve of the overall bundle should be the same regardless of the shape
of the demand curve for the component products.

2003]

RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION

1709

first product exceeded $5 (i.e., $0.50) was greater than the extent to which their
valuation of the second product fell short of $2 (i.e., $0.25). The net result of
bundling is to allow the producers to use the excess surplus associated with the
first product to help fund the purchase of the second product. This in turn
allows producers to capture a greater proportion of the available surplus.
In contrast to other forms of imperfect price discrimination, which must
satisfy a relatively restrictive set of preconditions (including a fairly high
degree of knowledge about customer preferences, some mechanism for
segregating different classes of consumers into different price points, and the
ability to prevent arbitrage through resale), bundling permits producers to
reduce deadweight loss and maximize producer surplus in a much simpler
manner. Sellers need only charge a single price without identifying different
types of consumers.474
It should be noted that bundling introduces a possible source of economic
loss that is not possible in single-product sales. As noted earlier,475
maximization of total surplus requires that consumers be able to purchase a
product only when the value that they would derive from consuming it exceeds
the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the good. In other words,
they should only be able to purchase the good if their reservation price exceeds
marginal cost. Using the consumer surplus from one product to fund the
purchase of another may induce some consumers to purchase a bundle even
though their reservation price for a particular component falls below the
marginal cost of that component.476 Such an outcome is, of course, impossible
if the marginal cost is zero, as is the case when consumption of a good is
nonrival. Stated more generally, bundling is more likely to be welfare
enhancing in markets in which marginal costs are relatively low and the spread
between marginal cost and the consumers’ mean reservation price is large.477

474

See id. at 1619.
See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
476 See Adams & Yellen, supra note 469, at 492; Nalebuff, supra note 468, at 3.
477 Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 472, at 1617; Salinger, supra note 472, at 92-95; Schmalensee,
supra note 471, at S228-29; see also Suchan Chae, Bundling Subscription TV Channels: A Case of Natural
Bundling, 10 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 213, 219-20, 226-27 (1992) (concluding that pure bundling represents the
optimal strategy when costs are low, while mixed bundling represents the preferred strategy when costs are
high).
475
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The theoretical literature has often cited television as a prime example of
an industry in which bundling could be employed as a form of imperfect price
discrimination.478 Although some of these analyses have suggested that the
welfare impact of bundling television programming is ambiguous,479 there are
aspects of the television industry that make it more likely that bundling
television network channels would enhance total surplus. By providing
producers with an effective means for capturing surplus that is relatively easy
to administer, bundling promises to increase dynamic efficiency. So long as
program producers have the option to bundle or not to bundle as they see fit (or
alternatively to engage in a practice called “mixed bundling” in which
consumers are free to choose from a menu that includes options to purchase
both bundles or individual components), they will do so only when the practice
increases revenue and, by extension, is most likely to increase total surplus. In
addition, the fact that marginal costs associated with the television industry are
so low as to approach zero makes it unlikely that bundling television networks
will give rise to the unique type of welfare loss that occurs whenever
customers are forced to purchase products even though their reservation price
for those goods falls below the marginal cost of producing them.480
These theoretical results have recently been confirmed by an empirical
study of the impact of bundling in the cable television industry. This study
tested the impact of the addition of each of the top fifteen cable networks to the
bundle of networks that comprised the basic programming package offered by
various cable operators. Although these results are still preliminary, this study
found that, consistent with the theory described above, bundling of cable
television networks caused demand to flatten, with the effect being particularly
pronounced with respect to special-interest networks when compared with
general-interest networks.481 Some rough welfare calculations based on this
data revealed that, again consistent with the theoretical predictions, bundling

478 See, e.g., BESANKO & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 21, at 539-40; CHURCH & WARE, supra note 47, at
169; Chae, supra note 477, at 214-15; Salinger, supra note 472, at 97 n.17; Wildman & Owen, supra note 82,
at 255-58.
479 See Wildman & Owen, supra note 82, at 257-58. This is because bundling can cause another source of
welfare loss resulting from the reduction in the number of instruments available to extract consumer surplus.
If consumer preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous, producers will find that they can extract surplus more
effectively by pricing the goods separately. See Crawford, supra note 468, at 6.
480 See Bakos & Brynjolfsson, supra note 472, at 1626.
481 Crawford, supra note 468, at 14-17, 19.
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causes consumer surplus to fall, while causing total surplus to rise.482 Thus the
belief that bundling will tend to cause total welfare to increase is based on
more than just theory. It is confirmed by empirical data as well.
The implication is that the overall hostility toward multi-channel
technology reflected in current television policy may be exacting a significant
price in terms of the overall quantity, quality, and diversity of television
programming. It also has implications for the efforts undertaken by the FCC
and Congress to impel digital broadcasters to forgo multicasting in favor of
transmitting a single stream of HDTV. The approach taken by the FCC in
rolling out digital television, however, only serves to frustrate the networks’
ability to price discriminate, both by discouraging digital broadcasters from
focusing their efforts on pay television and by placing burdens on the
deployment of multi-channel service, which limits the networks’ ability to use
bundling as a form of imperfect price discrimination. Removing such a bias
would thus be more likely to promote the maximization of both static and
dynamic efficiency.
Perhaps the most complex consideration is whether the principle
disfavoring the promotion of single-channel television over multi-channel
television also supports requiring cable operators to carry all of the program
streams offered by digital broadcasters who choose to multicast. It is arguable
that this principle has no application to what amounts to a tradeoff between
two multi-channel media. Particularly when combined with the general
principle favoring the emergence of new technologies,483 this consideration
would arguably support requiring cable operators to carry all such streams.
Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes clear that favoring multichannel broadcast television over multi-channel cable television cannot be
justified. This is because the welfare losses associated with the producers’
inability to capture the entire surplus are likely to be worse under advertisingsupported television than under pay television.484 In addition, the bundling
analysis advanced above suggests that the providers that are able to bundle

482 Id. at 17-19. These findings contradict Chae’s conclusions that economies of scope, rather than price
discrimination, represent the primary motivation for bundling cable channels and that consumer surplus and
total surplus tend to move together. Chae, supra note 477, at 219-20, 226-27.
483 See infra Part IV.
484 See supra Part III.B.3-4.
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relatively large numbers of networks are likely to be able to extract a higher
proportion of the available surplus than providers limited to smaller-sized
bundles.485 Although the magnitude of this effect depends somewhat on the
structure of viewer demand, this consideration would tend to disfavor efforts to
impose carriage burdens on cable television in order to advantage digital
broadcasters who multicast.
The more fundamental problem with this argument is that it is not my
position that policymakers should reverse their previous willingness to require
multi-channel television services to cross-subsidize single-channel services.
My point is that policymakers should eliminate cross-subsidies altogether.
Thus my criticism of past policy does not in any way suggest support for
imposing an implicit cross-subsidy running in the other direction. On the
contrary, the economic analysis suggests that multi-channel television needs no
such cross-subsidy, because the ability to price discriminate through bundling
will give multi-channel technologies a natural advantage over single-channel
technologies by allowing them to capture a greater proportion of the available
surplus to cover fixed costs. Nor do I mean to suggest that regulators should
force television providers to bundle their networks. Indeed, the theoretical
literature suggests that requiring the bundling of all television networks in all
circumstances may actually cause total welfare to fall.486 It should be
sufficient to eliminate the cross-subsidies running in either direction and to
allow television providers either to bundle their networks or sell their networks
as individual components as they see fit.
IV. ASSESSING THE SECONDARY DISTORTIONS RESULTING FROM THE
COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates how the commitment to free, local
television has had the direct consequence of reducing the overall quantity,
quality, and diversity of television programming available. It is equally
important to recognize that in addition to these primary effects, these
regulations cause important secondary effects that make the welfare losses still
greater. Some of these secondary effects stem from the fact that all of these
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See supra note 473 and accompanying text.
See Adams & Yellen, supra note 469, at 483; McAfee et al., supra note 472, at 374; Schmalensee,
supra note 471, at S228-29.
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policies have tended to preserve and increase the amount of electromagnetic
spectrum devoted to broadcasting. Even when taken by itself, analog
broadcasting represents the single largest commitment of spectrum. Estimates
of the combined value of the spectrum committed to analog and digital
broadcasting run from $32 billion to $202 billion.487
This decision has obvious collateral supply-side consequences on all other
spectrum-based media products. The enormous commitment of spectrum to
the various forms of television broadcasting (especially when combined with
the limitations on broadcasters’ ability to transfer that spectrum to alternative
uses) inevitably increases the cost of all other spectrum-based technologies.
As a result, the public bears the costs by paying higher fees for cellular
telephony, 3G, and other spectrum-based technologies.488
These effects are exacerbated by the cross-subsidy implicit in the other
regulatory features designed to promote broadcasting at the expense of cable
and DBS discussed above. By reducing the revenue generated by cable and
DBS systems, these regulations cause the price of subscribing to cable and
DBS to rise. Thus, not only does the decision to promote free, over-the-air
broadcasting exact costs by reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of
television programming available, it also reduces the accessibility of television
programming and in so doing works to thwart one of the justifications that underlay the enactment of many of these regulations in the first place.489
In addition to these static efficiency considerations, the secondary
distortions resulting from the promotion of free, local television have effects
on dynamic efficiency as well. The burdens placed on the cable industry
inevitably slowed the buildout of the nation’s broadband infrastructure by
retarding the implementation of cable modem service. The increase in cost has
also slowed the deployment of 3G. Furthermore, the amount of spectrum
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See supra notes 183, 233 and accompanying text.
Yoo, supra note 117, at 354-55; see also Hazlett, supra note 372, at 504 (offering a similar observation
with respect to unlicensed spectrum).
489 See Ericksson et al., supra note 329, at 499. Cross-subsidies that penalize one subsector of an industry
to benefit another are also somewhat problematic from the standpoint of fairness, in that rarely is the penalized
subsector responsible for creating the problem being redressed. Doing so makes about as much as sense as
taxing cable operators to pay for the construction of new public schools. To the extent that general concerns of
public welfare form the basis for the subsidy program, those subsidies should be financed out of general
revenues.
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committed to broadcasting has also created administrative problems. In
contrast to European nations, which have already deployed 3G (albeit with less
success than they hoped),490 the FCC remains embroiled in administrative
controversies over which services will be relocated in order to make way for
this new technology.491
The policies designed to promote free, local television have caused
secondary distortions on the demand side as well. Altering the relative prices
of the various spectrum-based services makes broadcast television artificially
attractive and makes cable, DBS, and spectrum-based technologies look
artificially unattractive from an economic standpoint. Because these prices do
not reflect the true costs of these goods, these differences will inevitably cause
consumers to deviate from the most efficient product mix.492
Examination of these collateral consequences further underscores the fact
that there is nothing “free” about free, local television. Although individual
consumers do not have to pay for television services directly, such services
depend on the availability of the massive direct subsidy associated with the
spectrum giveaway as well as the massive cross-subsidies implicit in the
overall regulatory scheme. As a result, consumers must pay for free television
in other ways, either through higher prices, reduced product offerings
associated with other spectrum-based services, or both. Such indirect pricing
mechanisms are unlikely to lead to efficient allocation in the primary market
and inevitably create secondary distortions in other markets, as producers
respond to the artificial prices set by such subsidies by combining substitute
inputs in combinations that are less economically efficient.
CONCLUSION
The classic approach to television regulation frames the basic policy issue
as an irreconcilable conflict between two countervailing forces. On the one
hand are considerations of static efficiency, which demand that price be set as
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low as possible. On the other hand are considerations of dynamic efficiency,
which require that price be set high enough to generate sufficient revenues to
cover the fixed costs of producing the television program in the first place.
Any single-part price chosen would generate too much revenue from the
standpoint of static efficiency and too little revenue from the standpoint of
dynamic efficiency. Thus any resolution of this conflict allegedly necessitated
a choice from among second-best outcomes.
The integrated analysis developed in this Article offers a way to bring these
supposedly opposing forces into alignment. Both static and dynamic
efficiency can be maximized if the producer is able to appropriate the entire
surplus created by its product. A producer that is able to capture the entire
surplus achieves static efficiency by allowing every person who places a
positive value on the product to purchase it. Indeed, even the marginal
customer who places only a nominal value on the product is able to consume it
for free. Producers who appropriate the entire surplus also achieve dynamic
efficiency by allowing products to be produced whenever the total benefits
created by the product exceed the costs associated with creating it (which in
the case of nonrival goods consist solely of fixed costs). So long as the
revenue generated exceeds the fixed costs, the product will be made, and
revenue represents a good proxy for the total benefits created by the product so
long as the proportion of surplus appropriated by the producer remains
relatively high. The amount of the surplus that the producer is unable to
capture will determine whether a socially beneficial product does not get
produced. Although enhancing the appropriability of surplus may allow some
producers to earn short-run profits, the free entry made possible by the
nonexistence of barriers to entry ensures that any such profits will not be
sustainable.
This transformation has profound economic and policy implications. It
makes room for policy decisions by identifying ways to promote static and
dynamic efficiency simultaneously. In so doing, it reveals the supposedly
irreconcilable conflict between static and dynamic efficiency to be a false one.
Furthermore, it transforms the transfer of surplus from consumers to producers
from a consideration that has no effect on efficiency into a necessary condition
for efficiency. In any event, whatever distributional consequences that may
have been thought to exist will be limited by the fact that free entry will
dissipate supra-competitive profits in most cases.
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Appropriability of surplus in turn depends on two considerations. First,
consumers must be able to use prices to signal the intensity of their
preferences. Second, producers must be able to engage in price discrimination.
The standard model of perfect competition has long regarded price
discrimination with suspicion, taking it as evidence of monopoly or oligopoly
power. Price discrimination takes on a far different cast in the context of
public good economics, because it is a common feature of competitive markets
whenever products are differentiated and whenever joint costs are spread over
multiple purchasers. In neither case is it necessarily evidence of substantial
monopoly power.
The power of the analysis is demonstrated quite persuasively by applying it
to the market for television programming to evaluate the longstanding policy
of attempting to promote free, local television, which I suggest should be
disaggregated into four smaller subcommitments. What emerges is a
theoretical explanation for why these historical efforts have failed to produce
the desired results. The theory reveals how past attempts to promote free, local
television might well have reduced the overall quantity, quality, and diversity
of television programming and made it harder for any programming that
appeals only to small audiences (such as locally oriented programming) to
survive. It also demonstrates how the market for television programming lends
itself to a technique known as bundling, which represents a form of price
discrimination that is relatively easy to implement. These theoretical results
are backed up with empirical findings with respect to each of the
subcommitments.
Finally, my analysis shows how the commitment to free, local television
has had the inevitable consequence of artificially raising the prices of other
spectrum-based communications media and of impeding the deployment of
new spectrum-based services, such as 3G wireless devices. Consequently, the
fundamental policy commitments identified above have caused economic
harms in the here and now and have harmed dynamic efficiency by artificially
discouraging investment in new programming and new television technologies.
This analysis should be of obvious interest to those inclined to define the
goals of television policy exclusively in economic terms. There are also two
reasons why it should also be of interest to those who would define these goals
in noneconomic terms. First, my analysis shows how elimination of the
historical policies designed to promote free, local television should allow a
richer variety of programming to appear, which should reduce the need to

2003]

RETHINKING THE COMMITMENT TO FREE, LOCAL TELEVISION

1717

promote directly many of the types of merit programming usually advanced by
commentators who have adopted noneconomic approaches. Indeed, those who
value diversity for its own sake would find it best promoted if producers were
able to capture as much revenue as possible.493
As a result, allowing the market to function more efficiently will both
lower the cost and minimize the First Amendment concerns associated with
any such programs by narrowing the extent to which the government will need
to intervene in order to further these goals. In addition, this Article
underscores the extent to which the economic analysis points out the price
exacted by the traditional forms of regulatory intervention and underscores the
importance of determining whether a particular regulatory device is likely to
promote or frustrate policymakers’ goals.
Ever since Newt Minow’s classic speech condemning broadcast television
as a “Vast Wasteland,”494 it has been fashionable to disparage the quality of
television programming and to use its poor quality as justification to call for
more regulation. My analysis indicates that, somewhat ironically, the relative
mediocrity of the current programming environment may in part be the result
of regulatory decisions rather than a problem that must be redressed. A better
understanding of the distinctive economic characteristics of television
programming reveals that in this instance regulation is the cause rather than the
consequence of this phenomenon. The insights provided by my analysis
should also help us avoid the pitfalls of the past and design regulatory steps
that are less likely to be part of the problem and more likely to be part of the
solution.
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